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Summary 
 
Birks’ unjust enrichment formula was intended to provide a common descriptive structure to all 
the instances where there was recovery. He did not, however, engage in an analysis of the various 
reasons why courts awarded restitution. My thesis seeks to fill this gap. I argue that without such 
an account Birks work is incomplete. According to Birks, for example, money and services both 
amounted to enrichments and so should be considered together. But there are some differences 
and similarities between money and services. In order to be able to group them together Birks 
needs to be able to say that the reasons for giving recovery in money and service cases are similar 
enough that they can be grouped together. The same goes for all the unjust factors. The point is, 
the generalisation that Birks sought to do, can only properly be done if one is attuned to the reasons 
why recovery is granted in each of those cases. If the reasons are similar then the generalisation 
makes sense. But if they are not then it does not make sense to so generalise. 
 The argument of the thesis is that there three relevant principles to justifying unjust 
enrichment: the Property Principle, the Benefit-Burden Principle and the Autonomy Principle. The 
Property Principle states that one should not have property belonging to another. The Benefit-
Burden Principle states that if one takes a benefit then one must bear the associated burdens; to 
put it more colloquially: you have to take the rough with the smooth. These first two principles 
provide reasons for considering a situation to be defective and the last principle provides a 
constraint for the operation of the first two. It is there to ensure that the imposition of liability will 
not unduly affect the autonomy of the defendant. Based on that the thesis proposes that the scope 
of the unjust enrichment formula be trimmed down to only cover defective transfers of money 
and other assets. For the other cases, a different analytical structure is needed. This is because the 
reasons for recovery in those cases are different. 
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I. ABSTRACT 
 
When Peter Birks wrote his Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) he distinguished between two 
different conceptions of ‘unjust enrichment’. There was what he called ‘the generic conception of 
all events giving rise to restitution’ and there was the ‘principle against unjust enrichment’. The 
former was descriptive generalisation of all of the set of facts where the law would award 
restitution. In order to get it to he started from the core case of a mistaken payment of money. He 
generalised money to ‘enrichment’, payment to ‘at the expense of’, and mistake to ‘unjust’. 
According to Birks all of restitution fitted within this model. The model, however, was amoral. So, 
for Birks ‘unjust’ was a term of art which meant nothing more than ‘the circumstances where the 
law grants restitution’. It did not important any moral or political concepts. It was descriptive, not 
prescriptive.  
 Birks contrasted this ‘generic conception’ with the moral principle against unjust 
enrichment. Such a principle appealed to moral notions and was prescriptive. It said that that law 
must reverse unjust enrichments. Birks was critical of this concept and thought it ought to be 
abandoned in favour of the ‘generic conception’. Birks’s criticism was that either unjust enrichment 
meant ‘enrichments that are morally unjust’ or it meant ‘enrichments which the law considers to 
be unjust’. If it is the former then the principle was invitation to do Palm Tree justice. It is the latter 
then this prescriptive principle simply amounts to saying ‘the law must be respected’ and hence is 
a useless truism.  
 Birks’s rejection of the principle against unjust enrichment creates two problems for his 
generic conception. The first is that it threatens the unity thereof. According to Birks, for example, 
money and services both amounted to enrichments and so should be considered together. But 
there are some differences and similarities between money and services. In order to be able to 
group them together Birks needs to be able to say that the reasons for giving recovery in money 
and service cases are similar enough that they can be grouped together. The same goes for all the 
unjust factors. The point is, the generalisation that Birks sought to do, can only properly be done 
if one is attuned to the reasons why recovery is granted in each of those cases. If the reasons are 
similar then the generalisation makes sense. But if they are not then it does not make sense to so 
generalise. 
 The second problem for Birks is that this makes the ‘generic conception’ useless is new 
cases which do not fit within any of the existing categories. How is the judge to decide such a case 
using Birks’s ‘generic conception’ if it is merely descriptive and not prescriptive. Birks’s answer was 
to reason by analogy. But analogies cannot be made simply on the basis of facts alone. Some facts 
are relevant whilst others are irrelevant. And in order to pick out what the relevant and irrelevant 
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facts are one must consider the reasons why restitution is granted in the established cases and see 
whether those reasons apply in the new case. 
 Notwithstanding those two theoretical defects, Birks’s theory was quite successful. This 
was because, implicitly, Birks’s theory traded on the intuitive plausibility of the principle against 
unjust enrichment. It was appropriate to classify a mistaken payment of money, the payment of 
unlawful taxes, and the ability of a surety to recoup the sum he paid to discharge a debt, under the 
‘generic conception of unjust enrichment’ because all such situations involve what a layperson 
would recognise as ‘unjust enrichments’. But the question that needs to be asked, and which Birks 
did not want to ask, was why we recognise that all those situations are ‘unjust enrichments’ which 
the law ought to correct. 
 It is this question which this thesis seeks to answer: what are the reasons for considering 
that these situations are unjust enrichments? There are three possible ways of answering this 
question. The first is a complete tabula rasa, we would seek to ask two questions: (i) in what 
circumstances ought there to be recovery and (ii) why. The second approach would take as given 
the instances where the law accords recovery but would seek to answer the second question without 
reference to reasoning given in the cases. The final approach would also take as given the instances 
where there is recovery and would seek to identify the reasons for recovery from within the cases 
and contemporaneous commentaries. In a recent case Lord Reed gave a strong endorsement of 
the third approach, saying that ‘wisdom of our predecessors is a valuable resource’. It is this 
approach that this thesis takes. 
 The general argument of this thesis is that, contra Birks, the principle against unjust 
enrichment is not an invitation to Palm Tree justice because it is mediated by other more specific 
principles. It is those principles which allow us to characterise certain situations as defective. 
Although the reasons for those defects are different, all such situations share a similarity: namely 
that the defect consists of someone having a benefit that they ought not to have had. Hence, all 
such defective situations are properly be grouped within the rubric of ‘unjust enrichment’. The 
principle against unjust enrichment then prescribes that the law ought to do something to remedy 
those situations. However, the response that the law takes will vary from each situation. This will 
depend on what the reasons for the defect were. 
 The argument of thesis is that there three relevant principles: the Property Principle, the 
Benefit-Burden Principle and the Autonomy Principle. The Property Principle states that one 
should not have property belonging to another. The Benefit-Burden Principle states that if one 
takes a benefit then one must bear the associated burdens; to put it more colloquially: you have to 
take the rough with the smooth. These first two principles provide reasons for considering a 
situation to be defective and the last principle provides a constraint for the operation of the first 
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two. It is there to ensure that the imposition of liability will not unduly affect the autonomy of the 
defendant.  
 Those principles are identified by looking at the cases and associated commentaries from 
the 18th century onwards. The thesis argues that it is the Property Principle which was the 
explanation given in the cases and commentaries for recovery of money and goods from the late 
18th century until the 1960s. It argues that cases of recoupment, contribution, unrequested rescue 
of lives and property were explained by the Benefit-Burden Principle. Finally, it argues that cases 
of quantum meruit were explained by a mediation between the Benefit-Burden Principle and the 
Autonomy Principle (specifically in the need to respect the contract arrangements of the parties).  
 Because of the methodology adopted the thesis does not aim to mount a full-blown defence 
of those principles. Instead, it notes that these are the principles that have shaped the law and 
understanding them is necessary to properly understand the law as it is today. Nonetheless, the 
thesis does attempt to flesh them out in a manner consistent with the historical sources. The thesis 
then concludes by looking at the implications of this for the law of unjust enrichment. It argues 
that the Birksian model is premised on identifying normatively defective transactions (and not 
merely defective situations), this fits well with the Property Principle but not with the others. 
Hence, it argues that the Birksian analytical framework is best suited to the money and goods cases 
but not for services or non-returnable unrequested benefits. Those cases are best served with 
having a different analytical framework. Fortunately, there is no need to reinvent the wheel because 
such different analytical frameworks already exist. The temptation that needs to be resisted is to 
consider that, because in the wide sense such cases are all about unjust enrichment, the Birksian 
analytical framework ought to apply to them. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND 
OVERVIEW 
 
At least since 1998, with the House of Lords’ decision in Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Parc 
(Battersea) Ltd,1 a common assumption in unjust enrichment scholarship and case law is that every 
instance of unjust enrichment can fit within the four-stage formula:  
(i) enrichment of D,  
(ii) at the expense of C,  
(iii) an unjust factor,  
(iv) any defences.  
In other words, the four-stage formula defines unjust enrichment. That is not to say that unjust 
enrichment itself is a cause of action. Rather, the formula represents a class of causes of actions 
with the variable being the unjust factor. Hence, there is, for example, a cause of action to recover 
taxes unlawfully levied and another to recover money paid under a mistake.2 But the essential point 
remains: there is a common structure and the whole of unjust enrichment must fit within that 
structure. This is why all the leading textbooks order the material by following that structure.3 Of 
course there are debates over what falls within unjust enrichment,4 and indeed debates over what 
the formula should be (should it be unjust factors or absence of basis?).5 There have also been 
wholesale critiques of unjust enrichment.6 But, crucially, none of those debates have questioned 
the definition of all instances of unjust enrichment in terms of the formula.  
                                                 
1 [1999] 1 AC 221 (UKHL). 
2 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioner [2014] EWHC 4302 (Ch) [248] 
(Henderson J). 
3 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2015); A Burrows, The Law of 
Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford Universtiy Press 2011); A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford University Press 2012); C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson, Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016). 
4 See e.g. Virgo arguing that maritime salvage is not part of unjust enrichment because it does not fit within the 
‘enrichment’ limb: (n 3) 295, 305. 
5 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) ch 6; Burrows, The Law of Restitution (n 3) ch 5; 
Virgo (n 3) 127–132. 
6 S Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (2nd edn, The Law Book Company of Australia 1989); P Jaffey, The Nature and 
Scope of Restitution: Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts and Disgorgement (Hart Publishing 2000); P Jaffey, ‘The Unjust 
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 The aim of this thesis is to challenge that assumption.  It will be argued that there are two 
senses of ‘unjust enrichment’ which need to be distinguished.  The first is the formulaic, which is 
narrowly defined and technical. It is primarily intended to be descriptive of what the law does (‘if the 
following elements are met then the law will award recovery’). That conception of unjust 
enrichment is relatively new, having been invented by Birks in 1985.  
The second sense is wider. It is unjust enrichment as lay people might understand it. It is a 
fuzzier concept and is intended to prescribe what the law should do (‘a just legal system ought to 
correct unjust enrichments’). It is an old concept, which can be traced back to the Roman Law. It 
first appeared in English language legal scholarship in 1888 when Ames argued that it underpinned 
what used to be called ‘Quasi-Contract’.7 The vagueness of that principle combined with its 
prescriptive formulation led to accusations that it was a sloppy concept which was an invitation to 
‘palm tree justice’. Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter 2, it was in response to those criticisms that 
Birks created the formulaic conception. 
In this thesis it will be argued that both concepts are important. The wide sense is indeed 
too abstract to be used directly by the courts. It must be mediated by more specific rules, which is 
what the formula does. But the formulaic concept also needs the abstract conception of unjust 
enrichment. This is because, if the formulaic conception operates alone, it is purely descriptive. It 
cannot help resolve new cases nor can it serve as a justification for the existence of this body of 
law. So, the concepts must complement and support each other. However, and this is a key claim 
of the thesis, it is not the case that one of the concepts must be defined in terms of the other.  In 
particular, it will be argued that the normative concept of unjust enrichment is wider than the 
formulaic one. So, the thesis argues that not much of unjust enrichment in the normative/moral 
sense should actually be captured by the formula. This is not to say that there should be no 
recovery. Indeed, the point of saying that they are unjust enrichments in the normative/moral sense 
is that the law should give recovery. Rather, the point is that only some of those circumstances are 
best accounted for by the formula. For the others it is preferable to use a different analytical 
structure to consider when a court ought to give recovery. The following table represents the 
conclusion of the thesis about which instances fall within each of the two types of unjust 
enrichment. 
 
                                                 
Enrichment Fallacy and Private Law’ (2013) 26 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 115; S Hedley, Restitution: 
Its Division and Ordering (Sweet & Maxwell 2001); S Hedley, ‘Implied Contract and Restitution’ (2004) 63 Cambridge 
Law Journal 435; P Watts, ‘Restitution - A Property Principle and A Services Principle’ [1995] Restitution Law 
Review 49; P Watts, ‘“Unjust Enrichment”—the Potion That Induces Well-Meaning Sloppiness of Thought’ (2016) 
69 Current Legal Problems 289. 
7 JB Ames, ‘The History of Assumpsit II. Implied Assumpsit’ (1888) 2 Harvard Law Review 53. 
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Normative/Moral Unjust Enrichment Descriptive/Formulaic Unjust Enrichment 
• Reversal of defective transfers of 
money/goods/other returnable 
things/rights 
• Recoupment/Contribution 
• Reimbursement for the performance 
of another’s obligation 
• General average 
• Agency of necessity 
• Berkeley Applegate8 orders 
• Supply of necessaries to an incapax 
• Quantum meruit 
• In some cases, use of 
subrogation/rectification to fix 
transactions (e.g. Menelaou v Bank of 
Cyprus)9 
• Reversal of defective transfers of 
money/goods/other returnable 
things/rights 
 
 
 
Why is this?  As it is argued in Chapter 2, the unjust enrichment formula has two main flaws. The 
first flaw, one might call it Birks’s original sin, is that it was intentionally designed without any 
reference to the reasons why recovery was awarded in each of the cases. But a unified formulaic 
structure only makes sense if the reasons for recovery in each case that it covers are the same (or, 
at least, similar enough). The second flaw is caused by the first. In order to make everything fit 
within the formula the elements of the formula had to be extended to their breaking point. So 
much so that it is now recognised that ‘enrichment’ and ‘unjust’ are just ‘terms of art’ which mean 
nothing more than ‘what the law considers to be an enrichment’ and ‘circumstances where the law 
will reverse a transfer a value’.10 This, however, is simply circular. It empties the formula of any real 
content and it means that there is no internal coherence to it. The consequence of this has been a 
great deal of confusion as to how the formula should be applied. 
                                                 
8 Re Berkeley Applegate (Investment Consultants) No 1 [1989] Ch 32 (Ch). 
9 Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus Plc [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176. 
10 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 1985) 19; Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson 
(n 3) paras 4–04; Crown Prosecution Service v Eastenders Group [2014] UKSC 26, [2015] AC 1 [100] (Lord Toulson). 
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 Having conducted the autopsy of the formula, the thesis then sets out to fix the problem 
by addressing the original sin. There has to be an investigation of the reasons why, prior to Birks’s 
formula being adopted, the law considered that certain situations amounted to unjust enrichments 
that had to be remedied. The method employed in this thesis is not to reinvent the wheel but to 
look at the cases and associated commentary since the 18th century and to extract from them what 
the reasons for recovery were.  This investigation reveals that the reasons why recovery was 
awarded was to do with the interplay between three principles: The Property Principle, The Benefit-
Burden Principle and The Autonomy Principle.  The first two play a positive role by identifying 
prima facie reasons why there should be recovery in certain situations. The final one has a limiting 
role; it ensured that the first two principles did not lead to a situation where the autonomy of the 
defendant was unduly infringed.  
The Property Principle broadly states that someone should not have the benefit of assets 
belonging to another.  But, crucially, the notion of belonging is not merely legal but can also be 
moral.  As will be shown in Chapter 3, this principle explained the recovery of defective transfers 
of money and of other goods. For (good) reasons not to do with the parties, the law considered 
that there had been a legally valid transfer of title notwithstanding a defect in the intention of the 
claimant.  This created a situation where the defendant was now the legal owner of assets which 
the claimant did not really intend for him to have. In this situation the law considered that the 
claimant was ‘ex aequo et bono’ still the owner of such assets and so awarded a remedy to the 
claimant to reflect that. This way the ‘ex aequo et bono’ ownership could be protected whilst not 
undermining the reasons why legal title actually passed in the first place. 
The Benefit-Burden Principle reflects adages that we learn at our mother’s knee: ‘you 
cannot blow hot and cold’; ‘you cannot have your cake and eat it too’; ‘you have to take the rough 
with the smooth’. Slightly more formally it requires that if one has the benefit of something then 
one has to bear the associated burdens. In Roman Law the principle was used to justify General 
Average. As argued in Chapter 4, such justification was subsequently adopted in English Law and 
spread to justifying contribution, for example, between co-sureties, recoupment, recovery for the 
discharge of another’s obligations, recovery by the agent of necessity, recovery for unlocking or 
improving another’s asset. Broadly, all cases of the recovery of unrequested non-returnable benefits 
fall within this principle. The idea is that the defendant has received a benefit (for example, the 
discharge of his debt) but the claimant has involuntarily borne the burden. This breach of the 
Benefit-Burden Principle leads to a situation of unjust enrichment which the law, therefore, has to 
cure. But the law does not do so by reversing the benefit: if my surety discharges my debt to X, the 
law does not make me owe money to X again. Rather, the law acts by shifting the burden from the 
surety who bore it to me, who had enjoyed the benefit without the burden. 
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Chapter 5 considers non-returnable benefits (typically, services) that have been requested 
(or freely accepted). Here it is argued that recovery for such services in the absence of an explicit 
contract is justified by the Benefit-Burden Principle and is not due to the parties promising to pay 
for it. This is because it is not true that a request for services (knowing that they are not provided 
gratuitously) necessarily implies a promise to pay for them.  No doubt, most honest people actually 
do make that promise (if only implicitly), but this is not necessarily the case. Yet, in the absence of 
an obligation to pay for the services, we would have a breach of the Benefit-Burden Principle and, 
since there was an opportunity to reject or agree to other terms of remuneration, the imposition 
by law of an obligation to pay a reasonable sum does not contravene the Autonomy Principle. This 
is not to say that, in cases where there is no other agreement between the parties, such an obligation 
is inappropriately considered contractual. It is indeed contractual, but this does not mean that it 
was positively willed by the parties.  
Matters, however, get more complicated where the parties have reached an agreement 
concerning the provision of services. This can lead to a situation, for example where the obligation 
is an entire one or where the contract is unenforceable, where services have been provided but 
there is no contractual obligation on the other party to pay for them. This will, for example, be the 
case if there has only been part performance of an entire obligation.  In such a situation the law 
will not normally award a reasonable sum for the work done so far; the bargain has to be respected 
because of the Autonomy Principle. But there are some instances where this will not be the case. 
Suppose that the reason the claimant could not complete the work was because the defendant has, 
in breach of contract, prevented him from doing so. If the claimant brings a quantum meruit action 
to recover the value of the work done so far, can the defendant seek to defeat the claim by pointing 
out that the contract created an entire obligation?  The courts have held that he could not plead 
that.11 This was because, having so breached the contract, the defendant could not then seek to 
invoke the protection of that same contract. So, again, the Benefit-Burden Principle intervened. 
Services, then, are an area where recovery is determined by a fine-tuned mediation between the 
Benefit-Burden Principle and the Autonomy Principle. 
Chapter 6 concludes by bringing all the threads together. It explains how the principles 
operate together to generate reasons explaining why certain situations are considered defective, 
how such defects can broadly be characterised as unjust enrichment, and how the law responds to 
such defects. It argues that there are three responses that the law takes: (i) returning the benefit, (ii) 
shifting the burden and, (iii) fixing the transaction.  
The first applies in cases underpinned by the Property Principle and to the few cases 
underpinned by the Benefit-Burden Principle where the benefit is returnable. Such cases are well 
                                                 
11 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Section II.A.4 ‘Making Sense of it all’.  
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suited to the unjust enrichment formula. They seek the reversal of a transaction and the touchstone 
of liability is the enrichment of the defendant.  
The second applies where the Benefit-Burden Principle does the work but where the 
benefit cannot be returned. In such a case the law responds to the injustice by shifting the burden 
so that both the benefit and the burden are borne by the same person. Here the formula is not 
appropriate. There is no reversal or return to the status quo ante. The focus of the liability is not 
actually the gain of the defendant but the loss of the claimant. This does not mean that the reason 
for recovery is loss based; it is because of unjust enrichment. But the way the law cures this unjust 
enrichment is by shifting the loss from the claimant to the defendant, because shifting the loss will 
mean that there will no longer be a breach of the Benefit-Burden Principle (and hence there will 
no longer be an unjust enrichment). 
The final response arises in situations where the transaction does not go as planned in a 
way that results in an unjust enrichment because, for example, someone receives a benefit without 
the associated burdens they were also meant to received. So, for example, in Menelaou v Bank of 
Cyprus, the defendant was meant to receive a house with a charge by the bank on it. Due to the 
negligence of the solicitors she received the house without the charge.  The law can respond to 
such situations by reversing the whole transaction, but it has an alternative course of action: it can 
fix the transaction so that it operates as originally intended. This is what the law did in Menelaou v 
Bank of Cyprus by giving the bank a charge over the house. Again, in such cases the use of the 
formula is not appropriate as the law is not actually seeking to reverse the transaction or getting 
the defendant to return the benefit. 
The thesis concludes by restating the elements needed to be established for recovery in the 
other cases not covered by the formula. In all such cases the law already has (or at least had) distinct 
analytical structures to apply. So, there is no need to reinvent the wheel by artificial expansion of 
unjust enrichment. 
CHAPTER 2: THE PROBLEMS WITH 
BIRKS’S CONCEPTION OF UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
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I. TWO CONCEPTS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT: MORAL 
AND DESCRIPTIVE 
 
 
Peter Birks defined unjust enrichment as the ‘generic conception of all events which give rise to 
restitution’.1 By that he meant the set of facts on which the law will award restitution. Birks would 
go on to give a very clear structure for organising such events: a benefit had to be received by the 
defendant at the expense of the claimant and such receipt had to be unjust. Such a structure was 
subsequently accepted by the courts.2 But the evaluation of whether the receipt is ‘unjust’ does not 
‘invite appeals to abstract conceptions of justice derived from whatever moral and political values 
might best suit a party’s case’.3 Instead, the meaning of ‘unjust’ was ‘downward-looking to the 
cases’,4 so ‘[n]o enrichment can be regarded as unjust, disapproved or reversible unless it happens 
in circumstances in which the law provides for restitution.’5 Such an account is purely descriptive. 
It does not tell us the reason, other than deference to authority, why restitution should be awarded. 
That Birks defined unjust enrichment in this way amounted to a complete reversal of the role unjust 
enrichment had previously played in the legal literature. There, unjust enrichment was understood 
as a principle of justice which explained why the courts were awarding recovery. 
 This understanding of unjust enrichment is the one which Robert Goff and Gareth Jones 
followed in their seminal Law of Restitution in 1966; ‘“Unjust Enrichment” is, simply, the name 
which is commonly given to the principle of justice which the law recognises and gives effect to in 
a wide variety of claims of this kind.’6 This understanding predated Goff and Jones. The first time the 
phrase ‘Unjust Enrichment’ was mentioned in Anglophone legal scholarship was in 1887 in an 
article by William Keener concerning recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact. He wrote 
that: 
 
The equitable principle which enables A to recover in this case, as in quasi-contractual obligations generally, 
is the principle of enrichment: "One shall not be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another;" 
or, as it is usually stated in the common law, "One shall not unjustly profit at the expense of another."7 
 
                                                 
1 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 1985) 17. 
2 Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (UKHL) 227 (Lord Steyn). 
3 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 19. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid. 
6 R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1966) 11. 
7 W Keener, ‘Recovery of Money Paid Under Mistake of Fact’ (1887) 1 Harvard Law Review 211, 211. 
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A year later, James Barr Ames also explained that the equitable principle of unjust enrichment was 
the foundation of quasi-contracts.8 Both Keener and Ames used ‘equitable’ in the sense of moral, 
rather than in the sense of that which concerns the Chancery jurisdiction. Neither of them 
suggested that courts, when deciding cases, should directly use ‘unjust enrichment’. This meant 
that for them unjust enrichment had a much wider scope than it does under the Birksian structure. 
So, unjust enrichment was used to explain cases of waiver of tort9 (what we would now call 
restitution for wrongs), and constructive trusts were said to arise to prevent unjust enrichment.10 
The first treatises published on quasi-contract confirmed that approach. Keener11 (published in 
1893), Woodward12 (published in 1913), and Seavey and Scott’s Restatement13 (published in 1937) all 
identify unjust enrichment as the founding principle of the subject, but do not attempt to use it to 
organise the cases. Instead the organisation is by type of situations: money paid by mistake, services 
provided without request, informal contracts, supply of necessaries, discharge of debts, etc. There 
was no suggestion that there was a common analytical structure, let alone that such a structure 
would be in terms of (i) enrichment, (ii) at the expense of, (iii) unjust factors, and (iv) defences. 
 The first non-American texts published – Winfield,14 Kersley,15 Munkman16 and Stoljar17 – 
also followed a similar structure. Admittedly, Munkman’s account was slightly different in that it 
organised the subject in terms of the common counts used – money had and received, quantum 
valebat, quantum meruit, money paid. But still, there was no suggestion that unjust enrichment 
provided a common analytical structure. Unjust enrichment was the moral foundation of the 
subject, but it had no role in structuring the subject, let alone in guiding the decision of judges. 
 The perception that unjust enrichment might have an adjudicatory role was the principle 
ground of opposition to it. Hamilton LJ (as Lord Sumner then was) famously said that ‘we are not 
now free in the twentieth century to administer that vague jurisprudence which is sometimes 
                                                 
8 JB Ames, ‘The History of Assumpsit II. Implied Assumpsit’ (1888) 2 Harvard Law Review 53. 
9 W Keener, ‘Waiver Of Tort’ (1892) 6 Harvard Law Review 223; GH Wald, ‘The Law of Quasi-Contract’ (1898) 14 
Law Quarterly Review 253. 
10 Ames, ‘The History of Assumpsit II. Implied Assumpsit’ (n 8) 64; JB Ames, ‘The Failure of the “Tilden Trust”’ 
(1892) 5 Harvard Law Review 389; JB Ames, ‘Can A Murderer Acquire Title By His Crime and Keep It?’ (1897) 36 
The American Law Register and Review 225. 
11 W Keener, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Baker, Voorhis and Company 1893). 
12 F Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Little, Brown, and Company 1913). 
13 Seavey and Scott, Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Quasi-Contracts and Constructive Trusts (American Law Institute 
1937). 
14 PH Winfield, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell 1952). 
15 RH Kersley, Quasi-Contract (The Law Notes Publishing Offices 1932). 
16 J Munkman, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons 1950). 
17 S Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (1st edn, The Law Book Company of Australia 1964). 
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attractively styled “justice as between man and man.”’18 His concerns were shared by a number of 
academics during a dispute in the 1920s and 1930s concerning unjust enrichment and implied 
contract. The defenders of the implied contract were Hanbury, Landon and Holdsworth (‘the 
traditionalists’). On the other side, defending unjust enrichment, were Winfield, Lord Wright, 
David, Gutteridge and Friedman (‘the modernists’). A detailed examination of this debate is beyond 
the scope of this thesis19 but a short account is in order. The traditionalists argued against the 
recognition of unjust enrichment as a separate legal category. Their concern was that the courts 
would have too much discretion if their decisions were based on what ‘aequo et bono’ required. 
The modernists countered by arguing that implied contract was based on a fiction and that the 
courts would not be deciding cases based on what they felt was fair but rather based on precedent, 
although some concept of fairness was still necessary to develop the law. The traditionalists’ 
rejoinder was to accept this, but they argued that this was already happening within implied 
contract; changing to unjust enrichment would bring the risk of too much uncertainty, so ‘if it ain’t 
broke, why fix it?’ Holdsworth put the dividing line between the two camps in terms of what 
question they wanted to ask: ‘Is it fair that the Court should imply a contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant?' and not 'Is it fair that the defendant should make a repayment?'20  
One can sympathise with Lord Simonds in calling the dispute ‘arid’.21 In this whole 
dispute RM Jackson made what was probably the most illuminating comment: 
 
The aequum et bonum theory was not the basis of the action but the basis for deciding when the law will 
imply a contract. Adopting the language used by Salmon for describing sources of law we can say that 
aequum et bonum was the material source of the obligation, but that the formal source was a contract implied 
in law.22 
 
In other words, the modernisers argued that: 
 
(i) Unjust enrichment was the normative/moral foundation of quasi-contracts,  
(ii) it was fictional of the judges to talk in terms of whether they should be implying a contract, so  
(iii) judges should explicitly acknowledge that what they were doing is reversing unjust enrichments, 
but  
                                                 
18 Baylis v Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch 127 (EWCA) 140 (Hamilton LJ). 
19 For a summary, along with the references, see S Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (2nd edn, The Law Book 
Company of Australia 1989) 2–5. 
20 WS Holdsworth, ‘Unjustifiable Enrichment’ (1939) 55 Law Quarterly Review 37, 48. 
21 Ministry of Health v Simpson [1951] AC 251 (UKHL) 275 (Lord Simonds). 
22 RM Jackson, A History of Quasi-Contract (Cambridge University Press 1936) 119. 
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(iv) in doing so, they should follow established precedents, and  
(v) they should not make decisions based on whether, intuitively, something is an unjust 
enrichment (and so should be reversed).  
 
The traditionalists agreed with the modernisers on (i), (ii), (iv) and (v), but rejected (iii). They did 
so because (a) they did not see the use of the implied contract fiction as being inherently bad (and 
so ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’) and (b) they feared that the use by courts of unjust enrichment 
would lead the courts to ignore constraints (iv) and (v). Looking at some of the recent cases decided 
by the English courts23 one can see that the traditionalists were by no means being unreasonable in 
having those fears. For example, in TFL Management Ltd v Lloyds24 the Court of Appeal used unjust 
enrichment as a justification for ignoring precedent decided before 1991, when the House of Lords 
first recognised the unjust enrichment principle.25 
 This debate between traditionalists and modernisers explains the significance of what Birks 
did. When Birks was looking at the Law of Restitution in the 1980s it appeared that the 
traditionalists had won. True, implied contract had been rejected by the mid 20th Century, but 
unjust enrichment was not recognised as a legal principle either. In 1978 Lord Diplock had said 
that: 
 
There is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law. What it does is to provide 
specific remedies in particular cases of what might be classified as unjust enrichment in a legal system that is 
based on the civil law.26  
   
 It is of course true that there were more favourable statements regarding unjust enrichment. Lord 
Wright, for example, had said that:  
 
It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called 
unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit 
derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are 
generically different from remedies in contract or tort, and are now recognised to fall within a third 
category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.27 
 
                                                 
23 Collected in P Watts, ‘“Unjust Enrichment”—the Potion That Induces Well-Meaning Sloppiness of Thought’ 
(2016) 69 Current Legal Problems 289. 
24 TFL Management Services Ltd v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1415, [2014] 1 WLR 2006. 
25 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 (UKHL). 
26 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95 (UKHL) 104 (Lord Diplock). 
27 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 (UKHL) 61 (Lord Wright). 
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But there was no suggestion that unjust enrichment would or should have any adjudicatory 
relevance. Yes, unjust enrichment could be used to describe and delineate doctrinal categories and 
as a moral principle it could explain why recovery was granted in certain cases. But it was not a 
cause of action or a class of causes of action, and, when deciding cases, courts did not need to pay 
any attention to it. In that sense it was similar to the principle that ‘loss wrongfully caused should 
be compensated’. Almost all the torts can be grouped under that principle; it serves to delineate 
tort from other obligations and as a general moral principle it explains why the law does what it 
does. But there is no suggestion that this can be pleaded in court or that courts should decide a 
case by asking whether there was a loss which was caused by a wrong.28 Unjust enrichment was 
just like that.  
The traditionalists had succeeded in their main objective. The challenge for Birks was, 
therefore, to construct a theory of unjust enrichment (as an adjudicatory tool for courts) which 
would accommodate the concerns of the traditionalists. He did so by inverting the problem. He 
rejected any moral principle of unjust enrichment and set out for unjust enrichment to be 
descriptive of the set of situations where recovery was awarded. 
Part II of this Chapter sets out the reasons why he did so and criticises him for it on the 
ground that it is not possible to adopt a descriptive analytical structure without considering the 
various moral reasons why restitution is awarded. Part III considers the practical problems to which 
this Birksian analytical structure leads. In particular, it is argued that the four-part formula had to 
be greatly modified in order to accommodate the inclusion of services and of discharge of legal 
obligations.  
II. THEORETICAL PROBLEMS WITH DESCRIPTIVE 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
 
A. Birks’s Project 
 
For Birks the Law of Restitution ‘lack[ed] any agreed framework and [stood] in danger of being 
unintelligible’.29 What it needed was ‘description rather than criticism’.30 His complaint was that 
                                                 
28 Compare with the situation in France where the courts do just that: Article 1382 and 1383 Code Civile (Fr). 
29 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 1. 
30 ibid. 
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even the ‘skeleton of principle’ of the subject had not been established.31 Therefore he set out to 
find the ‘simplest structure on which the material in Goff and Jones can hang.’32 Such an analytical 
scheme could not be found in the cases, but rather had to be ‘forced on to cases’.33 
Birks defined Restitution as ‘the response which consists in causing one person to give up to another an 
enrichment received at his expense or its value in money.’34 He further specified that Restitution was not 
concerned with cases where the claimant gets back something which he had always owned. In such 
cases the law is merely passive; nothing changes. But Restitution is the active or creative response 
of the law. It creates new rights at the moment of enrichment, in order to undo that enrichment.35 
This limitation was justified on practical and conceptual grounds. Practically it was needed, for 
otherwise it would have meant that the entirety of the law of real property, via the action of 
ejectment, would come into Restitution, and such an action cannot be understood without a full 
account of land law. But this would mean that the subject would be too big.36 Conceptually, he 
considered that this this would prevent us from distinguishing (the few) restitutionary rights in rem 
from other proprietary rights.37 
This,38 then, was Restitution. But Restitution, unlike tort or contract, is a response to an 
event (i.e. it is remedial), for example recovery of a mistaken payment of money. Unjust enrichment 
is the ‘generic conception of all such events’.39 By ‘generic conception’ Birks meant, at a high level 
of generality, ‘the common quality of a number of apparently different events.’40 For example, ‘the 
generic conception of sale, hire, agency, partnership, loan is “contract”.’41 ‘Unjust enrichment at 
the plaintiff’s expense’ is the generic conception of all the events giving rise to restitution. How did 
Birks find that this is the generic conception of such events? Not by induction from the events, 
Birks warns us. But rather by ‘deduct[ion] from the definition of restitution itself.’42 How so? 
                                                 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid 3. 
33 ibid 4. 
34 ibid 13 (emphasis in original). 
35 ibid 14–15. 
36 ibid 15. 
37 ibid 16. 
38 ‘the response which consists in causing one person to give up to another an enrichment received at his expense or 
its value in money’: see footnote 34 above. 
39 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 16. 
40 ibid 17. 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid. 
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Fortunately, ‘the particular nature of the response allows a generic conception of the event to be 
easily formulated.’43 The argument goes as follows: 
 
If the restitutionary response happens when the law causes one person to give up to another an enrichment 
obtained at that other’s expense or its value in money, it follows that, as a matter of observation at the 
highest level of generality, the event triggering that response must be enrichment at that other’s expense. 
This is a tautology.44 
 
But the law will not undo every enrichment at the expense of another. For example, mistaken 
payments are certainly recoverable, but gifts, for example, are not undone simply on the ground 
that one has changed their mind. Hence: 
 
Some word is needed to express the distinction. In the former cases the obvious inference is that the 
enrichment which generates the active response ought not to have happened. It is possible, therefore, to 
add an adjective signifying disapproval. ‘Unjust’ is the one which has stuck.45 
 
Hence, ‘unjust’ is actually amoral and those judges and commentators who feared that ‘the word 
“unjust” would invite appeals to abstract conceptions of justice derived from whatever moral and 
political values might best suit a party’s case’,46 have nothing to fear. There is nothing moral about 
‘unjust’. It is used purely descriptively to mean ‘those circumstances in which the law provides for 
restitution.’47 Indeed, Birks accepts that using words such as ‘disapproved’ or ‘reversible’ ‘might 
have been better in being more obviously downward-looking to the cases.’48 It seems that the only 
reason he went for ‘unjust’ is because it is the one ‘which has stuck.’49 
 But, if this is all that unjust enrichment means, is it not ‘inert and useless’?50 ‘No’, says Birks, 
there are three ‘evils’ in the state of the law which can be overcome by ‘habitual and disciplined use 
of the words of the generic conception.’51 First, there is uncertainty due to the lack of ‘shared and 
stable pattern[s] of reasoning.’52 With the various torts and contract there is a shared understanding 
                                                 
43 ibid 18. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid 19. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid 18. 
50 ibid 19. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
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of the steps that have to be established before the claim can succeed, but not so with restitution.53 
Second, the absence of the generic conception means that the subject is fragmented and that one 
is not ‘able to detect important structural similarities between fact situations which are only 
superficially dissimilar.’54 Birks then went on to illustrate the point by drawing analogies between 
recovery of mistaken payments and the compulsory discharge of another’s liability.55 Third, the 
reluctance to talk in terms of unjust enrichment meant that ‘uninformative’ or ‘misleading’ terms 
(such as implied or quasi contract) are instead used by the courts. This ‘displaces the truth [and] 
introduces a lie.’56 It means that we ‘lose the benefit of calling the event by its proper name … [and] 
are obliged to suppose instead that it has some affinity with events to which it is wholly unrelated.’57 
For these reasons, the generic conception of unjust enrichment as the event giving rise to restitution 
was considered by Birks to be valuable even though it is, in a sense, circular.  
 Birks is then careful to distinguish this ‘generic conception of unjust enrichment’ from what 
he calls ‘the principle against unjust enrichment’.58 This is the principle which originated in Roman 
law. It is the moral principle which all the authors from Ames and Keener to Goff and Jones had 
seen as being the foundation of the law of quasi-contract. Birks observed that it ‘restates the 
conception of the event in a dynamic or normative form.’59 It is prescriptive rather than descriptive. But 
Birks warns us that this ‘transition from event to principle can play some odd tricks’,60 of which we 
need to be aware. The first is really quite startling and is worth quoting in full: 
 
The principle threatens to undo the effort taken to make ‘unjust’ look downwards to the cases. To the 
extent that it does so it is to be regarded with suspicion. Indeed it may be that the principle can never be 
other than a moral aspiration. For as soon as steps are taken to bring it down to earth it begins to say 
nothing other than the law ought not to be ignored. Thus ‘unjustly enriched’ (once ‘unjustly’ is made to 
look downwards to the cases) must mean: ‘enriched in circumstances in which the law says that there 
should be restitution’. Hence, ‘no-one ought to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another’, only means 
                                                 
53 ibid 20. For what it is worth, Birks is here vastly overstating his case. At the time he was writing what needed to be 
shown to succeed in, say, money had and received was very well established. It had to be shown that there was a 
transfer of money from the claimant to the defendant in circumstances where the defendant did not have the right to 
retain it. Those circumstances were the ones specified in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burrow 1005, 97 ER 676 and 
subsequent cases. 
54 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 20. 
55 This is true, but without an account of the reason why restitution is awarded (something which Birks’s amoral 
generic conception is incapable of providing) we cannot know whether the two situations are indeed similar. 
56 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 22. 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid 23. 
60 ibid. 
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‘no-one ought to be enriched at the expense of another in circumstances in which the law says he should 
make restitution’. In other words, the law should be respected. The other formulation boils down to a 
similarly unambitious statement: ‘There are circumstances in which the law does not permit one person to 
be enriched at the expense of another.’61 
  
Birks seems to assume that there are only two ways of understanding the principle. Either ‘unjust’ 
simply means ‘against an abstract conception of justice’, in which case it cannot do any (legal) work 
and so is merely a ‘moral aspiration’. Or, ‘unjust’ is understood purely positively as meaning, ‘when 
the law says there should be restitution’, in which case it just means the truism that the law should 
be respected. That objection to the principle is not new. It was first made against Keener by a 
reviewer of his, Everett Abbott,62 in 1896, although it was retracted by Abbott in 1898.63 That 
objection failed when Birks made it in 1985 for the same reason it failed back in 1898, namely that 
the inference from a moral understanding of ‘unjust’ to a legal one is illegitimate. But, before 
considering this point in more detail, let us consider Birks’s second objection. 
 This concerns the phrase ‘at the expense of’. Birks pointed out that it could be understood 
in two different ways, ‘by subtraction from’ or ‘by doing wrong to.’64 The case of a mistaken 
payment falls within the former category, but receiving a sum of money in exchange for beating up 
someone falls within the latter category. Applying the same inference from ‘unjust’ to ‘what the law 
recognises’, it follows that there are two forms of ‘at the expense of’: ‘the law will not permit one 
person to be unjustly enriched by subtraction from another’ and ‘the law will not permit one person 
to be unjustly enriched by doing a wrong to another.’65 But, Birks points out, the second of these 
is false. The law does not always require that the profits of wrongdoing be given up.66 Without the 
distinction made between the two forms of ‘at the expense of’, the ambiguity remains in the 
formulation of the ‘principle against unjust enrichment’. ‘It remains a latent defect whose presence, 
sensed but not identified, has contributed to the suspicion in which the language of unjust 
enrichment has been held.’67 For these two reasons Birks recommends rejecting the ‘principle 
against unjust enrichment’: 
 
                                                 
61 ibid. 
62 E Abbot, ‘Keener on Quasi-Contract I’ (1896) 10 Harvard Law Review 209. 
63 E Abbot, ‘A Retraction’ (1898) 11 Harvard Law Review 402. 
64 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 24. 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid 25. 
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The best policy is to make no use of the so-called principle against unjust enrichment. The neutral, and 
seemingly less interesting, generic conception has in fact the more important work to do.68 
 
There is a contradiction at the heart of Birks’s argument. He criticises the principle of unjust 
enrichment for either being a truism or being so vague that it leads to suspicion. He criticises those 
– such as Goff and Jones –  who propound unjust enrichment thinking, of ‘leaving “unjust” up in the 
sky, where it cannot do [the] necessary work’.69  He accepts that this suspicion comes from the 
term ‘unjust’ itself, which is ambiguous as between an abstract conception of justice and simply 
‘what the law says’.70 He recognises that ‘disapproved’ or ‘reversible’ better conveys the meaning 
of the generic conception that he defends.71 And yet, despite all of that, he uses ‘unjust’ and gives 
no reason for doing so other than the fact that ‘[u]njust is [the adjective signifying disapproval] 
which has stuck.’72 
 There are a number of problems with this approach. The first is that it is ambiguous. If one 
hears the phrase ‘unjust enrichment’, how is one to know if what is meant is the ‘generic 
conception’ or the moral principle? This ambiguity can prevent us from seeing that the generic 
conception alone cannot actually be allowed to develop the law. Suppose a court is faced with a 
new situation where the case law does not specify whether there should be recovery or not, and 
the judge decides that recovery should be allowed on the ground that this is an ‘unjust enrichment’. 
Let us look at this situation from the point of view of an observer and then from the point of  view 
of the judge.  
If ‘unjust enrichment’ means ‘reversible enrichment’ (i.e. the generic conception) then all 
the judge has said is that ‘this should be reversed because the law says it should’, but, since – we 
have assumed – this is a new case, the judge is unable to point to a previous decision where this 
was held. Hence, for the observer, the judge really is just begging the question. If, instead, the judge 
meant the moral principle against unjust enrichment then we know that he has ordered recovery 
because he thought that it was unjust (in the moral sense)73 for the defendant to retain the benefit. 
Now, admittedly, this reasoning by the judge is incomplete. It does not tell us why it is unjust. But 
the fault is that one of the premises is suppressed, not that the reasoning begs the question. Besides, 
the reason why it is unjust might, intuitively, be obvious to all and so the failure to spell it out might 
not be such a significant flaw. But the fact that unjust enrichment is used in these two different 
                                                 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid 20. 
70 ibid 19. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid 18. 
73 Or, against conscience, as the old cases put it. 
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senses does not allow us to distinguish between them and each of them has their flaws. ‘Reversible 
enrichment’ is just question-begging and ‘moral unjust enrichment’ re-introduces the spectre of 
judges deciding cases on nothing other than their conception of fairness. But the ambiguity in the 
term ‘unjust enrichment’ allows the judge to have his cake and eat it. If someone charges him with 
deciding cases based on his own moral principles he can respond by saying that he just meant 
‘reversible enrichment’. And if someone else tells him he is just begging the question, he can say 
that he was not because he was deciding based on higher principles. These two possible meanings 
of unjust enrichment do not, therefore, produce clarity of thought. It makes it very hard for the 
observer (and anyone reading a judgment), in a new case, to properly understand the true basis of 
the judge’s decision. 
 But, from the perspective of the judge, how is he to decide this case? ‘Reversible 
enrichment’ provides no guidance for him. However, he is able to use his moral sense to consider 
whether that benefit ought to be retained or given up. Indeed, this is what appears to have 
happened in some cases. In Woolwich v Inland Revenue Commissioners74 the House of Lords recognised 
a new unjust factor: money paid pursuant to an unlawful tax demand could be recovered without 
having to show a mistake or compulsion. This was because such an instance was ‘the paradigm of 
a case of unjust enrichment’ and ‘the concept of unjust enrichment suggests the plaintiffs should 
have a remedy.’75  
So, the problem with using ‘unjust enrichment’ only in the sense of the ‘generic conception’ 
is that it provides no guidance for judges in how to decide cases and it makes it difficult for anyone 
reading the judgement to understand the true basis of the judge’s decision. Perhaps a middle 
solution would be to look for analogies with the decided cases. This is the approach the courts 
have taken,76 and it appears to have been Birks’s suggestion too. Indeed, he said that the adoption 
of the generic conception would allow us ‘to detect important structural similarities between fact 
situations which are only superficially similar’.77 But the problem, as Webb has pointed out, is that 
reasoning by analogy requires being able to identify the reasons behind recovery in one case in 
order to see if they apply in another case.78 Is this something Birks was willing to do? Here again 
Birks’s reasoning appears to be contradictory. On the one hand he completely rejects any role for 
the moral principle against unjust enrichment.79 He does so whilst accepting the relevance of open-
textured principles in tort (‘a man must pay for the harm which he negligently causes’) and contract 
                                                 
74 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 70 (UKHL). 
75 ibid 197 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
76 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (UKHL) 697 (Lord Goff). 
77 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 20. 
78 C Webb, Reasons and Restitution (Oxford University Press 2016) 43–50. 
79 See passage cited at footnote 68 above. 
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(‘pacta sunt servanda’) because ‘in these areas the open-textured principles are mediated by well-
defined concepts whereas, in restitution, unjust enrichment has to do the work both of high-level 
[moral] principle and low-level concept.’80 So the lack of such mediating principles explains why he 
considered that we must do away with the moral principle against unjust enrichment altogether. 
 On the other hand, when dealing with more detailed aspects of the law Birks seems willing 
to entertain moral arguments about the reasons for restitution. For example he asks:  
 
Could the moral force exerted by the perception of danger to another’s property be regarded as having an 
effect on the intervenor’s mind equivalent to mistake or legal compulsion so as to qualify by analogy as 
another factor calling for restitution? It would be an affirmative answer to this question which would attract 
the adjective ‘unjust’.81 
 
Later on he states that the main category of ‘unjust’ is ‘non-voluntary transfer’.82 He does warn that 
this phrase is an ‘ugly’ one. He adds that it is subject to the same warning as the word ‘unjust’ itself: 
‘you cannot conclude in favour of restitution just by looking at the story of a transfer from P to D 
and deciding, as though it were only a question of fact, that P did not mean D to have the given 
item of his wealth.’83 However, unlike ‘unjust’, he acknowledges that the ‘layman’s commonsensical 
version’ of ‘non-voluntariness’ is a ‘starting point.’84 Whilst one must be guided by the cases and 
by what the philosophers think, this does not mean that ‘“non-voluntariness” is an inert or useless 
notion. On the contrary it is the basis of much restitution.’85 
 The fact is Birks’s theory amounts to a Motte and Bailey Doctrine: 
 
A Motte and Bailey castle is a medieval system of defence in which a stone tower on a mound (the Motte) is 
surrounded by an area of pleasantly habitable land (the Bailey), which in turn is encompassed by some sort 
of a barrier, such as a ditch. Being dark and dank, the Motte is not a habitation of choice. The only reason 
for its existence is the desirability of the Bailey, which the combination of the Motte and ditch makes 
relatively easy to retain despite attack by marauders. When only lightly pressed, the ditch makes small 
numbers of attackers easy to defeat as they struggle across it: when heavily pressed the ditch is not 
defensible, and so neither is the Bailey. Rather, one retreats to the insalubrious but defensible, perhaps 
impregnable, Motte. Eventually the marauders give up, when one is well placed to reoccupy desirable land. 
For my original purposes the desirable but only lightly defensible territory of the Motte and Bailey castle, 
that is to say, the Bailey, represents philosophical propositions with similar properties: desirable to their 
                                                 
80 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 20. 
81 ibid 21. 
82 ibid 99. 
83 ibid 100. 
84 ibid 101. 
85 ibid (emphasis added). 
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proponents but only lightly defensible. The Motte represents the defensible but undesired propositions to 
which one retreats when hard pressed.86 
  
In Birks’s theory the Bailey is the moral principle against unjust enrichment. This is what makes 
his classification of events interesting and attractive, because, intuitively in all the circumstances 
where the law gives restitution it makes sense to say – in layman’s terms – that the enrichment was 
unjust. The Motte is his reversible enrichment doctrine, according to which ‘unjust’ just means 
‘what the cases say is reversible’. When Birks is actually using unjust enrichment he appeals to the 
Bailey, but when pressed with objections that this is just palm tree justice, he retreats to the Motte 
and claims that there is nothing moral with ‘unjust’.  
 In one sense, however, the above comparison is unfair on Birks. I do not think that he 
intentionally meant to appeal to such a fallacy and, given the scepticism about unjust enrichment 
at the time, I can understand why he did so. The problem with Birks was not so much the 
construction of the Motte, but rather it was his failure to defend the Bailey. The moral principle 
against unjust enrichment is not indefensible. Birks’s fault is that he did not even try to defend it. 
In this thesis I do not mean to attack the Motte, rather I aim to defend the Bailey that Birks claimed 
to have abandoned. 
 
B. The principle against unjust enrichment 
 
As we saw above, Birks’s case against the unjust enrichment principle was that ‘unjust’ could mean 
one of two things: (i) an undefined/abstract conception of justice or (ii) the circumstances in which 
the law says an enrichment should be reversed. The trouble with the former is that it would lead 
to palm tree justice. The trouble with the latter is that it reduces the principle to a mere truism.87  
 
1. Not a question-begging truism 
 
The second interpretation cannot be right. To see this, consider a simple thought experiment. 
Suppose that Parliament passed the Restitution (Abolition) Act which provides that there will be 
no recovery in the situations where restitution is now commonly available. So there would be no 
recovery for mistaken payments, for work done under an unenforceable contract or for having 
discharged another’s debts. It seems quite clear that a philosopher, or indeed anyone, could criticise 
                                                 
86 N Shackel, ‘The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology’ (2005) 36 Metaphilosophy 295, 298. 
87 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 22–25. 
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such a law by saying that it allows unjust enrichments to go unreversed. Such a criticism does not 
beg the question. Rather it appeals to moral principles which are outside of the law and which the 
law can fail to reflect. And it is the law’s failure to reflect those principles which is criticised. The 
principle against unjust enrichment is used as a yardstick with which to measure the law: does the 
law give recovery for unjust enrichments? If yes, the law passes the test. If not, the law fails and so, 
if the unjust enrichment principle is accepted as true, the law should change to reflect it. Indeed, 
this seems to have been what Lord Browne-Wilkinson was saying in Woolwich when he described 
that case as ‘the paradigm of unjust enrichment.’88 
To see this point in more detail it is useful to consider the work of Everett Abbot, the first 
critique of unjust enrichment.89 Abbott took as his starting point Keener’s definition of unjust 
enrichment: (1) ‘No one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.’90 Abbot then 
adds that, because we are talking of a proposition of law, the words ‘by law’ need to be added after 
‘allowed’. This, Abbot says, ‘is necessary to redeem the proposition from the charge of being ethical 
merely and not juridical.’91 Hence the proposition now reads: (2) ‘No one shall be allowed by law to 
enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.’92 He then states that the proposition is still subject to 
another ‘fundamental objection’, namely: 
 
If it is true that no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another, it is also true 
that no acts whereby one does so unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another are allowed by law, or to 
state the proposition conversely, all such acts are by law forbidden.93  
 
Hence the proposition is modified to read: (3) ’Acts whereby one unjustly enriches himself at the expense of 
another are forbidden by law.’94 Abbot then makes a number of other modifications which do not 
change the meaning, the final version is then: (4) ‘The unjust enrichment of one at the expense of another is 
illegal.’95 Abbot then moves to flesh out what ‘unjust’ could mean. He points out that ‘the forum of 
the law is not of equal jurisdiction with the forum of conscience, and that some acts may be ethically 
                                                 
88 Woolwich v IRC (n 74) 197 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
89 Abbot, ‘Keener on Quasi-Contract I’ (n 62); E Abbot, ‘Keener on Quasi-Contract II’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law 
Review 479. 
90 Abbot, ‘Keener on Quasi-Contract I’ (n 62) 221. 
91 ibid. 
92 ibid. 
93 ibid 222. 
94 ibid. 
95 ibid. 
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unjust which are yet permissible in law.’96 Hence unjust acts may be unjust and legal, or unjust and 
illegal. This, therefore, gives us two possible formulations:97 
 
(4)(a) The unjust and legal enrichment of one at the expense of another is illegal. 
 
(4)(b) The unjust and illegal enrichment of one at the expense of another is illegal. 
 
Abbot correctly points out that the first of these proposition is a contradiction in terms; a legal 
enrichment cannot be illegal. As for the second, it is ‘obviously true’, but it is a truth which serves 
no purpose. Like the mathematical equation A = A, no deduction can be drawn from it.98 Hence 
it cannot, in either sense, be used as a reason to award recovery in a case. This is so even if it is 
used as a middle term: 
 
Thus to say to the defeated party, when the decision of the controversy is against him, that he is unjustly 
enriched at the other’s expense because (to take an example) he has obtained money from the other by a 
false statement of fact, is merely to import an unnecessary term. It is in effect to say, you ought to be 
defeated because you obtained money by false pretences. Resorting again to the simile of an equation, it is 
like saying, A = A = B. The middle term in both cases is unnecessary and should be neglected as not 
actually used.99 
 
Hence, any attempted use of the principle ‘results either in begging the question or else in a more 
or less conscious resort to some other and extrinsic principle.’100 For an example of reliance on an 
extrinsic principle, Abbot cites Keener’s explanation for the basis of restitution of money paid 
under a contract which is subsequently discharged for breach. Keener states, ‘If this right [to 
recover money paid] is to be given to a plaintiff it would seem to be for the reason that the 
defendant should not be allowed to blow hot and cold, and to profit by a contract the burdens of 
which he refused to perform.’101 Abbot agrees with this basis, but says that; ‘The obligation is 
explained, however, not by the doctrine of unjust enrichment, but rather by the proposition that 
the defendant cannot occupy two inconsistent positions at one and the same time.’102 
  
                                                 
96 ibid 223. 
97 ibid. 
98 ibid. 
99 ibid 224. 
100 ibid 225. 
101 Keener, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (n 11) 299. 
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To recap, Abbot’s argument is as follows: 
a) Proposition (1) (No one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another) needs to 
be modified to proposition (2) (No one shall be allowed by law to enrich himself unjustly at the 
expense of another) because it is a juridical proposition and not a merely ethical one. 
b) The converse of proposition (2) is proposition (3) (Acts whereby one unjustly enriches himself at 
the expense of another are forbidden by law) which can be modified, without change of meaning, 
to proposition (4) (The unjust enrichment of one at the expense of another is illegal). 
c) Unjust acts can be unjust and legal or unjust and illegal, so proposition (4) can be mean 
either: 
a. The unjust and legal enrichment of one at the expense of another is illegal. 
b. The unjust and illegal enrichment of one at the expense of another is illegal. 
d) Proposition (4)(a) is contradictory. 
e) Proposition (4)(b) is a truism, which cannot be used in reasoning. 
f) So any attempt to use proposition (4) results in either begging the question or is actually 
motivated by extrinsic principles (and proposition (4) is unnecessary for such reasoning). 
g) So proposition (4) should be rejected. 
h) Since proposition (4) is just a reformulation of proposition (1), it should also be rejected. 
 
This argument is undoubtedly logically valid and the charge against proposition (4) is undoubtedly 
true. But the move from proposition (1) to proposition (4) is illegitimate. To his credit, Abbot 
recognised the illegitimacy of that move a year later and retracted his criticism of Keener’s theory.103 
The argument from (b) to (g) is true but (a) is false and so this means that (h) is false. The reason 
premise (a) is false is because Abbot wrongly assumed that proposition (1) was a juridical 
proposition and not an ethical one. But, in fact, it was an ethical one, making a statement about 
what the law should be and not merely about what the law is. As such the appropriate 
transformation of proposition (1) should have been: (5) The unjust enrichment of one at the expense of 
another should be illegal. This can then further be divided into:  
 
(5)(a) The unjust and legal enrichment of one at the expense of another should be illegal. 
 
(5)(b) The unjust and illegal enrichment of one at the expense of another should be illegal. 
 
                                                 
103 Abbot, ‘A Retraction’ (n 63). 
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Proposition (5)(b) is a truism and will always be reflected in the law, as such it does not tell us 
anything.104 In that sense it is no different from (4)(b). But unlike proposition (4)(a), proposition 
(5)(a) is not a contradiction. Nor is it the case that appeal to proposition (5) either begs the question 
or appeals to an extrinsic principle. Faced with a new situation, as the House of Lords was in 
Woolwich, the court can appeal to proposition (5) to justify why the law should be changed in order 
to award restitution. 
 
2. Not palm tree justice 
 
Fair enough, the objector might say, the principle against unjust enrichment is neither incoherent 
nor is it question begging. But, what about the other objection, that it just amounts to palm tree 
justice? With respect, that objection is bizarre. Take any high level moral norm and it will have 
open-ended terms, but this does not mean that lower level norms that give it greater content do 
not exist. For example, Christ instructs us to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’, but it remains the case 
that this is fleshed out by the 4th to the 10th Commandments.105  For matters not covered by these 
Commandments, the ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ commandment retains residual value.106  The 
point is the same with the principle against unjust enrichment. There are other moral principles 
and rules to flesh out the meaning of it. It is not meant to do the work on its own. Problems of 
restitution are not new. The Western tradition has been considering such issues for at least 2,500 
years. The problem is dealt with in the Bible in the Book of Exodus,107 in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics,108 in Roman Law,109 in medieval Canon Law, in St Thomas Aquinas’s Summae Theologia,110 in 
                                                 
104 There is one interpretation of (5)(b) (and indeed of (4)(b)) which is not a truism: if one illegally enriches himself at the 
expense of another, he has to give up that enrichment to the other [or the law ought to make him do that]. It is obvious that, 
even as descriptive matter, such a proposition is not a truism (indeed it does not accurately reflect the law). 
Therefore, the more charitable interpretation of Abbot is that he did not mean that when he stated (4)(b). Hence, 
when doing my normative turn to (5)(b) I am not interpreting it that way either. 
105 ‘Matthew’ vv 19:16-19. 
106 ‘For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false 
witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, 
namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.’: ‘Romans’ v 13:9 (KJV). 
107 ‘Exodus’ ch 22. 
108 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (D Ross and H Fielding eds, Oxford University Press 2009) bk V. 
109 M Radin, ‘The Roman Law of Quasi-Contract’ (1937) 23 Virginia Law Review 241. 
110 T Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St Thomas Aquinas (Second Rev, Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
1920) pts II-II Q62; D Reid, ‘Thomas Aquinas and Viscount Stair: The Influence of Scholastic Moral Theology on 
Stair’s Account of Restitution and Recompense’ (2008) 29 The Journal of Legal History 189. 
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the writings of the Scholastics of Salamanca,111 in Hugo Grotius,112 in Pothier, and in common law 
since Moses v Macferlan.113 We are not here starting from first principles, but standing on the 
shoulders of giants. Before condemning unjust enrichment as just being palm tree justice we at 
least have to try and see what clear rules and principles can be extracted from that tradition. 
 The objection of palm tree justice rests on the misunderstanding that the principle against 
unjust enrichment would do all the work on its own. Insofar as legal adjudication is concerned, this 
is not the case and no one has ever seriously suggested that this be the case. Legal precedents matter 
and they should not be ignored. But even seen through a purely moral lens the objection is 
mistaken. The principle against unjust enrichment will be just one premise in a moral reasoning 
justifying restitution. This is best seen by comparison with the tortious principle that wrongfully caused 
loss should be compensated. If we are faced with a situation where A negligently damaged B’s property, 
the award of compensation is not morally justified114 simply by appealing to that principle. Rather 
the reasoning would be along those lines: 
1. A acted wrongly because 
a. B’s property rights require that others take sufficient care not to damage his 
property 
b. So A had a duty to take sufficient care 
c. A failed in that duty. 
2. A’s wrong caused the damage to B’s property. 
3. Wrongfully caused loss should be compensated. 
4. Therefore, A should be made to compensate B for the loss he suffered. 
 
The point is that premise (3) alone does not do the work to justify the award of recovery. It needs 
to be combined with other moral principles in order to do so. These moral principles will address 
the issue of what is a wrong, what amounts to a loss, and when a wrong can be linked to a loss. In 
practice, these principles are likely to be much more controversial: does economic loss count?115 If 
one is a learner and does one’s best, is one negligent?116 If one contributes to the risk of something, 
                                                 
111 J Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (Gerard Noodt Instituut 1996). 
112 R Feenstra, ‘Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment as Source of Obligation’ in EJH Scharge (ed), Unjust 
Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution (2nd edn, Duncker & Humblot 1999). 
113 Moses v Macferlan (n 53). 
114 By this I do not mean the reasoning that the court will use. Rather I mean the moral or political justification for 
the state using its coercive power to award compensation to one party. 
115 Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin and Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 (EWCA). 
116 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 (EWCA). 
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is one responsible if that risk eventuates?117 So the focus of a normative (and sometimes doctrinal) 
argument about recovery will be on those issues rather than on the third premise. Indeed, the third 
premise itself is seen as so obviously true that often it is just a supressed premise of the argument. 
But this does not mean that it is not significant. On the contrary, it is crucially important, without 
it recovery could not be justified. So, whilst it is true it is not a truism (unlike A = A). 
 The principle against unjust enrichment operates in a similar manner. What it says is that 
unjust enrichments should be reversed. But it is not the job of the principle itself to identify what 
counts as an unjust enrichment. So, a moral argument for restitution might go as follows: 
1. A has received a benefit from B. 
2. This receipt is unjust because [insert reason]. 
3. Unjust enrichments should be returned. 
4. Therefore, A has to return the enrichment to B. 
The principle against unjust enrichment does not tell us, nor is it meant to tell us, why the 
enrichment is unjust. But once we have, using other moral principles, established that it is unjust, 
the principle against unjust enrichment takes over and tells us that this needs to be reversed.  
 The difference between the wrongful loss principle and the unjust enrichment principle is 
that with the former the other principles that are part of the reasoning are well established. We 
have fairly well settled and established principles telling us what the various wrongs are, what counts 
as causation, and what counts as loss for those purposes. But, for unjust enrichment, that work 
does not appear to have been done. Hence Birks rejected the comparison with the wrongful loss 
principle by saying that it was ‘mediated by well-defined high level concept’,118 whereas this was 
not the case for restitution where unjust enrichment has to do all the work. The expectation that 
unjust enrichment had to do the work on its own is what leads to it being viewed suspiciously as 
palm tree justice. Birks sought to solve that problem by defining it in a purely downward-looking 
manner. This classification of the events giving rise to restitution is valuable, but it is not complete. 
Instead the quest for the reasons for restitution also has to happen. The set of principles which tell 
us what are unjust enrichments must be found. 
 
C. The quest for principles 
 
There are broadly three ways of proceeding to identify such principles. The first involves a 
complete tabula rasa. It asks: if we were designing a legal system from scratch in what circumstances 
                                                 
117 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (t/a GH Dovener & Son) [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32. 
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would we have restitution and why? In other words, this involves figuring out from first principles 
both the events and the reasons giving rise to restitution. This has, broadly, been the approach of 
a number of political philosophers who have sought to argue that those who benefited from 
historical injustices should be required to give up those benefits.119 The second approach takes as 
given the events where the law awards restitution and tries to reason from first principles what the 
reasons for that might be. Webb is the most recent exponent of that approach.120 This thesis will 
follow neither of these two methodologies but instead will take a third approach. Like Webb it will 
take as given the events where the law awards restitution and will seek to identify the reasons for 
that. But, unlike Webb, it will not do so from first principles. Instead, it will seek to identify the 
reasons that have been given by courts and commentators in the common law world, with a focus 
on England, since Moses v Macferlan. As Lord Reed said in a recent Supreme Court decision, ‘the 
wisdom of our predecessors is a valuable resource’,121 and so there is no need to reinvent the wheel. 
This approach has the advantage that the moral principles it identifies have been received and 
accepted by the courts and this makes their future use by the courts more legitimate. 
 This thesis is only concerned with what has been termed unjust enrichment by subtraction 
and is not concerned with restitution for wrongs, except in the few instances where the two overlap. 
As such we would typically not be concerned with cases where the benefit derives from a wrong 
that the defendant has committed. Instead, the focus is on those cases where the act of obtaining 
the benefit was not in itself wrongful. The reason for the exclusion of restitution for wrongs is 
because such cases are not considered to be part of the Birksian structure of unjust enrichment. 
Since that structure is the target of the thesis, restitution for wrongs falls outside the scope of the 
thesis. 
 The conclusion of the thesis is that there are two principles which explain why an 
enrichment is unjust (and so has to be given up). These are the Property Principle and the Benefit-
Burden Principle. The Property Principle asserts that the enrichment is unjust because the benefit 
in question still belongs – either morally or legally – to the claimant. The word ‘morally’ is important 
                                                 
119 D Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’ (2007) 37 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 129; D Butt, ‘“A Doctrine 
Quite New and Altogether Untenable”: Defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle’ (2014) 31 Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 336; B Haydar and G Øverland, ‘The Normative Implications of Benefiting from Injustice’ (2014) 31 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 349; R Goodin and C Barry, ‘Benefiting from the Wrongdoing of Others’ (2014) 31 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 363; H Lawford-Smith, ‘Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change’ (2014) 
31 Journal of Applied Philosophy 392; T Parr, ‘The Moral Taintedness of Benefiting from Injustice’ (2016) 19 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 985. 
120 Webb (n 78). 
121 The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies (in liquidation) [2017] UKSC 
29, [2017] 2 WLR 1200 [40] (Lord Reed). 
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because, often, legal title in the asset would actually have passed. Yet, there remains a sense in 
which, as between the claimant and the defendant, the defendant was not meant to have the asset. 
This has been expressed by the courts by saying that the asset morally still belongs to the claimant 
and so ought to be returned. Such an expression can be found in the cases as early as Moses v 
Macferlan where Lord Mansfield said: 
 
One great benefit, which arises to suitors from the nature of this action, is, that the plaintiff needs not state 
the special circumstances from which he concludes “that, ex æquo & bono, the money received by the 
defendant, ought to be deemed as belonging to him:” he may declare generally, “that the money was received 
to his use;” and make out his case, at the trial.122 
 
 As will be shown in Chapter 3, until the 1950s this remained – albeit with a greater sophistication 
– the dominant explanation for the recovery of mistaken payments. After that it became less 
fashionable but has still had quite a number of defenders,123 the latest being Webb.124 The theory 
has also had its fair share of criticisms,125 but it remains the fact that it was the reason why, for 
about 200 years, the judges thought they were awarding restitution in those cases.  
 The second principle is the Benefit and Burden Principle. It is sometimes expressed by the 
Latin maxim qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus (He who gets the benefit of something also ought 
to bear the burden).126  The idea is that if a benefit and a burden are tied together then one must 
take both or nothing. If D takes the benefit whilst C bears the burden then D has been enriched 
at C’s expense and such an enrichment is unjust because it violates the principle. So, it must be 
returned. A simple illustration of this is the ability of co-guarantors to get contribution from each 
other. If A and B are both liable for the same debt and A pays the whole sum, then this discharges 
the obligations of both. But A has borne the entirety of the burden whereas B has not. B got the 
benefit (the discharge) without bearing any of the burden. This violates the Benefit and Burden 
Principle. That this principle is the foundation for recovery between co-guarantors has been 
recognised by the courts since 1787 in Deering v Earl of Winchelsea: 
 
                                                 
122 Moses v Macferlan (n 53) [1010] (Lord Mansfield). 
123 Stoljar (n 17); P Watts, ‘Restitution - A Property Principle and A Services Principle’ [1995] Restitution Law 
Review 49; P Jaffey, The Nature and Scope of Restitution: Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts and Disgorgement (Hart 
Publishing 2000). 
124 Webb (n 78). 
125 J Wade, ‘Review’ (1966) 16 University of Toronto Law Journal 473; F Wilmot-Smith, ‘Reasons? For Restitution ?’ 
(2016) 79 The Modern Law Review 1116. 
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The maxim applied is qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus. In the case of average there is no contract 
express or implied, nor any privity in an ordinary sense. This shews that contribution is founded on 
equality, and established by the law of all nations.127 
 
The principle has also been used to justify recoupment,128 remuneration in cases where there was 
an ineffective contract,129 and in other seminal unjust enrichment cases.130 More generally the 
principle operates as follows: 
1. If a benefit and a burden are linked and the defendant voluntarily takes the benefit, then 
he must bear the burden. 
 
2. If the benefit and burden are linked and the benefit is of such a nature that the defendant 
cannot reject it, then the defendant will only be liable if the claimant did not act officiously 
in conferring the benefit on the defendant and if imposing liability would not make the 
defendant worse off than if he had never received the benefit. 
 
 These two principles – the Property Principle and the Benefit-Burden Principle – explain 
why particular situations are unjust. The moral principle against unjust enrichment then states that 
the remedy for such situations is to reverse them.  
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE BIRKSIAN 
STRUCTURE 
 
In light of the above, should Birks’s generic conception of unjust enrichment be modified? If so, 
how? Recall that Birks took his core case to be the mistaken payment of a debt that was not due. 
From there he generalised to other types of enrichments – including services and discharge of 
liabilities – and other unjust factors such as legal compulsion. This generalisation was based on the 
similarity between these instances. However, if the argument made above is correct, the recovery 
                                                 
127 Deering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos & Pul 270, 126 ER 1276 [272] (Lord Chief Baron Eyre). 
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of money and goods is governed by a different principle from the recovery of services and 
discharge of liabilities. This is because the recovery of money and goods is based on the Property 
Principle whilst the last two are based on the Benefit-Burden Principle. Hence, the analogy that 
Birks made with mistaken payments might not be appropriate.  
 The result, as this Part will argue, is that the four-part formula simply does not fit services 
and legal enrichments. Its application to such cases is due to Birks mistakenly thinking that such 
cases were analogous. Birksian unjust enrichment should be narrowed down to money and goods 
cases. This Part will consider in more detail, the difficulties for the four-part formula outlined 
above. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Investment Trust Companies,131 the purpose of unjust 
enrichment is to ‘correct normatively defective transfers of value’.132 The claim of this thesis is that 
this is only what goes on in cases where the enrichment consists of money or (returnable) goods. 
In cases of services and discharge of legal obligations what goes on is not the correction of a 
normatively defective transfer. This claim will be developed further in the next chapters. This 
chapter is concerned with showing how a number of artificial definitions and ad hoc exceptions 
are used in order to fit such cases within the four-part structure. 
A. Enrichment 
 
Following Benedetti v Sawiris133 the test for identifying an enrichment is a three-stage enquiry: 
1. The defendant must have received something of objective value (‘the receipt test’). 
2. This benefit should be valued based on what a person in the position of the defendant 
would have had to pay for it in the market (‘the objective valuation test’). 
a. This consists in first identifying the ordinary market value of the benefit, and 
b. Second, considering whether the position of the defendant is such that he would 
have to pay more or less for the benefit (‘objective revaluation’). 
3. This benefit can be subjectively devalued by the defendant (‘subjective devaluation’). 
 
1. Subjective devaluation 
 
 
There is some uncertainty about what exactly subjective devaluation requires. There are broadly 
three possible views. The first is that ‘subjective devaluation’ is just a shorthand for the fact that 
                                                 
131 Investment Trust Companies (n 121). 
132 ibid [42] (Lord Reed). See also paras [43], [46], [49], [60]. 
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non-money benefits will not automatically satisfy the enrichment test and that for such benefits 
the claimant additionally has to show the presence of a request, or free acceptance, or that the 
benefit was realised in money or that it is readily returnable. Under the second view, ‘subjective 
devaluation’ protects the autonomy of the defendant by allowing him to claim that he did not want 
the benefit in question. Once the defendant has done that the claimant can seek to show that one 
of the above factors is present and, if he succeeds, the subjective devaluation will be overridden, 
and the defendant will be treated as enriched. The third view requires the defendant to show that, 
according to his personal system of value, the benefit was worthless. If he succeeds in doing so the 
claimant can override this by showing the presence of one of the factors above. 
My preference, which is also that of Andrew Lodder,134 is for the first understanding, but 
this is inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Benedetti v Sawiris which recognised 
that there was a substantive doctrine of subjective devaluation and that it required the defendant 
to show something.135 Benedetti is, however, ambiguous as between the second and third 
understanding of subjective devaluation. On the one hand, the majority endorsed statements in 
Goff and Jones that the defendant had to show how the benefit was valued according to his ‘personal 
value system’.136 On the other hand, the majority agreed with Lord Reed that the doctrine was really 
about protecting freedom of choice and that ‘the expression “subjective devaluation” is certainly 
misleading.’137 Lord Reed had carefully examined the case law and found that there was no authority 
which supported the conclusion that ‘a restitutionary award for unjust enrichment resulting from 
the receipt of a service should be based on the defendant’s personal valuation of the service.’138 
The majority then stated that there was little practical difference between their approach and Lord 
Reed’s.139  
 It certainly follows from Benedetti that there is a doctrine of subjective devaluation and that 
it does require the defendant to show something. But Benedetti is unclear on what that is. Must the 
defendant simply show that he did not want the benefit, or must the defendant show that according 
to his ‘personal value system’ the benefit was worthless?  
The Court of Appeal in Littlewoods v Revenue and Customs Commissioners addressed this.140 The 
issue was that the Government had received overpaid taxes from Littlewoods, the principal sum had 
                                                 
134 A Lodder, Enrichment in the Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Oxford University Press 2012). 
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been repaid but the question was whether interest should be paid at the simple rate or if it should 
be compounded. This basically turned on whether the Government could subjectively devalue the 
‘use value of the money’. The Government had already succeeded in showing that the relevant 
interest rate at which the use value should be assessed was the rate at which the Government could 
borrow money and not the higher rate available to commercial parties. This was an application of 
the objective revaluation rule and was completely orthodox. But the Government then sought to 
argue that the use value should be subjectively devalued by reference to whatever the Government 
actually used the money for (‘the actual use value’). This required the Court of Appeal to decide 
how to approach the subjective devaluation exercise. The Court of Appeal rejected any relevance 
for the expression ‘personal value system.’141 It decided that the ‘actual use value’ should be awarded 
‘unless he freely accepted the benefit of having an overpayment and the obligation to pay for it at 
market rates.’142 This means that a benefit will amount to an enrichment only if one of the factors 
overriding subjective devaluation is present. In the specific context of the use value of money, there 
are four possible awards as listed below. 
 
 
Situation 
Award on top of the 
principal sum 
Legal basis 
D freely accepted the money 
Objective use value of 
money (i.e. compound 
interest at the rate at which 
D would have been able to 
borrow had this been a loan) 
Subjective devaluation of 
use value defeated by free 
acceptance 
The money generated x% 
interest 
Compound interest at x% 
interest 
Subjective devaluation of 
use value defeated by 
incontrovertible nature of 
benefit (benefit realised in 
money) 
The availability of the 
money meant that D did not 
have to borrow money 
which he otherwise would 
have had to borrow 
Compound interest at the 
rate D would have had to 
borrow at (this should be 
the same as objective use 
value) 
Subjective devaluation of 
use value defeated by 
incontrovertible nature of 
benefit (saved necessary 
expense saved) 
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None of the above (e.g. 
money kept in a non-interest 
bearing account) 
Nil 
Use value of money not 
considered enriching 
because of successful 
subjective devaluation 
 
  
More generally, subjective devaluation does not require the defendant to show anything 
substantive. It certainly does not require the defendant to show how he valued the benefit 
according to his ‘personal value system’. The upshot of this is that for non-money claims it is a 
necessary condition for success of the claim that it be established – whether by direct proof or on 
the basis of a rebuttable presumption – that there was one of:143 
 
1. request knowing that the benefit was not provided gratuitously; 
2. free acceptance knowing that the benefit was not provided gratuitously; 
3. the benefit is incontrovertible: 
a. benefit realised in money 
b. benefit easily realisable in money 
c. benefit legally/factually necessary 
d. benefit is readily returnable + refusal to return. 
 
This is unnecessarily complex. The phrase ‘subjective devaluation’ is misleading and has 
wrongly suggested that the ‘personal value system’ of the recipient should be relevant. Indeed, as 
Lord Reed said, the reason for these requirements has nothing to do with the enrichment question 
but instead serves to protect the autonomy of the defendant. Such autonomy would be threatened 
if the defendant were required to pay for a benefit that he did not want. But this risk does not arise 
if the benefit is money or goods because in such a case it is returnable. It only arises when non-
returnable benefits such as services are considered. So, a great degree of complexity was introduced 
in the formula by the inclusion of services under the rubric of unjust enrichment. 
2. The problem with receipt 
 
In the case of tangible things and of legal rights the meaning of receipt will be pretty clear. True, 
there might be some borderline cases: do I ‘receive’ goods if they are left on my front porch? But 
these pose no real difficulties. The test to be used is clear: do I acquire possession of the goods? 
                                                 
143 I have, as will be argued in Chapters 4 and 5, some concerns about some of these. But the point here is to state 
what the current law is according to the orthodox position. 
 Ch 2: The Problems with Birk’s Conception of Unjust Enrichment  
 33 
However, with services matters are much less clear. What does it mean to receive a service? The 
point is especially unclear insofar as ‘pure services’ are concerned. Take a concert for example. If I 
pay to attend the concert it seems clear that I have received the service of the performers. But what 
if I live next door to the venue and can hear it perfectly well? Have I received a benefit then? Is 
receipt to be equated with the sound waves reaching my ears? Conversely, suppose I hire a band 
to play at a venue for my friends, but unfortunately, I am unable to attend. I have not heard them 
play, so have I received anything? 
 Matters get even more complicated when there is not anything which can on any view be 
said to have been received. In Planché v Colbourn144 the plaintiff had been engaged by the defendant 
to produce a book for inclusion in a series published by the defendant. Before completion of the 
work the defendant, in breach of contract, discontinued the publication of the series. The plaintiff 
sued under a quantum meruit to recover the value of his labour. That claim succeeded. It did not 
matter that the defendant had not actually received anything. This has caused some problems for 
unjust enrichment lawyers. Broadly, two views have emerged. On the one hand, Birks145 and the 
original authors of Goff and Jones, took the view that where a service is requested it is deemed to 
have been received even if there is no actual receipt.146 On the other hand Burrows,147 Virgo,148 and 
the new editors of Goff and Jones149 take the view that there is no receipt in such a case and that it 
therefore falls outside the law of unjust enrichment. They claim that Planché v Colbourn was really a 
case about damages for anticipatory breach of contract. 
 The difficulty with the second view is that it is inconsistent with what the case says. The 
court explicitly decided that the action on the express contract failed but that the action for 
quantum meruit succeeded. Furthermore, such a claim, based on the so-called ‘prevention 
principle’150 is also available in cases where the contract is unenforceable. So, for example, in James 
                                                 
144 Planché v Colbourn (1831) 8 Bing 14, 131 ER 305. 
145 Peter Birks, ‘In Defence of Free Acceptance’ in Andrew Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law of Restitution (OUP 1991) 
141. 
146 G Jones, Goff and Jones: The Law of Restitution (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 23. 
147 A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford Universtiy Press 2011) 46, 346. 
148 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 68. 
149 C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson, Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2016) paras 5–40. 
150 S Magintharan, ‘The Prevention Principle and the Contractor’s Remedies’ (2017) 33 Construction Law Journal 
455; D Ibbetson, ‘Implied Contract and Restitution: History in the High Court of Australia’ (1988) 2 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 312. 
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v Thomas H Kent,151 Deglman v Guaranty Trust Co,152 and Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul153 the plaintiff 
had provided services to the defendant under an unenforceable contract which was wrongly 
terminated by the defendant before the plaintiff could complete the work. In all three cases the 
plaintiff recovered based on Planché v Colbourn. So it cannot be the case that Planché v Colbourn is a 
breach of contract claim.  
 The problem is this. It is straightforward that such a claim is available on the basis of a 
non-contractual quantum meruit. Quantum meruit did not require that the work be received by 
the defendant; it simply required that work be done at the ‘special instance and request’ of the 
defendant.154 Artificial rules about what constitutes ‘receipt’ and, in three party situations, who the 
recipient is are only needed if one insists that all non-contractual quantum meruit claims require 
the receipt of a service. This only arises if one insists, as Birks did, that such claims are analogous 
to money claims (where receipt was indeed required). 
 
3. A critique of enrichment 
 
What then does ‘enrichment’ mean? Since Birks introduced the four-part structure in 1985 no 
consensus has emerged either in the literature or in the case law about the meaning of enrichment. 
Some say enrichment is about the receipt of rights,155 others say it is value,156 yet others say it is 
wealth.157 Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, there is deemed to be an enrichment whenever 
something is requested.158 Finally, a physical definition might be used: one is enriched by music if 
one hears it. The problem is that none of those definitions is able to cover all cases. To see the 
point, consider the following situations: 
• Band playing. Alice hires Bob to play at an event that she organised. Charlie buys a ticket to 
the event from Alice. David who lives nearby hears the music and quite likes it. Alice does 
                                                 
151 James v Thomas H Kent [1951] 1 KB 551 (EWCA); [1950] 2 All ER 1099 (EWCA). 
152 Deglman v The Garanty Trust Company of Canada and Constantineau (n 129). 
153 Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (n 129). 
154 Lodder (n 134) 78. 
155 R Chambers, ‘Two Kinds of Enrichment’ in R Chambers, C Mitchell and J Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of 
the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press 2009); B McFarlane, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Rights and Value’ in 
D Nolan and A Robertson (eds), Rights and Private Law (Hart Publishing UK 2012). 
156 Lodder (n 134). 
157 J Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press 1991) ch 2. 
158 Birks, ‘In Defence of Free Acceptance’ (n 145) 141; Jones (n 146) 23. 
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not attend the party. According to the law, in such a case, only Alice – the person who did 
not actually hear the music – is enriched by Bob.159 
• Swimming Pool. Alice hires Bob to build a swimming pool on her property. This has the 
result of reducing the value of Alice’s property. In such a case, the law considers Alice to 
have been enriched by Bob because the benefit was requested by her. 
• New Kitchen. Bob by mistake installs a new kitchen in Alice’s house which she has no 
intention to sell. This increases the value of Alice’s property. Yet, Alice is deemed not to 
have been enriched.160 
• Improved Car. Bob by mistake repairs Alice’s car. Alice recovers the car and sells it. Alice is 
enriched up to the value of the repair services or the surplus value of the car, whichever is 
lowest.161 
 
Enrichment as wealth does not work. It cannot explain the absence of enrichment in New Kitchen 
and the presence of enrichment in Swimming Pool. Enrichment as rights cannot work either. In none 
of the above situations have rights been transferred. The physical definition of enrichment does 
not work either. In Band Playing Alice is enriched despite the physical aspect not being satisfied. 
Leaving aside the fact that seeing an enrichment whenever there is a request makes the definition 
of enrichment fictional in the extreme, it also cannot be fully exhaustive as it cannot explain Improved 
Car. Enrichment as value is also problematic: is the New Kitchen not valuable? 
 There is no single definition of enrichment which is capable of covering all those cases. In 
light of that it is not surprising that the editors of Goff and Jones write that: 
 
It is tempting, but wrong, to think that a defendant can always show that he has relevantly been “enriched” 
whenever something happens that makes him financially better off. Often the law does allow claims in 
these circumstances, but in this context “enrichment” is a term of art, i.e. it is a technical legal question 
whether a defendant has received an “enrichment” that is capable of forming the subject matter of a 
claim.162 
 
                                                 
159 Alice is enriched because she requested the service. As will be seen in the ‘at the expense of’ section (section III.B 
below). Charlie is deemed not to be enriched by Bob, but by Alice. David is able to resist a claim by Bob by saying 
that he did not want the benefit and there are no factors which can override ‘subjective devaluation’. In addition, 
David can also rely on the incidental benefit rule, considered below, to say that he was not enriched.   
160 None of the factors overriding subjective devaluation apply. So, Alice is able to say that she did not want to pay 
for the kitchen. 
161 Greenwood v Bennett (n 130). 
162 Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 149) paras 4–04. 
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They also cite a judgement of the Supreme Court where it is said that ‘the words “unjust” and 
“enrichment” are both in some respects terms of art.’163 So, just as ‘unjust’ simply means ‘those 
circumstances in which the law provides for restitution,’164 ‘enrichment’ simply means ‘the instances 
where the law considers that there is something the value of which may be returned if other 
conditions are met’. This is hardly satisfactory. Yet, all of these problems stem from the desire to 
impose on all non-contractual quantum meruit claims the same analytical structure as that which 
applies to the action for money had and received. As explained in Chapter 1, and as will be 
developed further in this thesis, such a desire was not justifiable. 
 Additionally, even if one wanted to impose the same analytical structure, it is unclear why 
the concerns regarding services should have been accommodated at the enrichment stage. As Goff 
and Jones identified from the beginning, liability for services received should be narrower than for 
money because by ‘their very nature services cannot be restored; and the defendant may never have 
wished to receive them or, at least, to receive them if he had to pay for them.’165 But this did not 
mean that one had to say that services that had not been requested or freely accepted should not 
be enriching. According to a lay person’s understanding of enrichment the defendant in New Kitchen 
has been enriched but the point is that he should not be liable because the service was unrequested, 
and it would be unreasonable to require him to sell his house to realise the value of the kitchen. 
There was no need to conflate that with enrichment.  
B. At the expense of 
 
Whilst the difficulties with enrichment are mostly concerned with services, when it comes to ‘at 
the expense of’ the main problem is to do with discharge of legal obligations. There is a somewhat 
artificial rule concerning other forms of benefits. The rule is identified in section 8(3) of Burrow’s 
Restatement: 
 
In a contract for the benefit of a third party, the third party’s benefit is to be treated as obtained directly 
from the contracting party who required the benefit to be supplied rather than from the contracting party 
who supplied it.166  
  
This means that if A under a contract with B does work for C then (i) C will be deemed to have 
received the benefit at the expense of B and (ii) not at the expense of A. The rule, therefore, has 
                                                 
163 Crown Prosecution Service v Eastenders Group [2014] UKSC 26, [2015] AC 1 [100] (Lord Toulson). 
164 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 19. 
165 R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1986) 18. 
166 A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press 2012) 44, 52–54. 
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two components; the first one says that B is considered to have enriched C and the second one 
says that A drops out of the picture completely. This is so even in cases where B is insolvent and 
has not paid A. The first aspect of the rule makes much sense. Suppose that B contracts with A to 
deliver a gift to a friend but accidentally provides A with the wrong address; it would seem odd if 
B could not recover against the recipient on the ground that it is A who has really provided the 
benefit. But the second aspect makes less sense; the reality is that C has received a benefit from A. 
It is one thing to add to that to reflect the fact that B commissioned it. It is quite another to deny 
that A did benefit C. 
 This is not a complaint against the policy reasons behind the rule: that giving A the ability 
to recover against C would undermine the contractual allocation of risk between A and B (A takes 
the risk of B’s insolvency).167 These reasons make sense, though one might quibble with them.168 
Rather the complaint is that this had nothing to do with ‘at the expense of’; it more appropriately 
goes to the question of whether the enrichment is unjust. Adding it here (in ‘at the expense of’) 
suggests that the analytical structure of unjust enrichment is being asked to do work which is too 
complex for it. 
 To be fair, the cases dealing with such issues have not actually adopted that rule, but their 
judgements have been consistent with it.169 The complaint is that commentators, in their zeal to 
explain the case law in terms of the unjust enrichment formula, have had to create artificial rules in 
order to make it all fit within that formula. 
 This brings us to the second ad hoc rule, the incidental benefit exception. Burrows states 
this rule as follows: 
 
Even if the benefit obtained by the defendant is directly from the claimant, the enrichment is generally not 
at the claimant’s expense if the benefit is merely incidental to the furtherance by the claimant of an 
objective unconnected with the defendant’s enrichment.170 
 
Until recently the status of that rule was uncertain. The Court of Appeal in TFL Management Services 
Ltd v Lloyds TSB Bank plc171 stated that there was no such rule in English law. However, the Supreme 
Court in Investment Trust Companies (In Liquidation) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners172 explicitly 
                                                 
167 ibid 53. 
168 In the case where B is insolvent and where C has not paid B would it really be so unfair to require C to pay A on 
the basis of his agreement with B?  
169 Brown and Davis Ltd v Galbraith [1972] 1 WLR 997 (EWCA); Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 27, 
(2008) 232 CLR 635; MacDonald Dickens & Macklin v Costello [2011] EWCA Civ 930, [2011] 3 WLR 1341. 
170 Burrows (n 166) 44, 54, 55. 
171 TFL v Lloyds (n 24). 
172 Investment Trust Companies (n 121) [52] (Lord Reed). 
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reaffirmed the rule. This means that if C carries out a certain activity for his own purposes and a 
side effect of such activity is that D benefits, then D is not considered to have been enriched at the 
expense of C; hence C cannot recover against D. So, for example, if C cuts down trees on his land 
and this has the effect of providing a nice view to D’s land, hence increasing the value of D’s 
property (which he then sells), C cannot bring a claim against D. 
 The reasons given for the rule are that (i) the claimant ‘may have received the consideration 
for which he bargained as the counterpart of his own expenditure, and in that event will not usually 
have suffered any loss’173 and (ii) even if there is a loss, it would not have arisen through ‘the 
provision of something for the benefit of the defendant, since the benefit received by the defendant 
will have been merely incidental or collateral to the reason why the expenditure was incurred.’174 
 The first reason will not always be applicable and is best seen as going to the unjust 
question; if the claimant got what he bargained for then there is no unjust factor. With respect to 
Lord Reed, the second reason appears to be a mere restatement of the rule rather than an 
explanation of it. But perhaps one can defend the rule as follows. The purpose of the law of unjust 
enrichment is to correct defective transfers of value. A transfer of value is defective if it did not go 
as intended by the claimant. Hence, only intentional transfers of value to the defendant fall within 
the scope of unjust enrichment. Therefore, where the benefit is a mere side effect it does not fall 
within the scope of the law because there was no intentional transfer. 
 This is best illustrated with an example. C is hired by X to cut trees on his property, but 
the contract is actually invalid because of a misrepresentation. C does the work and the result is 
that D’s neighbouring property has increased in value (because of the nicer view). When C was 
doing the work, his intention was to discharge his obligation towards X, the benefit D got was a 
mere side-effect (in other words, the effect on D was not part of C’s reasons for acting). C’s 
intention to benefit X was vitiated by the misrepresentation and so he ought to obtain redress from 
X. But, since the effect on D was no part of C’s reasons for acting, it is not possible that there is a 
defective intention to benefit D. Hence, there can be no recovery. Put another way, if things had 
gone according to C’s plan, his action would have discharged an obligation he owed to X and the 
value of D’s property would still have been increased. Hence it cannot be said that the fact that D 
benefited was in any way defective. 
 There is, however, one instance where the law of unjust enrichment does give recovery for 
incidental benefits: the discharge of debts. Take the facts of Exall v Partridge.175 The plaintiff paid 
the landlord the sum that the defendant owed the landlord. He did not do so because he intended 
                                                 
173 ibid (Lord Reed). 
174 ibid (Lord Reed). 
175 Exall v Partridge (1799) 8 Term Rep 308, 101 ER 1405. 
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to benefit the defendant. He did so because he wanted to get his goods back. Hence the benefit 
the defendant got – the discharge of his debt – was incidental. Furthermore, the plaintiff got what 
he bargained for – the release of his goods – so there is no real loss. In addition, it cannot be said 
that the transaction between the plaintiff and the landlord is defective; indeed, the law does not 
reverse it.  
Yet, according to the Supreme Court in Investment Trust Companies, such a claim does fall 
within the scope of unjust enrichment. This is accommodated by saying that the discharge of a 
debt is an exception to the direct dealing rule.176 This is the only true exception to that rule. All the 
others (agency, assignment, tracing, shams, and co-ordinated transactions) are not real exceptions 
but simply applications of general rules of law: ‘the agent slips out of a transaction, the assignee 
stands in the shoes of the assignor, traceable assets are treated as if they were the original asset, the 
law ignores shams and treats co-ordinated transactions as one.’177 This exception is only required 
if one wants to treat recovery for having discharged someone else’s debt as akin to an undue 
payment of money. But, as will be explored in Chapter 4, there is no reason to do so. So once again 
we have a position whereby an ad hoc exception is required because we have tried to put too much 
inside unjust enrichment. 
 
C. Unjust factors 
 
The inclusion of services and the discharge of legal obligations in unjust enrichment have also 
caused difficulties at the unjust factors stage. If, as Lord Reed said in Investment Trust Companies, the 
point of unjust enrichment is to correct ‘normatively defective transfers of value’,178 then the task 
of unjust factors is to provide a reason why a particular transaction is defective. Mistake, the most 
common unjust factor, does so by showing that the intention to transfer the benefit was defective. 
Other unjust factors, such as illegality, point to a defect in the transaction which is unrelated to 
intention. However, it will be argued that the unjust factors relevant to recovery for services and 
discharge of legal obligations have nothing to do with defective transactions.  
 
1. What is defective about discharging someone’s debt? 
 
                                                 
176 Investment Trust Companies (n 121) [49] (Lord Reed). 
177 R Shah, ‘Indirect Enrichment in the Supreme Court’ (2017) 76 Cambridge Law Journal 490, 490. 
178 Investment Trust Companies (n 121) [42], [43], [46], [49], [60] (Lord Reed). 
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The unjust factors suggested to explain such cases will be considered in this section and they will 
all be found to fail. Importantly, it will be shown that recovery in such a case has nothing to do 
with either impaired intention or defective transactions. There is some disagreement amongst 
unjust enrichment scholars about what type of unjust factor is at play in cases of discharge of debts 
and performance of another’s duty. On the one hand, Birks, prior to him adopting absence of basis, 
and Virgo think it is about vitiation of intention; they think legal compulsion is the relevant unjust 
factor.179 On the other hand, Burrows and the editors of Goff and Jones think it is a policy based 
unjust factor.180 
 The difficulty with legal compulsion is that it is not clear why this in itself makes the transfer 
unjust. One can readily understand why duress or undue influence unjustly vitiate the intention to 
make a transfer, but with legal compulsion the pressure exercised is perfectly lawful. If one pays a 
sum under the threat of contempt of court to another, one is undoubtedly under great pressure to 
do so and one does not act voluntarily. But it is quite clear that in such an instance there cannot be 
recovery and quite rightly so. Why should this be any different in a three-party case? 
 Birks’s explanation is that all payments made under threat of legal process are non-
voluntary and so prima facie recoverable, but for policy reasons they are not recoverable: ‘such 
transfers are made in response to a type of pressure which is exempted from restitution as a normal 
and necessary incident of social life.’181 However, in the three-party cases such a policy reason does 
not apply and so there is no bar to restitution. The reason the policy does not apply is that in such 
cases the claimant was not meant to be liable vis-a-vis the defendant, but the reason he was required 
to pay was to give the creditor another avenue for recovery. So, the claimant’s claim ‘does not seek 
to reverse the remedial force applied with the approval of the legal system (as would a claim against 
the creditor) but only to ensure that its effect is passed on to the right person.’182 Virgo makes the 
point by saying  
 
The claimant benefits the defendant as a result of pressure being imposed, which is most certainly on a par 
with the pressure imposed in cases involving duress of property or economic duress. But that ground of 
restitution is not available to the claimant because the threat is lawful. It is for that reason that a distinct 
ground of legal compulsion must be recognized in its own right.183 
 
                                                 
179 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 185–193; Virgo (n 148) 121, 233–253. 
180 Burrows (n 147) 437; Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 149) paras 1–25. 
181 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 185. 
182 ibid 186. 
183 Virgo (n 148) 252. 
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 The Birks/Virgo argument has three steps: (1) the claimant does not act voluntarily when 
compelled by the law, (2) the law of restitution cannot stultify the law by undoing transfers which 
the law compels, but (3) in such cases recovery would not stultify the law because, as between the 
claimant and the defendant, it was not the defendant, who was meant to bear the burden of the 
debt. 
 There are two issues with that argument. First, the first premise is false; recovery can be 
given even when no pressure is applied or threatened. An example of that is Stimpson v Smith,184 
where a surety paid the creditor even before a demand had been made; it was held that the surety 
was entitled to recovery against the co-sureties and the debtor. Pace Birks/Virgo, this is not 
comparable to a duress case, where the pressure must actually have been applied. In any event, it 
seems odd to describe the surety cases as being about compulsion. After all, the surety agreed to 
put himself in that position. The second problem is that there is no involuntariness that does the 
work in explaining why there is recovery. Rather it is the policy factors that have been identified. 
Burrows is, therefore, right when he says: 
 
Given that the pressure on C cannot be regarded as illegitimate, it is misleading to regard ‘legal compulsion’ 
as a factor impairing consent alongside duress, undue influence, and exploitation of weakness. Instead legal 
compulsion is better viewed as a policy-motivated unjust factor designed to ensure that liability is ultimately 
borne by the appropriate party in the appropriate amount.185 
 
 The policy-based reasoning is as follows. For the benefit of the creditor the law allows the 
creditor to claim against either the claimant or defendant, but as between them it is the defendant 
that ought to be liable. So, the law allows the claimant to recover against the defendant. I think that 
reasoning is essentially correct, but I dispute the relevance of unjust enrichment to the whole 
matter. It is not clear what, if anything, this has in common with an action to recover an undue 
payment. Take the other policy-motivated unjust factor: unlawful levies and taxes paid to public 
authorities. In such cases there is typically, though not necessarily, a measure of involuntariness; 
the matter is not that different from the core case of a mistaken payment. More generally, every 
ground of restitution serves to identify something defective in the transaction. This might be the 
lack of voluntariness, a qualification that failed, breach of a constitutional principle, or illegality. 
But with the cases of recoupment or contribution there is nothing defective about the transaction 
itself. The putative policy-motivated unjust factor seeks to address the consequences of the 
transaction, but it does not impugn it at all. It is normal and expected that the claimant’s payment 
to the creditor discharges the liability of the defendant to the creditor. Therefore, the addition of 
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this putative policy-motivated unjust factor to the unjust enrichment scheme is ad hoc and 
unprincipled. Such an exception is only needed if we want to apply the same analytical structure to 
discharge of debts as we do to undue payments. But, as will be argued in Chapter 4, there is no 
need for that. 
 
2. Quantum meruit and the lack of defect 
 
In the typical situation where there is restitution in respect of a service provided, the claimant would 
have done work for the defendant under a contract, but the contract is terminated before the work 
is completed. In some circumstances, the claimant will be able to recover for the reasonable value 
of the services he has provided so far. So, for example, C enters into a contract with D under which 
C agrees to build a house on D’s land. The contract provides that payment is only due on full 
completion of the house. Consider the following three alternative situations: 
 
• Prevention: Before C completes the work, D wrongfully evicts C from the property. In such 
a case C can recover on a non-contractual quantum meruit for the value of the work he has 
done so far.186 
• Frustration: Before C completes the work, the partially built house burns down. In such a 
case C cannot recover anything.187 
• Abandonment: Before completion, C abandons the work. In such a case C cannot recover 
anything.188 
 
We might say that the unjust factor is total failure of consideration: the claimant received nothing 
in exchange for his performance. But this is true in all three cases. An unjust factor analysis cannot 
explain why there is recovery in the first case but not in the other two. Indeed, Birks accepted that 
conclusion and argued that there should be recovery in all three cases, i.e. he argued that Sumpter v 
Hedges is wrong.189 This might very well be true, but it does not account for what the law is. 
 More generally, there is a difficulty in saying that there is a defective transaction in all those 
cases. In none of those cases was there any defect with the provision of the services. The claimant 
when doing so was not labouring under any mistake nor was he acting under any duress nor was 
                                                 
186 Planché v Colbourn (n 144). 
187 This is the position at common law under Appleby v Myers (1866-67) LR 2 CP 651 (Exch). There is now recovery 
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the provision of such services illegal or against public policy. The only way one might be able to 
argue that there is a defective transaction is to say that, when the claimant was providing the 
services, he did so under the agreed condition that the defendant would allow the claimant to 
complete the work. If that condition is broken, then the provision of the service is defective 
because the condition on which the transaction happened failed. It might very well be the case that 
in some cases the parties have indeed reached such an understanding. But this will not necessarily 
be the case; in most cases such an analysis is artificial. So, in fact, recovery cannot be explained 
under a defective transaction model. This, of course, does not mean that there is no basis for 
recovery in such cases. As will be argued in Chapter 5, recovery is granted on the ground that the 
recipient unduly gets the benefit of the claimant’s labour without bearing the burden thereof. This 
is true in all three instances and, in the second and third, there should be no recovery because the 
parties have agreed that this should be the case in the contract. But in the first instance, the 
defendant is, due to his conduct, disabled from invoking the contract; hence, there is no obstacle 
to awarding recovery based on the Benefit-Burden Principle. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The claim made in this Chapter is that in order to include all the non-contractual assumpsit claims 
under a common analytical framework, this framework has had to be stretched to include ad hoc 
exceptions. As a result, terms such as ‘enrichment’ and ‘unjust’ just mean ‘what the law considers 
them to be’. It follows that there is no coherence in unjust enrichment. In order for services to be 
accommodated a set of ad hoc rules concerning enrichment had to be adopted, furthermore the 
entire notion of ‘subjective devaluation’ has led to much confusion in the case law. And it remains 
the case that there is no single test for what amounts to an enrichment. If we did not try to make 
services fit within the structure, it would have been much easier to come up with a test for 
enrichment. 
 It is not just services that have caused problems. The inclusion of cases concerning the 
discharge of a debt of another have also lead to problems. They have required an ad hoc exception 
to the rule that an enrichment must be provided directly and not incidentally. Furthermore, the 
reason why there is recovery cannot be explained either in terms of impaired intention or defective 
transactions. This would not be a problem if such cases were removed from the scope of unjust 
enrichment. Then, there would be no ad hoc exception to the direct dealing rule and all the unjust 
factors would be about identifying a defect in the transaction. 
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 The reason for such over-inclusion was Birks’s quest for the ‘simplest structure on which 
the material in Goff and Jones can hang.’190 But the material Goff and Jones had collected (which 
included services and discharge of debts) all belonged together only in a loose way. They were all 
instances where recovery was justified by the moral principle against unjust enrichment. But that 
principle does not operate alone, and it needs other principles to tell us why something is unjust. 
This was a question with which Birks did not want to engage. As such he proceeded on the 
assumption that there could be a common analytical structure for all those cases. Such an analytical 
scheme could not be found in the cases but rather had to be ‘forced on to cases’.191 Yet, because 
of the key differences in the reasons for restitution between those cases, such forcing is artificial 
and has led to the incoherent analytical structure that we now have. In order to be able to properly 
provide one (or several) analytical schemes for the law, we must answer the question which Birks 
refused to engage in: what are the various reasons why there is restitution in the different cases 
where it is available? It is this question which this thesis will endeavour to answer.  
  
                                                 
190 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 1) 3. 
191 ibid 4. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PROPERTY 
PRINCIPLE - MONEY AND GOODS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Birks took the mistaken payment of a non-existent liability to be the core case of unjust enrichment. 
Everything else is a generalisation from that instance.1 Birks took it as given that there must be 
liability in such a case and he called ‘unjust enrichment’ the event that results in that liability. There 
is, however, a normative question that was not asked: why is there liability in such a case? 
Webb recently provided an explanation for recovery in terms of property: the money 
should be returned because it belongs to the claimant.2 That view has in various forms been 
defended by amongst others Stoljar, Watts and Jaffey.3 The standard objection to such views is that 
title has in fact passed and so property cannot provide the explanation for recovery.4 Defenders of 
the proprietary theories of course know that title has passed. Rather, their point is that a normative 
moral entitlement remains.5 Another way of reading the objections to the proprietary theory might 
be that the law does not recognise mere moral entitlements. Whilst the point of this Chapter is not 
to engage in this debate, with those objections being addressed in Chapter 6, it will be argued in 
this Chapter that this proprietary theory is how lawyers in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries 
thought the law was justified.  
 At this juncture it is important to distinguish between normative issues and analytical ones. 
The normative questions are whether and why there should be recovery. The analytical ones are 
which tools did the courts use to give recovery in the cases where they felt such recovery was 
normatively justified. The older cases are peppered with references to implied contract. At first 
glance an observer might be forgiven for thinking that this was the normative justification for 
                                                 
1 P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 2–19. 
2 C Webb, Reasons and Restitution (Oxford University Press 2016) 75–76. 
3 S Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (2nd edn, The Law Book Company of Australia 1989) 7–10; P Jaffey, ‘The 
Unjust Enrichment Fallacy and Private Law’ (2013) 26 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 115; P Watts, 
‘Restitution - A Property Principle and A Services Principle’ [1995] Restitution Law Review 49. 
4 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 52; A Burrows, The Law of 
Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford Universtiy Press 2011) 30. 
5 Webb (n 2) 66–70. 
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recovery. However, the term ‘contract’ was used both as a source of rights and as a method of 
classification.6 Only the former understanding goes to the normative question, whilst the latter goes 
to the analytical one. This Chapter will consider both the normative question (‘why did the courts 
award recovery?’) and the analytical one (‘which tools did the court use to award recovery?’) It will 
be argued that, whilst the answer to the first question remained constant (it was always the 
proprietary theory), the answer to the second question varied and the courts first adopted a tortious 
structure before adopting a contractual one. The focus of this Chapter is historical. It only seeks to 
identify how lawyers in the past reasoned. An evaluation of the theories and concepts they used is 
beyond the scope of the chapter. 
 Part II considers the normative basis and Part III considers the analytical structure. Part IV 
completes the analysis by arguing that claims for goods are also based on the proprietary basis. Part 
V will consider the implications of that analysis. In particular it will be argued that the proprietary 
background against which unjust enrichment first appeared means that the concept of unjust 
enrichment had a different meaning then than it has now. Unjust enrichment was seen as derivative 
from property and the rights created by unjust enrichment derived from property rights. This is 
different from the current conception of unjust enrichment according to which it is an event – not 
triggered by property rights – and which can, on some views, lead to the recognition of property 
rights. To put the point another way: unjust enrichment and property had precisely the opposite 
relationship than they do now. So, understood, it will also be shown that there was no real conflict 
between the implied contract theory and unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment was the normative 
basis for recovery and implied contract was the analytical tool used to award recovery. Some brief 
conclusions are offered in Part VI. 
II. WHAT WAS THE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR 
RECOVERY OF MONEY? 
 
The action for money had and received (‘MHR’) is a response to a problem. The problem in 
question is the peculiar nature of money. Title to it passes very easily and when it does not pass it 
is extinguished by mixture.7 It was, therefore, much harder to give a legal remedy for mistaken 
transfers of money than it was for other chattels. In an essay in 1856 Lindley stated the problem 
thus: 
 
                                                 
6 T Baloch, Unjust Enrichment and Contract (Hart Publishing UK 2009) 10–13. 
7 For more about this see Chapter 6 Section I.A.2. 
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Take, for example, the case of money paid by mistake in satisfaction of a debt erroneously supposed to be 
due. The money paid ought clearly to be returned, but the means by which its return could be compelled 
were by no means obvious or satisfactory. Covenant was out of the question, trespass equally so, trover or 
detinue would not lie, inasmuch as the ownership in the particular coins paid had been transferred, account 
was doubtful and tedious, debt presupposed a contract.8 
 
And so, in order to give that remedy the courts had to employ a fiction: 
 
In this difficulty, a promise to return the money was imputed by a fiction, and by means of this fiction the 
remedy by assumpsit was made available. The fictitious promise was called a promise in law, an implied 
promise. A denial by the defendant that he made any promise in point of fact, was wholly useless, he ought 
to return the money, and the fiction was necessary as a means whereby to compel him so to do.9 
 
It is, therefore, clear that Lindley understood that implied contract was not the basis of the action 
but rather was just the technical mechanism used to give effect to the obligation. The basis of the 
action was that ‘the plainest principles of morality give rise to an obligation which, in the opinion 
of Common Law Judges, ought to be enforceable at law’.10 It is important to distinguish two claims 
that Lindley makes: (1) there is a moral obligation to return the money and (2) that moral obligation 
ought to be enforceable at law. The second point is very important for it clearly is not the case that 
every moral obligation must be enforced at law. A sound normative explanation must be able to 
answer those two questions: (1) why is there a moral obligation to return the money? (2) why should 
the law enforce that moral obligation? 
 The thesis of this Chapter is that from the 18th Century until the 1950s the received view 
amongst judges, lawyers and commentators was that the answers to those questions were as 
follows: (1) because morally the money belongs to the claimant (‘the property theory’) and (2) the 
lack of legal remedy is due to law having special rules governing the passing of title to money and 
so the law must provide a functionally equivalent remedy to the claimant to ensure that he does 
not lose out (‘the mess explanation’11). 
 
                                                 
8 N Lindley, ‘On the Theory of Implied Contracts’ (1856) 24 The Law Magazine: Quarterly Review of Jurisprudence 
27, 36. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid 37. 
11 A term coined by McBride for explanations of the law according to which ‘C is allowed to sue D not because 
anyone has done anything wrong, but because something has gone wrong, and allowing C to sue D is the only (or 
best) way to clear up the mess that has been created’: N Mcbride, ‘Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: The Coming 
Counter-Revolution’, 8th Biennial Obligations Conference, University of Cambridge (2016). 
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A. The money belongs to the defendant 
 
In a recent article, Michael Lobban surveys quite a few sources which use the language of 
ownership of money.12 Whilst I have included additional sources I am indebted to him for his 
survey. There are several cases dealing with MHR which explicitly state that the money belongs to 
the plaintiff. In Attorney-General v Perry the court said:  
 
whenever a man receives money belonging to another without any reason, authority or consideration, an 
action lies against the receiver as for money received to the other's use; and this, as well where the money is 
received through mistake under colour, and upon an apprehension, though a mistaken apprehension of 
having a good authority to receive it, as where it is received by imposition, fraud or deceit in the receiver (for 
there is always an imposition and deceit upon him that pays, where it is paid) by colour of a void warrant or 
authority, although the receiver be innocent of it.13 
 
In Moses v Macferlan Lord Mansfield unified the categories in which the action for money and 
received would be granted under the principle that ‘ex aequo et bono’ the money ought to be 
refunded. What did he mean by that phrase? The first time he uses it in the judgement he expresses 
the point in the language of ownership: 
 
One great benefit, which arises to suitors from the nature of this action, is, that the plaintiff needs not state 
the special circumstances from which he concludes ‘that, ex æquo & bono, the money received by the 
defendant, ought to be deemed as belonging to him:’ he may declare generally, ‘that the money was received 
to his use;’ and make out his case, at the trial.14 
 
Lord Mansfield, in saying that money is ‘deemed to belong’, recognises that the actual legal title is 
not retained.15 This is why, if he wants to say that the money belongs, to the plaintiff he must appeal 
to an extra-legal notion of ‘ex aequo et bono’. Similarly, in Clarke v Shee and Johnson Lord Mansfield 
spoke of the action lying by the ‘true owner.’16 Before considering the meaning of ownership ‘ex 
aequo et bono’ and what lawyers understood by it, let us look at other instances of proprietary 
language in the cases.  
                                                 
12 M Lobban, ‘Mapping the Common Law: Some Lessons From History’ [2014] New Zealand Law Review 21. I am 
grateful to C Webb for pointing me in the direction of that article. 
13 Attorney-General v Perry (1733) 2 Comyns 481, 92 ER 1169 [491].  
14 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burrow 1005, 97 ER 676 [1010]. 
15 Lord Mansfield was, of course, very familiar with the rules governing the passing of title in money having decided 
Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burrow 452, 97 ER 398 just two years before.  
16 Clarke v Shee and Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp 197, 98 ER 1041 [200]. 
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In Hudson v Robinson Lord Ellenborough explained that the ‘action for money had and 
received is maintainable wherever the money of one man has, without consideration, got into the 
pocket of another.’17 In Stephen v Badcock counsel for the plaintiff said that the action was ‘properly 
applicable where money has been paid into the hands of one person which, ex æquo et bono, 
belongs to another’. Counsel for the defendant agreed and so did Lord Tenderden CJ who said, 
‘the money being received for the plaintiff and belonging to him’.18 In Edwards v Bates Tindal CJ 
explained that ‘[t]he ground and principle upon which this form of action is maintainable is, that 
the defendant has received money which, ex æquo et bono, belongs to the plaintiff… it has always 
rested upon that ground.’19 Such language continues in the 20th Century. In Baker v Courage 
Hamilton J (later Lord Sumner) said that 
 
[i]t was said that the cause of action is in the nature of a breach by the payee of a duty to hand over money 
which ex æquo et bono does not belong to him, but belongs to the payor, and that there can be no breach 
of that duty where the facts which give rise to the duty have not been brought to the payee's attention.20  
 
He then went on to deny the implication made21 but he never challenged the proprietary 
explanation. Four years later in R Leslie v Sheil A. T. Lawrence J explained that MHR ‘arises 
wherever money has been received which ex æquo et bono belongs to the plaintiff’.22 In United 
Australia v Barclays Bank Lord Porter said that ‘[t]he fiction forming the basis of the action of 
assumpsit may be an implied promise but the substance is the right of the plaintiff to recover 
property or its proceeds from one who has wrongfully received them.’23 So it would appear that 
the cases put the normative basis of MHR firmly on a proprietary basis. 
In addition to these English authorities we can also cite a number of US cases where the 
notion of ‘ex aequo et bono’ ownership was used.24 In Claflin v Godfrey the Supreme Judicial Court 
                                                 
17 Hudson v Robinson (1816) 4 M & S 475, 105 ER 910 [478]. 
18 Stephen v Badcock (1832) 3 B & Ad 354, 110 ER 133, [356] (counsel for plaintiff), [359] (counsel for defendant), 
[360] (Lord Tenderden). 
19 Edwards v Bates (1844) 7 M & G 590, 135 ER 238 [597]. 
20 Baker v Courage [1910] 1 KB 56 (CA) 65. 
21 That there cannot be a duty to return the money until the defendant knows of the relevant facts. 
22 R Leslie Ltd v Sheill [1914] 3 KB 607 (EWCA) 626. 
23 United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1 (HL) 54. This passage was cited by Stoljar in support of the 
proprietary theory: S Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (1st edn, The Law Book Company of Australia 1964) 7. In his 
review Wade says the passage in context does not give as much support to Stoljar as he thinks: J Wade, ‘Review’ 
(1966) 16 University of Toronto Law Journal 473, 474 fn 4. I disagree. It is true that the passage does not provide a 
knockout blow in favour of the proprietary theory, but it does show that proprietary thinking was present then. 
24 A search on all US Federal and State cases in Westlaw reveals that there are just under 300 cases where ‘ex aequo 
et bono’ was used in the same sentence as ‘belongs’. 
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of Massuchesetts explained that the action ‘aims at the abstract justice of the case, and looks solely 
to the inquiry, whether the defendant holds money, which ex æquo et bono belongs to the plaintiff.’25 
In Wells v American Export Company a court in Wisconsin cited approvingly Lord Ellenborough in 
Hudson v Robinson26 and added, ‘an obligation is implied, in law, on the part of the defendant to pay 
it over to the rightful owner.’27 One year later another court explained that the action ‘proceeds 
upon the theory that the defendant has in his possession money which ex aequo et bono belongs 
to the plaintiff.’28 In 1885 a court in Oregon added that ‘[w]henever one person obtains possession 
of money which, ex aequo et bono, belongs to another, the latter may maintain an action to recover 
it.’29 Five years later a court in New York said that ‘the plaintiff's case depended upon the question 
to which party, plaintiff or defendant, does the money, ex aequo et bono, belong?’30 Such language by 
US courts continued throughout the 20th Century. Indeed, one can even find a case decided in 2009 
that uses such language.31 The Australian courts also used the language of ownership. In 1912 
Griffiths CJ said in the High Court that: ‘the action for money had and received lay whenever the 
defendant had received money which in justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff.’32 
That this was the understanding of the law in England is confirmed when one looks at the 
writings of commentators. Michael Nolan wrote in 1795 that ‘[t]he substance and principle of the 
action for money had and received is, that the defendant have received a sum of Money belonging 
to the plaintiff, which he ought, by the ties of justice and equity, to refund…’33 Similarly William 
Evans in his leading essay on the action said ‘the foundation of it being a retention by one man of 
the property which he had unduly received from another, or received for a purpose, the failure of 
which rendered it improper that he should retain it.’34 Samuel Comyn in his Law of Contract 
explained that:  
 
If a person received money, or something which has been converted into money, belonging to another, and 
has no legal or equitable right to retain it, the law deems this to be so much money had and received to the 
use of the proprietor thereof, and raises a promise by implication, on the part of the receiver, to pay it over; 
                                                 
25 Claflin v Godfrey (1838) 38 Mass 1, 6. This was approved by the US Supreme Court in United States v Jefferson Electric 
Mfg Co (1934) 291 US 386 (USSC) 402–3. 
26 Hudson v Robinson (n 17). 
27 Wells v American Export Company (1880) 49 Wis 224, 5 NW 333, 335. 
28 Howard v Donahue (1881) 7 Pacific Coast Law Journal 332 (California). 
29 Peterson v Foss (1885) 12 Or 81, 6 P 397, 398. 
30 Chapman v Forbes (1890) 123 NY 532, 26 NE 3, 3. 
31 Haugabook v Crisler (2009) 297 Ga App 428, 677 SE2d 355, 358. 
32 R v Brown (1912) 14 CLR 17 (HC Aus) 25. 
33 M Nolan, ‘Notes to Dutch v Warren (1720)’ in Strange Reports (3rd Edition, 1795) cited in Lobban (n 12) 52. 
34 W Evans, ‘An Essay on the Action for Money Had and Received’ [1998] Restitution Law Review 1, 4. 
 Ch 3: Property Principle  
 
 
51 
and upon his refusal to do so, an action of indebitatus assumpsit will lie against him at the suit of the rightful 
owner, as for money had and received.35 
 
In 1868 the third edition of Bullen and Leake said that the action was applicable ‘wherever the 
defendant has received money, which, in justice and equity, belongs to the plaintiff, under 
circumstances which render the receipt of it a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.’36 
Writing in 1936, Fifoot took the view that this had been the settled understanding until Sinclair v 
Brougham.37 
 Further support can be drawn from the fact that judges and commentators drew analogies 
between the property torts of trover and detinue and MHR. In Hambly v Trott38 the court was 
considering the applicability of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona39 to actions in trover 
when the defendant executor was still in possession of the goods which the testator had converted. 
Lord Mansfield said that, whilst trover was in the form of a tort, it was founded on property.40 He 
drew an analogy with money had and received when he said that if the goods had been sold then 
it would be clear that MHR would lie.41 Similarly, Ashton J stated that ‘[t]here seems to be but little 
difference between actions of trover, and actions for money had and received.’42 
 The converse analogy was made in Freeman v Jeffries,43 where the issue was whether in order 
to establish the cause of action for MHR it was necessary for the plaintiff to give notice of the 
mistake and for the defendant to refuse to give the money back. Bramwell B held that the action 
was based on an analogy with trover and detinue: 
 
Let me suppose the case that the plaintiff had brought against the defendant an action of trover or detinue 
for the promissory note. It is admitted that the plaintiff could not have established his cause of action without 
some demand; for how could there be a wrongful detention until some claim was made? If this is so, how 
can money paid be demanded back by an action without previous notice?44 
                                                 
35 S Comyn, The Law of Contracts and Promises upon Various Subjects and with Particular Persons as Settled in the Action of 
Assumpsit (2nd edn, Joseph Butterworth and Son 1824) 266. 
36 Bullen and Leake, Precedents of Pleadings (3rd Edition, 1868), 44. Cited in C Fifoot, Lord Mansfield (Clarendon Press 
1936) 246.  
37 ibid 246–245.  
38 Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowp 371, 98 ER 1136. 
39 According to which a suit could not be brought against the executor of a dead person for wrongs he had 
committed. 
40 Hambly v Trott (n 38) [374]. 
41 ibid [373]. 
42 ibid. 
43 Freeman v Jeffries (1868-69) LR 4 Ex 189 (Exch). 
44 ibid 201 (Bramwell B). 
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Martin B agreed with Bramwell B but without relying on the analogy with trover and detinue. Pigott 
B was sympathetic but decided the case on different grounds. So did Kelly CB. The similarities 
between trover and money had and received was also noted by some commentators. In 1898 Ames 
noted the parallels between trover and assumpsit and said: 
 
if the res so acquired [by fraud or duress] is money, the plaintiff may have an action of assumpsit for money 
had and received to his use; and if the res is a chattel other than money, the plaintiff is allowed, at least in 
this country, to sue the defendant in trover.45 
 
B. Two objections to the moral ownership theory 
 
There are two possible alternative interpretations of the sources considered in the previous cases. 
The first is that in those cases the money did legally belong to the plaintiff. The second is that as a 
matter of equity it did. The point of those alternative interpretations is that the judges and 
commentators were not suggesting that the money belonged to the plaintiff merely on the moral 
plane. 
 According to some writers, MHR exists in two modes: proprietary and unjust enrichment. 
In the former cases, the claimant, at the time of receipt, retains title to the money.46 Hence all the 
action does is vindicate legal property rights and there is nothing exceptional about it at all. 
According to such writers Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale47 is an example of the action operating in such 
fashion. However, in the latter category of cases title has passed at the time of receipt and so the 
rationale for recovery cannot be proprietary. Instead, those authors claim that the basis of the 
action is unjust enrichment, which, in their understanding, is something distinct from a property 
claim.48 Hence, the objection goes, insofar as I show that there are some cases which are based on 
the vindication of property rights, this does not undermine the view of these commentators that 
something other than property is the explanation in cases where title has passed. 
 To this objection I make two points. First, in the cases cited it was clear that title had 
passed. This is why the judges qualified the language of ownership with ‘ex aequo et bono’. Second, 
the commentators at the time did not draw a distinction between cases where the action would 
                                                 
45 JB Ames, ‘The History of Trover II. Replevin’ (1898) 11 Harvard Law Review 374, 386. 
46 Virgo (n 4) 642. 
47 [1991] 2 AC 548. 
48 Virgo (n 4) 8, 12–13, 58. In section V.A below, I will address the relationship between unjust enrichment and 
property.  
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arise because legal title had not passed and those where it had passed. For them it was all about 
property. 
 The second objection has more strength.49 It argues that when the courts spoke of 
ownership ‘ex aequo et bono’ all they meant was that in equity title was retained, i.e. that a trust 
was formed whenever there was a mistaken payment. Support for this view can be gleaned from 
the name of the action itself: ‘money had and received to the plaintiff’s use’. The reference to 
‘plaintiff’s use’ suggests that the plaintiff retains beneficial ownership of the money. Indeed, the 
formula was borrowed from the action of account against a receiver.50 As Lobban remarks, the 
idea of seeing ‘quasi-contractual’ obligations as involving some kind of trust was present in the 17th 
and early 18th Century.51 Furthermore, the 5th edition of Ballow’s Treatise of Equity states: 
 
And no man can be deprived of his estate and property, but with his consent or by order of law; as by some 
contract and conveyance, or by a forfeiture for some crime, or want of claim in due time, or for some other 
default or negligence in him; and therefore if a man pays money upon a mistake, it not being intended as a gift, the receiver 
shall take it only in trust for him that paid it; and he may recover it back even at law.52 
 
The reasoning of the passage seems to be: since there was no proper consent for title passing, the 
beneficial ownership is retained. This is very similar to the Birks-Chambers view.53 However, the 
accuracy of that statement can be questioned. The marginal annotation refers to Buller’s Ni. Pri. 
Page 131. It is unclear which edition this refers to. The editions consulted did not, at this page, 
include any support for that view. No additional authorities are cited for the proposition that the 
money is held on trust, nor have any been identified. There are additional reasons to reject the view 
that ‘ex aequo et bono’ referred to ownership in equity. In Edwards v Bates the court held that MHR 
could not be used to recover money paid upon trust, unless the trust had been closed and a surplus 
remained.54 It was in that very same case that Tindal CJ said that the basis of the action was that 
the money belonged ex aequo et bono to the plaintiff. Hence, it is clear that for Tindal CJ 
ownership ex aequo et bono must have meant something different to ownership in equity. The 
point is not that money had and received was unavailable to recover trust property, it occasionally 
                                                 
49 I am grateful to David Ibbetson for pressing the point. 
50 JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 370. 
51 Lobban (n 12) 52. 
52 H Ballow, A Treatise of Equity : With the Addition of Marginal References and Notes / by John Fonblanque., Vol 
2/2 (5th edn, J & WT Clarke 1820) 4. The footnote adds: ‘The receiving of money, which consistently with 
conscience cannot be retained, is in equity sufficient to raise a trust from whom, or on whose account it was 
received.’ It then goes on to draw the distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. 
53 R Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Clarendon Press 1997). 
54 Edwards v Bates (n 19). 
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was.55 Rather, the point is that the judges and commentators did not equate ‘ex aequo et bono’ with 
ownership in equity.56 This is confirmed when one looks at the meaning of that phrase as it was 
used in the 18th and 19th Centuries. 
 
 
C. What does ‘ex aequo et bono’ mean? 
 
‘Ex aequo et bono’ and its companion phrase ‘secundum aequum et bonum’ mean ‘according to 
what is just and good.’ A search in the English Reports indicates that the first use of the phrase ‘ex 
aequo et bono’ in English law was by Lord Mansfield in Moses v Macferlan.  
The term is now better known in the context of international dispute settlement. The Oxford 
Dictionary of Law 8th Ed says, ‘The phrase refers to the way in which an international tribunal can 
base its decision not upon conventional law but on what is just and fair to the parties before it.’57 
Under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that court has the power to 
decide the case on that basis if the parties so request. Such adjudication has its origin in the medieval 
law merchant. The merchant judges provided a quick way of resolving disputes for itinerant 
merchants, which was separate from the local laws. According to Trakman, decisions did not rely 
on an abstract conception of ‘the good’ and  
 
were not to be guided by the naked discretion of merchant judges nor by their personal sense of fair play, 
decency, or expediency. They were to be grounded in the tenets of mercantile fairness, developed according 
to the manner in which merchants conducted trade, and responsive to trading relations among merchant 
parties.58 
 
Whilst Lord Mansfield was intimately familiar with the Law Merchant, this does not seem to be 
what he had in mind. ‘Ex aequo et bono’ in the Law Merchant was a form of adjudication that 
involved ignoring the local law. This is not what Lord Mansfield, as one of Her Majesty’s Justices, 
                                                 
55 L Smith, ‘Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 338. 
56 See for a review of the US cases coming to the conclusion that ‘equity’ did not means equity in the legal sense: E 
Bishop, ‘Money Had and Received, an Equitable Action at Law’ (1933) 7 Southern California Law Review 41. 
57 J Law (ed), Oxford Dictionary of Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2015). 
58 L Trakman, ‘Ex Aequo et Bono - Demystifying an Ancient Concept’ (2008) 8 Chicago Journal of International 
Law 621, 630. 
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was doing. Aequum et bonum was also the Latin translation of ‘epikia’59 in Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics. According to Aristotle, situations would arise where the application of general laws to a 
particular case would not do justice as it is not the typical instance the legislator legislated for. In 
such a context Aristotle said that epikia/aequum et bonum had to be used as a corrective ‘to say 
what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law 
had he known.’60 In essence, Aristotle’s point is that a concept is needed to do justice in cases where 
there are unjust unintended consequences of the application of certain laws. Finally, the term also 
appears in Roman Law where it is linked with natural law with Paulus saying that ‘what always is 
just and fair (aequum et bonum) is called ius, as is the case with ius naturale.’61 
 Pollock wrote a two-part article on natural law at the turn of the 20th Century. In the first 
part he drew a common thread between Aristotle, the Roman law concept of ius naturale and the 
Law Merchant.62 In the second part he talked about the reception of such ideas into the Common 
Law. He lamented the fact that such ideas had less influence in England than they did on the 
Continent, whilst they continued to have some influence on Scotland which was ‘in closer touch 
with Continental thought than England’. Hence it was ‘no accident that our two great rational law 
reforms of the second half of the 18th Century were carried out by Lord Mansfield, a Scotsman by 
birth.’63 Those two great reforms were the incorporation of the Law Merchant and the development 
of quasi-contract. Of the latter Pollock said it ‘rests on a bold and timely application, quite 
conscious and avowed, of principles derived from the Law of Nature.’64 
 Farwell LJ in Baylis v Bishop of London agreed. He said: ‘Lord Mansfield was referring to the 
jus naturale of Roman law … which has had a considerable influence in moulding our common 
law.’65 He referred to his judgement in Bradford Corporation v Ferrand66 where he talked about how 
the jus naturale was a source of rights for English law. He was there concerned with a number of 
English cases which held that the rights to enjoy a stream of water belonged, ‘ex jure naturae’, to 
the proprietor of the adjoining lands. After analysing those cases he said:  
 
                                                 
59 I am grateful to Lorenzo Maniscalco for pointing out to me since the 1450s all Latin translations of Aristotle used 
the term aequo et bono for ekitas.  
60 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (D Ross and H Fielding eds, Oxford University Press 2009) bk V.10. 
61 D.1.1.11 pr. 
62 F Pollock, ‘The History of the Law of Nature: A Preliminary Study’ (1900) 2 Journal of the Society for 
Comparative Legislation 418. 
63 F Pollock, ‘The History of the Law of Nature: A Preliminary Study’ (1901) 3 Journal of the Society for 
Comparative Legislation 204, 207. 
64 ibid. 
65 Baylis v Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch 127 (EWCA) 137 (Farwell LJ). 
66 Bradford Corporation v Ferrand [1902] 2 Ch 655. 
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I have come to the conclusion, therefore, that jus naturae is used in these cases as expressing that principle 
in English law which is akin to, if not derived from, the jus naturae of Roman law. English law is, of course, 
quite independent of Roman law, but the conception of æquum et bonum and the rights flowing therefrom 
which are included in jus naturae underlie a great part of English common law.67 
 
He refers, inter alia, to Lord Mansfield’s judgement in Moses v Macferlan as such an example and 
concludes that he is ‘not, therefore, introducing any novel principle if I regard jus naturae on which 
the right to running water rests, as meaning that which is æquum et bonum between the upper and 
lower proprietors.’68 He concluded that the matter before him was ‘one to be decided on the general 
consideration of æquum et bonum.’69 The idea that the courts could give a remedy for a right which 
was not legal was also found in Lindley’s article70 and was also articulated, in the context of MHR, 
in a case from Wisconsin: 
 
The right is the creation of equity; but having come into existence, the right to recover is a legal right, 
enforceable by legal remedies. I would not speak of the right to money had and received as an equitable right, 
nor of the remedy to enforce it, as in its nature equitable, nor the form of the action as legal; but that the 
primary right is a creation of equity, the right to enforce it is a legal right the same as in case of any other legal 
obligation; and the remedy to enforce it is the civil action of the Code.71 
 
So, we have three related concepts of aequo et bono: (1) a source of rights, (2) a corrective on the 
application of general legal norms, (3) a method of adjudication where the goal is to do justice. The 
following is somewhat speculative, but we can see Lord Mansfield saying that as a matter of ius 
naturale the money belonged to the claimant,72 that the rules about the passing of title to money 
unjustly and unintentionally deprived the plaintiff of his legal right and so, in order to do justice, 
the common law would afford a remedy in order to recover the money. It is plausible that this 
second aspect (the mess explanation) is what Lord Mansfield had in mind, but he did not explicitly 
articulate it. The first such articulation happened in the early 20th Century. 
 
                                                 
67 ibid 661–2 (Farwell LJ). 
68 ibid 662 (Farwell LJ). 
69 ibid 665 (Farwell LJ). 
70 Lindley (n 8). 
71 Steuerwald v Richter (1914) 158 Wis 597, 149 NW 692, 695. 
72 On this point he is fairly explicit when he says that ex aequo et bono the money is deemed to belong to the 
plaintiff. 
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D. Enter the mess explanation 
 
Most commentators see Sinclair v Brougham73 as the case which attempted to kill off unjust 
enrichment and replace it with the implied contract theory. As I will argue below, and as R. M. 
Jackson pointed out in 1936, such a reading confuses the normative basis of the law and its 
analytical structure.  For now, I wish to focus on the mess explanation. It seems that the first time 
it was judicially stated was in Sinclair v Brougham in particular in the speech of Lord Dunedin.  
 He first identifies the proprietary principle as the underlying basis for the recovery of 
money: ‘it is clear that all ideas of natural justice are against allowing A. to keep the property of B., 
which has somehow got into A.'s possession without any intention on the part of B. to make a gift 
to A.’74 He explains that, when dealing with chattels, the matter is easy because there is a jus in re 
and so an action founded on the retained property right would do the trick. But for fungibles, 
especially money, the jus in re disappears. How to go about solving that problem?75 One possible 
argument is that there is no problem at all and that the plaintiff should not recover. This relies on 
the maxim that ‘when there is a jus in re an action will lie, and when there is not such a jus it will 
not.’76 But Lord Dunedin thinks this is obviously hopeless:  
 
This comes to this, that having got hold of property which does not belong to you, if only you are wise or 
lucky enough to change its form you may enjoy the proceeds unmolested. Such a plea on the face of it seems 
only worthy of the Pharisee who shook himself free of his natural obligations by saying Corban. In the words 
of technical equity it is unconscionable.77  
 
The Biblical example Lord Dunedin used is worth unpacking. The passage is found in Mark’s 
Gospel78 where Jesus is debating the Pharisees. A Corban was an offering to the God (more 
precisely to the Temple). Jesus is criticising the Pharisees for failing to obey the fourth 
commandment (‘honour thy father and thy mother’) - which requires them to support their parents 
in old age – by saying something is Corban (i.e. an offering to God) instead of using it to fulfil their 
                                                 
73 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 (UKHL). 
74 ibid 431 (Lord Dunedin). 
75 ibid (Lord Dunedin). 
76 ibid 432 (Lord Dunedin). 
77 ibid 435 (Lord Dunedin). 
78 ‘For Moses said, “Honor your father and your mother”; and, “Whoever reviles father or mother must surely 
die.” 11 But you say, “If a man tells his father or his mother, ‘Whatever you would have gained from me is Corban’” 
(that is, given to God)— 12 then you no longer permit him to do anything for his father or mother, 13 thus making 
void the word of God by your tradition that you have handed down. And many such things you do.’ : ‘Mark’ vv 
7:10-13 (ESV). 
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duty towards their parents. So, Jesus is critical of the reliance on a technical rule in order to avoids 
one’s natural obligations.79 Similarly, Lord Dunedin thinks it would be wrong for someone to rely 
on the special rules governing the passing of title to money in order to avoid having to give 
someone their money back. 
 He then addresses the problem with the argument based on the fact that title has passed: 
 
the whole strength of this argument lies in the idea that the jus in re represents the depositors' only right: that 
there can be no obligation on the other side at all. It is here that I think the importance of the action for 
money had and received comes in. That cannot be founded on a jus in re, for you cannot have a jus in re in 
currency. It shews that both an action founded on a jus in re, such as an action to get back a specific chattel, 
and an action for money had and received are just different forms of working out the higher equity that no 
one has a right to keep either property or the proceeds of property which does not belong to him.80 
 
By ‘higher equity’ he does not mean equity in the technical sense but in the sense of ‘inherent ideas 
of justice’,81 and he thought Lord Mansfield meant it in the same way. Here he links the mess 
explanation with the proprietary theory. The point is this: even though the technical rules 
concerning money mean that the defendant has legal title in the money, morally the money still 
belongs to the plaintiff. It would be unjust to allow the defendant to take advantage of those 
technical rules (it would be acting like the Pharisees) and so the common law will grant a remedy 
that gets around the problem of legal title having passed. But the basis of the award of that remedy 
remains the moral ownership of the money by the plaintiff. 
 We see further articulation of the proprietary mess explanation by Lord Sumner – 
apparently the great enemy of unjust enrichment – in Jones v Waring.82 Here again he confronts the 
fallacious argument that the defendant should be allowed to retain the money because title has 
passed: 
 
It is the peculiar character of coin or currency that gives rise to this idea. If a tradesman misdelivers goods, so that the 
wrong person gets them, many laymen and all lawyers recognize at once that they do not thereby become the 
property of the receiver, for passing of property is a question of intention, and obviously the tradesman never meant 
in such circumstances to make his goods the property of the wrong man. When goods are found, the maxim 
that finding is keeping attracts many people, but not without a strong subconsciousness of guilt. In the case 
                                                 
79 See the Pulpit Commentary (http://biblehub.com/commentaries/pulpit/mark/7.htm , accessed 8/22/16) and St 
Thomas’s Aquinas’s Exposio in Marcum (http://dhspriory.org/thomas/CAMark.htm#7 , accessed 8/22/16). See 
‘Pulpit Commentary - Mark 7’ (Bible Hub) <http://biblehub.com/commentaries/pulpit/mark/7.htm>; St Thomas 
Aquinas, Exposio in Marcum (JH Newman tr, 1842) 130–4 <http://dhspriory.org/thomas/CAMark.htm#7>. 
80 Sinclair v Brougham (n 73) 436 (Lord Dunedin). 
81 ibid 432 (Lord Dunedin). 
82 Jones v Waring [1926] AC 670 (UKHL). 
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of payments of money, however, the notion is common that, if some one pays me money when he need not 
do so, it is my windfall, for I am not bound to keep his accounts for him. This is where the fallacy comes in. 
I may not be bound to know the payer's accounts but I ought to know my own. The executrix of Solari ought 
to have known, and probably did, that the company had cancelled the policy, and was making a mistake in 
paying again. If so, there was no real intention on the company's part to enrich her.83  
 
In Norwich Union v Price Lord Wright applied the mess explanation to expand the grounds of 
recovery from liability to all fundamental mistakes. He relied on Lord Sumner’s speech in Jones v 
Waring to establish that the matter was a question of whether there was an intention to pass title, 
notwithstanding the special rules concerning money. So, if a mistake was such that it would prevent 
title in a chattel from passing, MHR should be available if money was paid under the same mistake.84 
Lord Wright further expanded on this proprietary mess explanation in a 1937 lecture at Cambridge 
on Sinclair v Brougham.85 In his 1950 work on quasi-contract Munkman went for the same 
explanation of recovery: 
 
Now if property is transferred under some fundamental error (at least, property other than land) the transfer 
will be void, and the transferor can bring an action in tort (either detinue or conversion) for the return of the 
identical property property or for damages. But no such remedy is available where money is paid by one person to another. 
The property in the coins passes by delivery, and unless they are in a sealed bag, or the identical coins can be 
traced (in which case detinue would lie) there is no right in rem, and therefore the law creates a right in 
personam against the wrongdoer. Thus, where specific property has passed under an ineffective transfer, the right of 
ownership continues to subsist and the remedies for its infringement continues; whereas if money is paid under the same 
circumstances, it is impractical to vindicate the right of ownership, and the remedy is given by the creation of a quasi-contractual 
obligation. This explains why the law of quasi-contract is so exclusively concerned with money claims, a feature 
which at first sight appears peculiar.86  
  
                                                 
83 ibid 695 (Lord Sumner, emphasis added). 
84 Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v WMH Price Ltd [1934] AC 455 (UKHL) 462–3 (Lord Wright). 
85 Lord Wright, ‘Sinclair v Brougham’ (1938) 6 Cambridge Law Journal 305. 
86 J Munkman, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons 1950) 27.  
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III. THE CHANGING ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE 
 
For the reasons given above, the courts felt that they had to give a remedy in cases of mistaken 
payment (and other such cases). As Lindley had stated, they did so using the fiction of an implied 
promise. This was a procedural fiction used to make assumpsit available. However, the judges knew 
that this was a fiction.87 This raises an interesting question: how did the judges understand and 
classify MHR? It seems that until the end of the 19th Century they understood it as a tort, i.e. a 
form of wrong, and it was only in the early 20th Century that the action came to be understood as 
being akin to a contract. However, whilst the analytical structure changed, the normative 
foundation did not. The position is similar to that of detinue, which was sometimes conceived as 
a tort and sometimes conceived as a contract, but which did not completely fit either.88 
 
A. A tortious structure 
 
1. The focus on retention 
 
Ben Kremer89 has carried out an impressive survey of decisions prior to the 20th Century where he 
shows that the notion of unconscionability played a very important role in the law. The role 
conscience played was not as an adjudicative tool. The courts did not directly ask whether retention 
was against conscience. ‘Rather, “conscience” is used as a concept to underlie and structure the 
operation of an area of the law; it provides a generative, basal principle which is in turn used to 
construct rules’90 which the courts will apply. His survey reveals two important points for our 
purposes: (1) the focus of the court’s enquiry was whether the defendant had the right to retain the 
money, and (2) the enquiry was not claimant focused at all, there was no need to establish anything 
like an unjust factor. 
 As Kremer shows from his analysis of the cases, the rule was that ‘the plaintiff had to 
[show] that the defendant had no “right to retain” that which he had received.’91 For example, in 
Price v Neal Lord Mansfield says that ‘the plaintiff can not recover the money, unless it be against 
                                                 
87 Baloch (n 6) 42. 
88 Lobban (n 12) 46, 47. 
89 B Kremer, ‘The Action for Money Had and Received’ (2001) 17 Journal of Contract Law 93. 
90 ibid 107. 
91 ibid 109. 
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conscience in the defendant to retain it.’92 Indeed that right to retain need not be legal or equitable 
but can be moral. This is why Lord Mansfield said there would be no recovery for debts that were 
not enforceable, for example gaming debts or debts which were time barred. This is another role 
which conscience plays; it allows the right to retain to be moral and not just legal or equitable.93 
 There was no unjust factor analysis. The claimant did not have to plead one particular 
ground, such as mistake or failure of consideration. As Lord Mansfield said, the plaintiff ‘may 
declare generally that “the money was received to his use”.’94 This meant that the plaintiff ‘never 
was bound to pick among a number of discrete instances in which the defendant's retention of the 
monies had previously been held to be against conscience due to the lack of any right to retain 
them.’95 The relevance of the established categories was that these were instances where as a matter 
of precedent it was found that there was no right to retain. So, practically, it made recovery easier 
in those cases, but it was by no means the case that if one did not fall within one of those instances 
one would not recover.96 Instead, the enquiry would be about whether the defendant had a legal, 
equitable or moral right to retain. 
The importance of Kremer’s work for these purposes is the focus on retention. The 
language of retention presupposes that there is something that is retained. It also suggests that the 
duty is to return in kind and not merely in value. Of course, in the case of fungibles, and especially 
money, the difference between returning the thing itself and returning the value is a purely 
theoretical one. 
  
                                                 
92 Price v Neal (1762) 3 Burr 1354, 97 ER 871 [1357]. 
93 Kremer (n 89) 110. 
94 Moses v Macferlan (n 14) [1010] (Lord Mansfield). 
95 Kremer (n 89) 115. 
96 ibid 116. 
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2. A wrong as the trigger of the cause of action 
 
In Kelly v Solari Parke B suggested that in order to recover the plaintiff must give notice of the 
mistake and demand the money back.97 Whilst this was a mere obiter dictum it became established 
as the law in Freeman v Jeffries, where it was established that the cause of action is triggered by the 
commission of a wrong, namely failing to return the money, and that since retention must be 
unconscionable there should be no duty to return until the defendant knows of the circumstances 
which make his retention problematic. The case must be dealt with in some detail. 
Jeffries had agreed to sell a farm to Freeman, the value of which was to be determined by 
two valuers. After payment was made Freeman found out that the valuers had made a mistake and 
that he should have been charged less than he paid. However, he did not bring the matter to Jeffries’ 
attention and Freeman sold the farm to a third party. He then brought two claims against Jeffries. 
The first alleged that the valuers’ mistake rendered the whole transaction a nullity and so he was 
entitled to his entire money back. The second alleged that he should get the overpayment back. He 
lost and appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Exchequer.98 There were four different reasons 
for dismissing the appeal. One of which, shared by Martin B, Bramwell B and – obiter – Pigott B 
was that the claim for the overpayment could be brought but that it would fail for lack of notice:  
 
it would be an action for the return of a portion of the money paid, on the ground that the consideration 
had failed, and after notice given that it had failed. But unless some communication has been made by the 
plaintiff, he is not entitled to recover either the whole or any part of this sum.99  
 
Furthermore, as was seen in the previous section, Bramwell B also ruled against Freeman on the 
basis of analogy with claims in trover and detinue. If the plaintiff wanted to sue for a promissory 
note on the basis of trover or detinue he would need to have made a demand. Why should it be 
different for an action for money had and received?100 
What were the rationes of the judges? It is not the case, as Burrows suggests,101 that if a 
judge decides a case on multiple grounds only one of them is ratio. Rather, each of the grounds is 
                                                 
97 ‘though a demand may be necessary in those cases in which the party receiving may have been ignorant of the 
mistake’ Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M&W 54, 152 ER 24 [58] (Parke B). 
98 Freeman v Jeffries (n 43). 
99 ibid 200 (Martin B). 
100 ibid 201 (Bramwell B). 
101 Burrows (n 4) 608.  
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ratio.102 It can, of course, be the case that a judge treats one of the grounds as ratio and the other 
as dictum. This is the case for Pigott B’s agreement on the need for notice. To summarise, the 
various grounds for deciding the case were as follows: 
 
The various 
rationes of the 
judges 
(1) the  valuation is 
final 
(2) it is impossible 
to rescind so the 
whole value cannot 
be recovered 
(3) it is not 
inequitable for the 
defendant to retain 
surplus because it 
is impossible to 
return the parties 
in their original 
position 
(4) it not 
inequitable to 
retain because no 
notice was given 
Kelly CB Ratio Ratio Ratio  
Martin B103  Ratio  Ratio 
Bramwell B    Ratio 
Pigott B Ratio   Obiter dictum 
 
Given the above it is not possible to extract a ratio common to at least three of the judges. 
(4) gets the closest given that it has the support of three judges but falls short of being a common 
ratio because Pigott B explicitly expressed agreement only obiter. Nevertheless, various subsequent 
cases and commentators read Freeman v Jeffries as deciding (4). In England, Leake on Contracts, Addison 
on Contracts, Chitty on Contracts and the Encyclopedia of the Laws of England all said that a notice and a 
demand was necessary to complete the cause of action.104 This was also the interpretation of 
English law which the New Zealand courts adopted.105 The Courts in the United States also 
followed that interpretation of the law.106 Both Professors Keener107 and Woodward108 – who wrote 
the first two textbooks on quasi-contracts – also defended that view of the law. This view of the 
law made it into the First US Restatement: 
                                                 
102 Commissioner of Taxation for New South Wales v Palmer [1907] AC 179 (PC) 184 (Lord Macnaghten); R Cross and J 
Harris, Precedent in English Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 1991) 82. 
103 The headnote states that Martin also held against the plaintiff on ground (1): this is not true. 
104 Cited in Assets Company v R (1901) 21 NZLR 222 (NZHC) 226 (Williams J). 
105 Assets Company v R (n 104); (1902) 22 NZLR 459 (NZCA); Smith v Cunningham (1915) 34 NZLR 385 (NZHC); 
Merenea People v Anderson [1936] NZLR 47 (NZHC). 
106 E.g.  Scholey v Halsey (1878) 72 NY 578; Southwick v First National Bank of Memphis (1881) 84 NY 420. But see 
Leather Manufacturer’s Bank v Merchant’s Bank (1888) 128 US 26 (SCOTUS) (cause of action complete on receipt); but 
not followed: Bedell v The Oliver H Blair Co (1931) 15 Pa D&C 405. 
107 W Keener, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Baker, Voorhis and Company 1893) 141. 
108 F Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Little, Brown, and Company 1913) 9, 49. 
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There is no breach of duty to make restitution because of a transfer made by mistake until the transferee or 
beneficiary has notice of the facts upon which the transferor’s right depends and has had a reasonable 
opportunity for making restitution.109 
 
In addition to Keener and Woodward, Austin also provided a theoretical defence of wrongdoing 
as the trigger for the law’s intervention. Only fragments of the lectures Austin gave on quasi-
contracts and delicts remain. These lectures had taken place at University College, London in the 
late 1820s and early 1830s but were only published in the 1860s.110 Although only fragments remain, 
they do give us a very good picture of what people thought about quasi-contracts in the 19th 
Century. Austin said: 
 
But quasi-contract seems to have a larger importer; - denoting any incident by which one party obtains an 
advantage he ought not to retain, because the retention would damage another; or by reason of which he ought 
to indemnify the other. The prominent idea in quasi-contract seems to be an undue advantage which would 
be acquired by the obligor, if he were not compelled to relinquish it or to indemnify.111 
 
In the notes for his students he put the matter as follows: 
 
The erroneous payment and receipt is a source or cause of obligation, although the transaction is not a convention, 
and although there is nothing in the fact savouring of injury or wrong. There is no convention, inasmuch as 
the performance of an obligation is the only design of the payment. There is no wrong, inasmuch as the party 
who receives the money believes the money is due. But inasmuch as the money is not given, an obligation to 
return it attaches upon the party who receives it from the moment at which it is paid.112 
 
Austin rejected the distinction between quasi-contract and quasi-delict. For him it sufficed ‘to look 
at the incident as begetting an obligation; and to treat the refusal to make satisfaction, or to 
withhold the advantage, as a delict; i.e. as a breach of that obligation.’113 He applied that analysis to 
the mistaken payment case and reached a conclusion similar to that in Freeman v Jeffries: 
 
The refusal to pay money received under a mistake, appears to be, not a quasi-contract, nor a quasi-delict, 
but a delict; there being intentionality… 
                                                 
109 Seavey and Scott, Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Quasi-Contracts and Constructive Trusts (American Law Institute 
1937) s 63. 
110 Baloch (n 6) 43 fn 185. 
111 J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law (John Murray 1885) 911. 
112 ibid 983. 
113 ibid 912. 
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If there be no delict without intention or negligence, quasi-delicts (like quasi-contracts) are merely sources of 
obligations, the refusal to fulfill which is properly the cause of action. Thus, the fact of my having received money 
through a mistake, is not a delict; but begets an obligation to repay that money or equivalent. And the refusal 
(express or indicated by conduct) to repay, is the immediate cause of action: i.e. is a delict.114 
 
In other words, Austin’s thought seems to be as follows. The receipt of money by mistake would, 
if not given back, amount to an undue advantage and so the law imposes an obligation on the 
recipient to repay that money. Failure to fulfill that obligation would be a wrong, which the law will 
respond to using MHR. That is exactly the structure of the law following Freeman v Jeffries. 
 
3. No money retained and change of position 
 
The position concerning what we would now call change of position is less clear. Most 
contemporary textbooks cite Durrant v The Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England and Wales115 and 
Baylis v Bishop of London116 as having decided that, aside from the cases of payment over by an agent, 
change of position was not a defence to money had and received. In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Lord 
Goff also took the view that those two cases made recognition of the defence impossible.117 
 However, there were a number of earlier cases which did seem to recognise something like 
the defence of change of position. For example, in Dale v Sollet Lord Mansfield held that the plaintiff 
could only recover ‘what remains after deducting all just allowances which the defendant has a right 
to retain out of the very sum demanded.’118 
 In Skyring v Greenwood an officer had been overpaid by mistake. The Paymaster sought to 
recover the overpayment from his estate. The claim failed. Abbott CJ said:  
 
It is of great importance to any man, and certainly not less to military men than others, that they should not 
be led to suppose that their annual income is greater than it really is. Every prudent man accommodates his 
mode of living to what he supposes to be his income; it therefore works a great prejudice to any man, if after 
having had credit given him in account for certain sums, and having been allowed to draw on his agent on 
the faith that those sums belonged to him, he may be called upon to pay them back.119 
                                                 
114 ibid. 
115 (1880) 6 QBD 234 (Exch). 
116 (n 65). 
117 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 (UKHL) 579 (Lord Goff). 
118 Dale v Sollet (1767) 4 Burr 2133, 98 ER 112 [2134] (Lord Mansfield). 
119 Skyring v Greenwood (1825) 4 B & C 281, 107 ER 1064 [289] (Abbott CJ). 
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And in Brisbane v Dacres (better known as being one of the cases that established the mistake of law 
bar) Sir James Mansfield CJ120 said: 
 
So far from its being contrary to æquum et bonum, I think it would be most contrary to æquum et bonum, 
if he were obliged to repay it back. For see how it is! If the sum be large, it probably alters the habits of his 
life, he increases his expences, he has spent it over and over again; perhaps he cannot repay it at all, or not 
without great distress: is he then, five years and eleven months after, to be called on to repay it?121 
 
The similarity between those cases and a modern case such as Phillip Collins v Davis122 are striking. 
In that case the defendants had been overpaid and they sought to argue that they had the defence 
of change of position on the ground that they had upgraded their lifestyle. That defence was 
successful. Neither Skyring v Greenwood nor Brisbane v Dacres were cited in Phillip Collins v Davis. It is 
striking that in Philip Collins v Davis the court thought it was being innovative by applying the only 
nine years old defence of change of position, when in fact Mansfield CJ had come up with the same 
solution almost 200 years before. One could be forgiven for thinking that all we have done in 
recent times is re-invent the wheel. There are a number of other cases in which change of position 
was recognised as a defence, which are collated in Kremer’s article.123 The question then is why the 
defence was apparently rejected in Durrant and Baylis. This will be addressed in the next section 
dealing with the implied contract analysis. 
 To summarise, in the 19th Century and until the beginning of the 20th Century the law 
relating to MHR was remedial. It responded to the commission of a wrong. That wrong was the 
unconscionable retention of money. It was wrong to retain it because that money belonged ex 
aequo et bono to the plaintiff. What made the retention unconscionable was that the defendant 
knowingly acted in a way that was inconsistent with the fact the money belonged to someone else. 
Since the law was triggered by unconscionable retention, if there was nothing to retain because the 
money had been spent then there was no wrong. Hence, whilst there was no change of position 
defence, the requirement of unconscionable retention allowed for the same outcomes to be reached 
as would have been the case had change of position been recognised. To conclude, MHR was 
functionally equivalent to the tort of trover, albeit without strict liability. 
 
 
                                                 
120 No relation to Lord Mansfield. 
121 Brisbane v Dacres (1813) 5 Taunt 143, 128 ER 641 [162–3] (Mansfield CJ). 
122 Philip Collins Ltd v Davis and Satterfield [2000] 3 All ER 808 (Ch). 
123 Kremer (n 89) 116–9. 
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B. The move to implied contract 
 
Given that the form of MHR required an implied promise (albeit a fictional one), it was always 
going to have some affinities with contract. Indeed, even in the cases laying down a wrong based 
structure, there were references to contract. For example, in the New Zealand case of Assets 
Company v R Denniston J said: 
 
the action for money had and received is founded on a contract implied by law to pay on request money 
which it would be unconscientious, as against the plaintiff, to retain. That implies that the right of action does 
not arise till a request to pay is made. That does not seem to me unreasonable. One can hardly be said to 
retain money unconscientiously until he knows of the facts which make it unconscientious for him to retain 
it, and, notwithstanding such knowledge, retains it. If the contract is a contract to pay on request, the breach 
of the contract is a refusal after request to pay. Freeman v Jeffries is a distinct authority to the same effect.124 
 
However, the reasoning based on contract is superfluous. The same conclusion could have been 
arrived at using the idea of unconscionable retention. The law still had that remedial structure even 
though it was occasionally packaged as a contract. But in the early 20th Century that remedial 
structure was shattered in three cases decided in just four years. The common denominator of 
those cases was John Hamilton (later Lord Sumner). 
 Baker v Courage125 was the first such case. The facts were simple. A mistaken payment had 
been made and the question was whether the claim was time barred. If the cause of action was 
complete at the time of payment, then the claim would be time-barred. However, if it were 
complete when the plaintiff made the demand then it would not be. Counsel for the plaintiff argued 
that, following Freeman v Jeffries, it was the latter. Hamilton J treated the case as binding but 
distinguished it on the ground that the mistake in that case was a unilateral one and not, as in Baker 
v Courage, a mutual one.126  This is unconvincing. In both Freeman and Baker, the parties had 
entrusted a third party to work out how much each party owed to the other. In both cases the third 
party made a mistake. They are, quite clearly, both cases of mutual mistake. Normatively it is unclear 
why characterising the mistake as mutual or unilateral should matter. Bramwell B’s reasoning was 
based on the fact that a defendant could not be under a duty to repay if he did not know of the 
mistake. This applies equally in the case of a mutual and unilateral mistake. Whilst there might be 
grounds for distinguishing Freeman from a case where the defendant knew of the mistake, Baker is 
no such case. Prior to the litigation beginning the defendant had no idea about the mistake.  
                                                 
124 Assets Company v R (n 105) 471 (Denniston J). 
125 Baker v Courage (n 20). 
126 ibid 66 (Hamilton J). 
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 Those sympathetic to the decision recognise that the attempt to distinguish Freeman v Jeffries 
was unconvincing.127 Burrows also recognises it is unconvincing but sees that as evidence of how 
‘determined Hamilton J was not to follow the unsatisfactory earlier decision’.128 Baker v Courage was 
followed in Anglo-Scottish Beer Sugar Corporation v Spalding UDC.129 In Re Mason130 and Re Blake131 
Hamilton J’s judgement was read as saying that liability arose on payment. A final attempt was 
made in 2001 to reinstate Freeman v Jeffries, but it failed.132 
 From a policy point of view, it must be said that the outcome of Freeman v Jeffries was not 
ideal. As Hamilton J pointed out, this would allow the plaintiff to delay his demand for an unlimited 
time and not have the time run against him.133 Later on, as Lord Sumner, he did express concerns 
as to the effect of long limitation periods in actions to recover mistaken payments.134 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in his reasoning the decision ‘particularly impressed the 
judiciary.’135 In 1912, only less than four years after having been appointed to the High Court, he 
was appointed to the Court of Appeal. It is there that he would inflict his second strike on the 
remedial view of the law. 
 As was mentioned above, Baylis v Bishop of London136 is seen as having rejected the defence 
of change of position. The outcome of the case was a product of the way it was argued. At first 
instance the Bishop sought to defend himself against a claim for repayment by placing himself 
within the scope of the payment over rule. For that he had to argue that he was an agent. In a short 
ex tempore judgement Neville J held that that the Bishop was not an agent but the principal.137 On 
appeal the agency argument was renewed and still failed. In addition, counsel for the Bishop sought 
to argue that from first principles the Bishop should not be liable. He argued that, since the nature 
of the action was based on the fact that ex aequo et bono the defendant ought to refund the money, 
                                                 
127 E.g. C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson, Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2016) paras 33–14.  
128 Burrows (n 4) 609.  
129 Anglo-Scottish Beer Sugar Corporation v Spalding Urban DC [1937] 2 KB 607 (KBD) 628–630 (Atkinson J). 
130  Re Mason [1928] Ch 385 (Ch) 392 (Romer J). 
131 Re Blake [1932] 1 Ch 54 (Ch) 60 (Maughan J). 
132 Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 1681 (Ch) (Lightman J). 
133 Baker v Courage (n 20) 65 (Hamilton J). 
134 ‘It might be a good thing if the Statutes of Limitation were amended, so as to cut down to a very short period the 
time within which actions such as Kelly v. Solari and others may be brought’: Jones v Waring (n 82) 695 (Lord Sumner). 
135 A Lentin, ‘Hamilton, John Andrew, Viscount Sumner (1859–1934)’, The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(online edn, Oxford University Press) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33670>. 
136 (n 65). 
137 Baylis v Bishop of London [1912] 2 Ch 318 (Ch). 
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the Bishop should not be liable if the court found that it was inequitable for him to refund it. He 
then argued that it would be inequitable because the Bishop no longer had the money.  
All three judges declined the invitation to decide from first principles. Instead they pointed 
out that there were cases which had limited the import of Lord Mansfield’s words; for example, 
Cozens-Hardy MR cited the mistake of law bar.138 Farwell LJ referred back to his judgement in 
Bradford Corporation v Ferrand139 where he defended Lord Mansfield’s appeal to the jus naturale, but 
added that it was now impossible to create any new doctrine of common law.140 After reviewing 
the cases following Moses v Macferlan, Hamilton LJ said: 
 
In effect, therefore, both the equitable and the legal considerations applicable to the recovery of money paid 
under a mistake of fact have been crystallized in the reported common law cases. The question is whether it 
is conscientious for the defendant to keep the money, not whether it is fair for the plaintiff to ask to have it 
back. To ask what course would be ex æquo et bono to both sides never was a very precise guide, and as a 
working rule it has long since been buried in Standish v. Ross and Kelly v. Solari. Whatever may have been the 
case 146 years ago, we are not now free in the twentieth Century to administer that vague jurisprudence which 
is sometimes attractively styled ‘justice as between ‘man and man.’141 
 
Modern writers see this passage, especially the last sentence, as a rejection of unjust enrichment, 
but it was nothing of the sort. Counsel for the Bishop had, in effect, asked the Court ‘to administer 
that vague jurisprudence’ and the Court declined that invitation. The principles had now been 
crystallised in the cases and the Court would decide based on those cases rather than going back 
to first principles. Looking at the cases the Court felt that the only exception was payment over by 
an agent. One might quibble with that judgement, especially since Skyring v Greenwood was not cited, 
but the refusal to rule on first principles is defensible. 
 The rejection of change of position was not surprising. Under the tortious analytical 
structure liability was based on unconscionable retention. If there was nothing to retain or if the 
retention would not be unconscionable then there would be no liability. As such, change of position 
was not a defence per se. Rather it was a denial that would prevent liability from occurring. The 
change of the basis of liability from retention to receipt meant that there was no scope for change 
of position to reduce liability. The only way it could be brought back is if the courts recognised it 
by judicial fiat. As Kremer put it, the defence’s ‘legitimacy could be attacked in that it appears to 
be the product of academia and not of the incrementalist approach of the common law, forged out 
                                                 
138 Baylis v Bishop of London (n 65) 133 (Cozens-Hardy MR). 
139 Bradford Corporation v Ferrand (n 66). 
140 Baylis v Bishop of London (n 65) 137 (Farwell LJ). 
141 ibid 140 (Hamilton LJ). 
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on the anvil of real disputes on a case-by-case basis.’142 The Court of Appeal in Baylis thought it 
would indeed be illegitimate to follow the invitation of counsel to do so. The House of Lords in 
Lipkin Gorman had fewer scruples. 
 The final case to contribute to the development of the implied contract theory is Sinclair v 
Brougham. In that case it was said that recovery was founded on a contract implied in law; no remedy 
could be given in cases where it was impossible to imply such a contract. This would be the case, 
as occurred in the case, where the defendant did not have the capacity to enter into such a contract; 
as such, MHR was not available. Whereas previously the fiction was used to get past a procedural 
hurdle (namely, allowing reliance on MHR); here it was given substantive effect.  
The use of the language of implied contract can be explained by use of the fictional promise 
under the forms of action and also because of the influence of Roman law. Under Roman Law real 
contracts arose based on agreement and the delivery of a thing. In the case of loan of a specific 
asset the contract was called commodatum. If, however, the asset was a fungible one the contract 
was called mutuum. So, a loan of money was called a mutuum. Whilst commodatum required the 
return of the actual thing that was not the case under a mutuum (as the assets are fungible). The 
mutuum required both the delivery of the thing and an agreement. What if the latter was lacking? 
This was the case if the thing was delivered by mistake or without the consent of the owner. In 
such a case a relationship known as promutuum arose. This was a quasi-contract and one would 
recover under it using the condictio indebiti. Seen through the lens of Roman Law, that a mistaken 
payment of money was said to give rise to a quasi-contract or a contract implied in law makes 
perfect sense. Lord Dunedin’s reference to pro-mutuum in Sinclair v Brougham143 suggests that this 
was part of the explanation for the revival of implied contract.144 
Having said that, it would be unfair to say that the House of Lords simply denied recovery 
because it was impossible to imply a contract. Rather, that decision is more likely to reflect certain 
policy reasons against awarding restitution. The point is this. If the depositors were allowed to 
recover using MHR, they could claim back the entire amount they had deposited. There being no 
change of position the building society would have been liable for the whole amount rather than 
                                                 
142 Kremer (n 89) 116. 
143 ‘And coming to the case of money, while mutuum was proper loan, pro-mutuum covered the cases where money 
was had and received without contract, and a special form of action for the common case of the payment of a 
supposed but non-existing debt was known as condictio indebiti. Now, the English law, having no quasi contracts, 
got over the difficulty in such cases as the action for money had and received by the fiction of a contract’: Sinclair v 
Brougham (n 73) 432 (Lord Dunedin). 
144 See also ‘the obligation arises re and not consensu’: Nash v Inman [1908] 2 KB 1 (EWCA) 8 (Fletcher Moulton LJ). 
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what remained in its hands.145 So their obligation under MHR would have been the same as it would 
have been under the loan contract between them and the depositors. As such, giving recovery 
under the action would amount to de facto enforcement of the loan contract which they had no 
capacity to enter into. In those circumstances it is understandable that the House of Lords did not 
want to give recovery. Indeed, this concern appears to have been the reasoning of their Lordships. 
For example, Lord Sumner said giving recovery would ‘indirectly sanction ultra vires borrowing’,146 
and Lord Parker added that it would ‘in effect validate the transaction so far as it embodied a 
contract to repay the money lent.’147 The point is not that their policy judgement was correct; one 
might very well disagree with it.148 Rather, it is that their Lordships reached their decision on policy 
grounds149 but used the language of implied contract to express it. Given Lord Sumner’s remarks 
about palm tree justice in Baylis v Bishop of London it is not surprising that he did not want to explicitly 
deny recovery on policy grounds. A doctrinal concept was needed to express that conclusion. 
Fortunately for them, the use of contractual concepts in circumstances where there clearly was not 
a contract was a common device to control liability at the time. For example, in negligence claims 
courts used the notion of privity to deny recovery.150 What was going on was a policy concern 
about excessive liability and the courts used ‘privity’ as a means of expressing that concern. It is 
quite telling that Lord Wright criticises contractual language in tort and unjust enrichment in the 
same breath.151  
 
C. Conclusion 
 
As was seen in Part II above, the normative basis for the recovery of money remained the same – 
it was proprietary – from the 18th Century until the mid 20th Century. The proprietary theory did 
                                                 
145 On the authority of Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank [2012] QB 549 (EWCA) even if the change of position 
defence were available it might not have been applicanle on those facts. 
146 Sinclair v Brougham (n 73) 452 (Lord Sumner). 
147 ibid 440 (Lord Parker). 
148 E.g. E O’Dell, ‘The Case That Fell to Earth: Sinclair v Brougham (1914)’ in E O’Dell (ed), Leading Cases of the 
Twentieth Century (Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 44. 
149 Lord Goff in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (UKHL) 688 thought that the 
decision came down to policy. See also Lobban’s discussion of the infant lending cases decided around the same 
time as Sinclair for further evidence of policy based reasoning: Lobban (n 12) 61–66. 
150 V Palmer, ‘Why Privity Entered Tort-An Historical Reexamination of Winterbottom v. Wright’ (1983) 27 The 
American Journal of Legal History 85. 
151 Wright, ‘Sinclair v Brougham’ (n 85) 321; Lord Wright, ‘The Study of Law’ (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 185, 
195–6. 
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become more refined through time. It started out with the judges saying that morally the money 
still belonged to the plaintiff and by the 20th Century was refined into a view that the plaintiff should 
have a remedy against the defendant which would put the plaintiff in the same position (vis-à-vis 
the defendant) that he would have been in had he still retained title (which he would have were it 
not for the special rules governing the passing of title to money). 
 This refinement in the normative basis coincided with a change in the analytical structure 
employed by the courts to decide cases. When the basis was articulated as the plaintiff still owns 
the money, it made sense that the courts used analytical structures equivalent to those that they 
used for the recovery of chattels where the plaintiff still retained title. The fact that with money the 
judges were concerned with moral ownership whereas with other chattels it was legal ownership, 
explains why the former was a fault-based claim whilst the latter was strict liability. 
 But when the normative basis was refined – from treating the plaintiff as if he still was the 
owner to putting the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had he still been the owner – 
then the tortious analytical structure would not work anymore. Hence, the courts, borrowing from 
Roman law learning, adopted a contractual analytical structure; one which treated the defendant 
not as someone wrongfully retaining the plaintiff’s property but as the plaintiff’s debtor. This 
contractual analytical structure was also used by the courts to deny recovery where it would be 
contrary to public policy to allow it. 
IV. THE PROPRIETARY NATURE OF GOODS CLAIMS 
 
If the normative basis for the recovery of money was a proprietary basis then one would expect it 
to be the case as well for goods. This hypothesis is defended in this Part. The only difference with 
money claims is that, once one scratches beneath the surface, claims for goods still retain a tortious 
analytical structure. Indeed, the requirements for a successful unjust enrichment claim for goods 
amount to a form of fault-based conversion claim, where it had to be shown that the defendant 
knew of the circumstances not entitling him to retain the goods. 
A. From quantum valebant to unjust enrichment for goods 
 
There are fewer historical cases dealing with goods than with money. The reason for that is simple: 
title to goods passes less easily than title to money. Hence, in cases of goods delivered due to a 
fundamental mistake, title would not pass and so recovery would be through trover or detinue 
rather than through quantum valebant. A search on Westlaw for ‘quantum valebant’ reveals 40 
cases and 32 for ‘quantum valebat’. 
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 Rather, restitutionary claims for goods more typically happened within a contractual 
context. Before we begin, an important point must be made concerning quantum valebat. Like 
quantum meruit, it was an implied and not a special contract. As will be seen in Chapter 5, if the 
plaintiff pleaded quantum meruit or quantum valebat, the defendant could defeat the claim by 
showing that there was an express contract between the parties. This is because, ‘no new contract 
can be implied from acts done under an express contract.’152  
So, for example, in Grousnell v Lamb153 the plaintiff had sold a machine to the defendant and 
was not paid for it. The contract provided that if the machine was defective the defendant would 
not be liable. The plaintiff was never paid nor was the machine returned. The plaintiff sued for 
quantum valebat. The court found that the machine was indeed defective but also found that it had 
not been returned to the plaintiff. Yet, the claim failed. There were two short judgements: 
 
Lord Abinger , C. B. Here the defendant shewed a special contract, on which the plaintiff had not declared, 
and having a condition annexed to it, which prevented the implied contract declared upon from arising. 
 
Parke , B. To entitle the plaintiff to any damages on the quantum valebat, he ought to have shewn some 
new implied contract, resulting from the defendant's conduct or dealing with the goods.154 
 
As Lord Abinger put it, the failure of the suit was essentially procedural. The express contract 
prevented the plaintiff from relying on the fact he had sold and delivered the machine to imply a 
contract. This is because ‘no new contract can be implied from acts done under an express 
contract.’155 This does not mean that the plaintiff would have no remedy on such facts, but instead 
he had to plead different facts (i.e. the defendant’s conduct or his dealing with the goods) in order 
to imply a new contract. However, he did not do so and so the claim failed. 
Let us now consider the situations where quantum valebat was available. This will allow us 
to see what conduct of the defendant and what form of dealing with the goods is required for 
liability to be established. 
Where the seller supplies a different quantity of goods the Sale of Goods Act 1893 section 
30 provides that the buyer may reject it, but if he accepts the different quantity he must pay for it 
at the contract rate. The position at common law was the same. So, in Shipton v Casson156 it was held 
that if the seller delivered a smaller quantity of goods than required and the buyer elected to retain 
                                                 
152 Britain v Rossiter (1879) 11 QBD 123 (EWCA) 127 (Brett LJ). 
153 Grousnell v Lamb (1836) 1 M & W 352, 150 ER 469. 
154 ibid. 
155 Britain v Rossiter (n 152) 127 (Brett LJ). For the precise meaning of this dictum see Chapter 5 Section II.A.4 
156 (1826) 5 B & C 378, 108 ER 141. 
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it, then he was bound to pay for those goods on a pro-rata basis. Similarly, in Oxendale v Wetherell157 
there was an entire contract to deliver 250 bushels of wheat, but the seller only delivered 130. After 
the expiration of the date on which the seller was meant to have transferred the whole 250, the 
seller sued for the price of the 130. The defendant pleaded that there was an express contract for 
250 and that the obligation was entire. The court accepted that, but held that by retaining the 130 
he was bound to pay for them. 
 This is consistent with Grounsell v Lamb because the act of not returning the goods amounts 
to a new dealing with them from which a new contract could be implied. As such, unlike in Grounsell 
v Lamb, the plaintiff was not relying on ‘acts done under an express contract’ to imply a new 
obligation to pay. Instead he is simply saying: ‘I delivered 130 bushels of wheat for 8s a bushel to 
the defendant and he accepted them, so he has to pay that price’. 
The position was the same where the buyer of the goods terminated the contract for breach. 
In such a case, the seller had the right ‘to sue for the fair value of the goods which had been 
delivered and kept.’158  
Where the contract was illegal the position appears somewhat less clear. At the time trading 
on Sunday was illegal.159 So, if a sale was conducted on Sunday the contract was void, although title 
did pass by delivery.160 Could the buyer sue for a quantum valebant by showing that the defendant 
retained the goods? The position appears to be no. In Williams v Paul161 the defendant had not only 
retained the goods but made a subsequent explicit promise, not on the Sunday, to pay for them. It 
was held that the seller could recover a quantum valebant. Parke J was concerned that ‘it may have 
a tendency to defeat the statute’, but allowed the claim because of the subsequent promise of the 
defendant and, as such, his present refusal [to pay for them] ‘is not consistent with the practice of 
a very sincere Christian.’162 This was subsequently doubted in Simpson v Nichols.163 Even if Williams 
v Paul is correct it is clear that there will not be recovery based on retention of the goods alone. 
The reason for this is obvious: it would have stultified the operation of the statute. This, however, 
does not detract from the point that retention of the goods will found a non-contractual quantum 
valebant claim. As Parke J put it: 
 
                                                 
157 (1829) 9 B & C 386, 109 ER 143. 
158 Bartholomew v Markwick (1864) 15 CBR 711, 143 ER 964 [716] (Erie CJ). 
159 29 Car. 2, c. 7. 
160 Note to the case of Simpson v Nichols (1840) 5 M & W 702, 151 ER 298; see also Singh v Ali [1960] AC 167 (PC). 
161 (1830) 6 Bing 653, 130 ER 1433. 
162 ibid 655 (Parke B). 
163 (1838) 3 M & W 240, 150 ER 1132; see also Note to the case of Simpson v Nichols (n 160). 
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In some cases, a special contract, not executed, may give rise to a claim in the nature of a quantum meruit, 
ex. gr., where a special contract has been made for goods, and goods sent, not according to the contract, are 
retained by the party, there a claim for the value on a quantum valebant may be supported, but then, from 
the circumstances, a new contract may be implied.164 
 
Similarly, in Weatherby v Bonham165 the deceased had subscribed to magazines from the plaintiff. 
After the deceased died the plaintiff, unaware of the death, continued to send the magazines to his 
address which was now occupied by the defendant. The defendant used the magazines and never 
offered to return them. It was held that the plaintiff could recover the value of the magazines.  
 Importantly, it would appear that if the goods have been consumed in good faith there 
would be no liability. So, in Boulton v Jones166 the defendant ordered goods from a company with 
whom they had a right to set off. Unfortunately, the business had been transferred to the plaintiff 
with whom the defendant did not have the right to set off. So, there was no contract between the 
parties. The goods had been consumed before the defendant found out about the different identity 
of the supplier and so was not liable. This is confirmed by the 1863 edition of Bullen and Leake.167 
 My thesis is that a non-contractual claim to recover the value of goods provided is available 
where the defendant retains the goods knowing that he was not meant to have had them. In that 
sense it operated as a form of fault-based conversion. This is consistent with the 19th Century case 
law and the contemporary case law, to which we now turn, confirms this.  
There have not been many cases since 1999 dealing with unjust enrichment where the 
benefit consists of goods. From the few cases we have it seems that, unlike money, goods can be 
‘subjectively devalued’ and that such ‘subjective devaluation’ can be overridden by showing one of 
the familiar factors, namely: request, free acceptance, benefit realised in money, and perhaps benefit 
realisable in money. In addition, in one of the few cases dealing with goods, the Court of Appeal 
discovered an additional factor overriding subjective devaluation. In Cressman v Coys of Kensington168 
                                                 
164 Read v Rann (1830) 10 B & C 438, 109 ER 513. 
165 (1832) 5 C & P 228, 172 ER 950. 
166 (1857) 2 H & N 564, 157 ER 232. 
167 ‘Contracts of sale sometimes arise from the mere acceptance by the defendant of goods delivered by the plaintiff 
for the purpose of sale, and the value may be recovered by this count. (See Hart v Mills, 15 M &W 87). In such a case 
the defendant must have some option in accepting or returning the goods and becoming bound to the plaintiff to 
pay for them, otherwise he cannot be held liable, as no contract or privity can be implied. Thus, where the defendant 
ordered goods of one person, and the plaintiff a different person, sent the goods, and the defendant consumed the 
goods before he had notice that they belonged to the plaintiff, it was held that he was not liable to the plaintiff for 
the price, because not having any option of returning the goods to the plaintiff he did not enter into any contract 
with him.’: E Bullen and SM Leake, Precedents of Pleadings (2nd edn, V & R Stevens, Sons, and Haynes 1863) 31. 
168 Cressman and another v Coys of Kensington (Sales) Ltd (McDonald, Part 20 defendant) [2004] EWCA Civ 47, [2004] 1 WLR 
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Mance LJ said that the recipient of a benefit would be treated as enriched ‘if [the benefit] is readily 
returnable without substantial difficulty or detriment and he chooses to retain it (or give it away to 
a third party) rather than to retransfer it on request.’169 In a typical case of a mistaken transfer of 
goods there would be no request or free acceptance, nor would the benefit have been realised in 
money. As such this ‘readily returnable benefit’ ground will be the most common one. As was 
argued in the section on subjective devaluation in Chapter 2,170 this, in effect, means that it will be 
necessary to show the good is readily returnable and that the defendant refused to return it in order 
to get a claim in unjust enrichment. Hence, the position is the same as it was in the 19th century. 
To illuminate this proprietary basis a comparison with conversion is required. 
 
B. A comparison with conversion 
1. Two lessons from conversion 
 
To start with, consider a case where title has not passed but possession has. C remains the legal 
owner. When will D be liable for the tort of conversion? It is not sufficient for C to show that he 
is the owner of the chattel or that he has an immediate right to possession. Instead, C must show 
that D has committed a converting act. That is an act relating to the chattel which amounts to a 
usurpation of the owner's rights.171 In some cases this will be use or sale of the chattel, but not 
always. There might be cases where D has not actually done anything with the chattels. For 
example, in Miller v Jackson if the homeowner had merely left the cricket balls in his garden there 
would be no conversion.172 In such cases, for C to recover he must make a demand and D must 
unreasonably refuse the demand.173 That there had been no demand is the reason why the claim 
failed in Clayton v Le Roy.174 
Furthermore, the refusal must be unreasonable. This is an important point. If C demands 
his property back and asks D to deliver it to him and D refuses to do so, there will be no liability 
since D's refusal is not unreasonable.175 However, D is bound to let C come collect his goods.176 In 
                                                 
169 ibid [37]. 
170 Chapter 2 section III.A.1. 
171 Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883 [39] (Lord Nicholls). 
172 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966 (EWCA) 978 (Lord Denning). 
173 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Sibec Developments Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1253 (Ch) 1258 (Millet J). 
174 [1911] 2 KB 1031 (EWCA). 
175 Capital Finance Co Ltd v Bray [1964] 1 WLR 323 (EWCA). 
176 Howard E Perry & Co Ltd v British Railways Board [1980] 1 WLR 1375 (Ch). 
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addition, for the purposes of the Limitation Act time only starts to run from the moment of the 
refusal.177 
As Robin Hickey178 has argued, this shows that property rights are not a sufficient basis for 
creating liability: ‘Property is not a causative event.’179 Rather, what is required is a wrong. This is a 
beneficial conclusion. As Hickey argues, requiring a wrong provides a single point at which the 
cause of action will accrue. It also accounts for the fact that it would be unfair for the defendant 
to bear the costs of reuniting the good to its owner. Finally, there might be uncertainty about who 
the actual owner is and a recipient might want to make enquiries. This is a good thing and by 
making liability based on wrongdoing rather than mere receipt, the law preserves the possibility 
that this will be done.180 If, in the tort of conversion, receipt of goods which C has title to is not a 
causative event, it is difficult to see why it should be the case in unjust enrichment (where C no 
longer has title). This point will be further developed in Section 2.a) below.  
There is another lesson worth drawing out from the conversion story. If after receiving a 
demand and refusing it, D decides to pay the market value of the goods to C. he would have 
discharged his liability, i.e. he was liable but following his payment he is no longer. If, however, on 
receiving the demand D decides to hand the goods over, this is not a discharge of his liability. 
Rather, it is an action which precludes his liability from ever arising. This is an important difference 
and I will argue that the position is – notwithstanding the orthodoxy – the same in unjust 
enrichment. 
 
2. A look at unjust enrichment 
a) Similarity with conversion – request required 
 
As in the case of conversion, unjust enrichment also requires showing a request coupled with an 
unreasonable refusal. Suppose C mistakenly transfers his car to D. Title passes. What should C do 
to recover in unjust enrichment? 
There has been an objective enrichment. D can try to subjectively devalue the enrichment. 
What does C have to do to override the subjective devaluation? There was no request or free 
                                                 
177 Schwarzschild v Harrods Ltd [2008] EWHC 521. Technically this was a case brought under a statutory form of 
conversion (conversion by bailee) under Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 s 2(2). But as R Hickey, ‘Wrongs 
and the Protection of Personal Property’ [2011] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 48 argues, there is no reason why 
it should not apply to conversion in general. 
178 Hickey (n 177). 
179 ibid 56. 
180 ibid 56–57. 
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acceptance. The benefit has not been realised in money nor was it necessary. The only overriding 
factor C can rely on is the so called ‘readily returnable benefit’ ground. Assuming this can be shown, 
the enrichment was at the expense of C and there is an unjust factor. So, C has a claim. 
Now, what does ‘readily returnable’ require? The ground was ‘discovered’ in Cressman v Coys 
of Kensington181 by Mance LJ. He said that D would be treated as enriched ‘if [the benefit] is readily 
returnable without substantial difficulty or detriment and he chooses to retain it (or give it away to 
a third party) rather than to retransfer it on request’.182 It is clear from this that a request is required 
as it is in the case of conversion. Furthermore, not every refusal will lead to liability. In conversion, 
only unreasonable refusals will lead to liability. In practice this means, as we have seen above, that 
the defendant is not required to incur any substantial costs (e.g. by delivering) in giving the benefit 
back. The position is the same in unjust enrichment. If D refuses to retransfer on the ground that 
this would raise substantial difficulty or detriment, then he is not liable. So, in this case if Mr 
McDonald had refused to give back the mark on account of the fact he did not want to pay the 
transfer fee he would probably have won. Mance LJ almost suggested as much when he said that 
‘Coys would no doubt have been only too pleased to resolve the matter by meeting any retransfer 
costs, and Mr McDonald would have received instead from the DVLA the age-related mark which 
he had expected.’183 
b) Delivery of the good prevents liability from arising – same as in 
conversion 
 
One might think that tendering the good back would discharge the liability in unjust enrichment, 
but that view is incorrect. I will argue that in unjust enrichment, delivery of the good does not 
discharge liability but instead prevents liability from arising. I will do so in three steps. First, I will show 
that, bar exceptional circumstances, D is only ever liable for the value of the good at the time of 
trial (i.e liability fully crystallises at the time of trial). Secondly, since such liability is a duty to pay 
money, tendering the actual good will not extinguish the liability (unless the claimant accepts the 
good in lieu of money). But thirdly, if prior to liability having crystallised the defendant tenders the 
goods back then liability does not actually arise.  
Suppose C mistakenly transfers his car to D. At the time of transfer the car is worth £10k. 
At the time of trial, the value of the car has gone down to £8k. The decrease in value is simply due 
to the fact it is no longer brand new. Analysing this claim according to the orthodox approach, 
there is an objective enrichment of £10k. Since the benefit is readily returnable it cannot be 
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subjectively devalued. The enrichment was at C's expense and it was unjust since C was mistaken. 
Since (says the orthodoxy) the cause of action arises on receipt, D is liable for £10k. However, he 
has a defence of change of position; more precisely the loss of benefit version of change of position. 
Since the value has gone down by £2k, D has changed his position to the extent of £2k and so he 
is only liable for £8k. So, if D was to give the car back he would not be liable any further.  
Note that on those facts it does not matter when D became aware of the mistake. Even if 
he knew straight away the defence is still available to him. As Elise Bant has argued, there is no 
reason why bad faith has anything to do with independent change of position.184 This is because 
the reduction of value of the property (the change of position) was not done in bad faith. Rather, 
it happened independently of him. To put it another way, even if D had returned the car three 
months earlier when it was worth £10k it would still now be only worth £8k. So, C is not at a 
disadvantage if D has the defence, even when he knew of the defect. Of course, it might be the 
case that (knowing it was not his) D did not take good care of it. In such a case the issue is whether 
D's fault bars the defence of change of position.185  
So, the point is, under the orthodox approach to unjust enrichment, D is only ever liable 
for the value of the good at the time of trial. However, this means that D cannot discharge his 
liability by giving the good back because what he is liable for is money and not return of the good. 
When one has a duty to pay cash and instead one wants to pay in kind the creditor is perfectly 
entitled to insist on payment in cash. 
So, if we can show that by offering to give the good back D can ensure that he is not liable 
this would mean that the offer to give the good back would prevent liability from arising (since the 
alternative, that it discharges liability, is false). I will show this now. Consider Cressman v Coys of 
Kensington again. What would have happened if D had offered to give the mark back? 
Let us analyse the claim according to orthodoxy. There is an objective enrichment. D would 
try to subjectively devalue by saying he does not want it and offers to give it back. This would be 
successful in defeating enrichment. Could C override the subjective devaluation by arguing that the 
good is readily returnable? Not so, since D has offered to give it back. ‘Readily returnable’ requires 
that D refused C's request by retaining the good. This is not the case here. So, C cannot override 
subjective devaluation. This means that D is not enriched, and so C's claim would fail. So, it follows 
from this that D's offer to make available (or to return) the good would prevent liability from 
occurring, because in such a case the offer means that the test for enrichment is not met. Similarly, 
to the case of conversion, this action does not discharge liability but rather prevents it from ever 
arising. 
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c) A hard case 
 
Let us now consider the harder case alluded to above. C transfers his car to D by mistake. Later 
on, D discovers the mistake. D fails to take reasonable care of the car (after finding out the mistake) 
and as a result the car is damaged. At the time of transfer, it was worth £10k. When the mistake 
was discovered it was worth £9k, and after the damage it is worth £5k. 
First, assume title did not pass (it was a fundamental mistake). How would liability in 
conversion work? If the demand and refusal happened before the incident, then D is liable for the 
value of the car at that date. He bears the risk of any subsequent fall in value whether it arose 
naturally or was caused by his negligence.  
But, instead, suppose that the demand and refusal happened after the incident. Here it 
seems that his liability in conversion will be the value of the car at the time of the refusal: i.e. £5k. 
However, it might be the case that the incident in question itself amounts to a converting act. 
Conversion requires a deliberate act,186 so negligence will not do. Even then damage to the good 
will only amount to conversion if it was done with intent to exercise dominium.187 However, in 
cases of deliberate damage falling short of conversion D will still be liable in trespass to goods. 
In cases where there is mere negligence by D he will still be liable on the basis that he is a 
bailee. For him to become a bailee he has to know of the true owner188 and must have accepted the 
goods.189 If this were the case then he would be liable for £5k in conversion and for the remaining 
£4k in bailment.  
How would unjust enrichment deal with such a case? If demand and refusal happen before 
the incident, what is the situation? The starting point is the objective value at the moment of receipt. 
D would seek to subjectively devalue it but this would fail because of the demand and refusal. The 
value therefore remains £9k. The enrichment was at C's expense and was unjust. D would then 
seek to rely on the defence of change of position. For the reduction of value from £10k to £9k 
there is no difficulty. Can he succeed for the reduction of value to £5k? There is no English 
authority on this point but according to Birks190 and Bant191 a New Zealand and an Australian case 
support the proposition that D cannot rely on the defence if, knowing he was not entitled to the 
                                                 
186 Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) (n 171) [39] (Lord Nicholls). 
187 Simmons v Lillystone (1853) 8 Ex 431, 155 ER 1417– cutting logs in two is not conversion unless it is shown that it 
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receipt, he fails to take reasonable care. Bant does add one caveat: this will only be the case if D 
has accepted the receipt.192 If this is true then the position is exactly the same as for bailment. If it 
is true that D's negligence bars his reliance on the change of position defence, then the position is 
very similar to that in conversion with one difference: in conversion D takes the risk of natural falls 
in value, whereas in unjust enrichment it is borne by C. 
Now, consider the case where the demand and refusal happened after the incident. Again, 
the starting point is the value at the moment of receipt: £10k. Subjective devaluation fails because 
of the refusal to return. D will want to rely on the change of position defence. He can do so for 
the natural fall in value to £9k but not for the change due to the incident because of his negligence. 
The position is the same as in tort (where the same result is achieved by combining conversion and 
bailment).193 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
We saw that both in the old law and in the new there are a lot of similarities between unjust 
enrichment and claims to recover property (conversion). In a case of a mistaken transfer of a 
chattel, C will be able to recover the value of the chattel. Whether C still has title will make little 
difference to his claim. In both cases: 
 
• He will need to make a demand and D must unreasonably refuse to make it available for 
him.  
• The amount he will recover will typically be the value of the chattel at the time of refusal. 
                                                 
192 ibid. 
193 There is, however, an even harder case. The demand happens also after the incident, but this times D acquiesces 
to it and returns the car. Now in the tort case this means that there is no liability in conversion. However, C gets his 
car back which is now worth £5k and he has a claim in bailment for the £4k loss suffered due to D's negligence. 
Overall his position is the same as in the case where D would not have returned the property. However, the position 
in unjust enrichment is more complicated. Again, the starting point is a £10k valuation. However, I said above that 
by offering to return the good D can prevent a claim in unjust enrichment from arising. If this is true here, then C 
only gets back £5k. He is £4k worse off than if he sued in tort or if D had refused to return the car (and C sued in 
unjust enrichment). Could C make up the difference by suing for negligence or bailment? No: bailment can arise on 
those facts since C does not have legal title. As for negligence, the duty of care in question would be one to prevent 
pure economic loss (since C does not have legal title) and this case is far removed from the limited range of cases 
where such a duty will be found. Is this a defensible outcome? I think so. It makes sense that C is in a slightly worse 
off position in this case. He, after all, no longer has legal title and so we would expect him to have less legal 
protection. 
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• D can prevent liability from occurring by making the chattel available to C. 
 
The only difference is that: 
 
• Where C retains title, D is liable even though he does not know that he is not the true 
owner, whereas where D acquires title he must be informed that he is not the true owner 
before he can be liable 
 
Such similarities between the conversion and the unjust enrichment claims cannot be a coincidence. 
Yet, according to the orthodox interpretation of the law, the claim where title has not passed is 
considered to be radically different from the claim where title has passed. The former is based on 
the commission of a wrong and arises when that wrong is committed. The latter is a strict liability 
claim not based on wrongdoing and the duty arises on receipt. The orthodox interpretation makes 
the two claims seem as if they were miles apart. 
Yet there is very little difference in the fact pattern leading to the two claims. In the former 
the mistake was fundamental and in the latter it was not. Furthermore, the same facts need to be 
shown for the claim to succeed and the remedies are very similar. An interpretation of the law that 
took account of those similarities would better fit the law. Can a common principle explaining 
recovery in both of those instances be found? I believe so. 
Both when the title passes and when it does not, the wrongful event is the refusal to give 
it back. In the case where C has title, the refusal is wrongful because it fails to respect the property 
rights of C. Can the refusal also be a wrongful act in cases where title has passed? I believe so. 
What makes it wrongful in such a case? It is the fact that D retains something which he is not 
meant to have. If things had gone according to plan the chattel would not be with D but with C 
(or with someone else). In other words, the property principle explains in both cases why the 
defendant must not retain the asset in question. This provides further support for the view that it 
is the property principle which underpins the recovery of money and goods in unjust enrichment. 
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V. TAKING STOCK: IMPLIED CONTRACT, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT AND PROPERTY 
 
A. Unjust enrichment, aequo et bono and property 
 
There has been a tendency to equate Lord Mansfield’s invocation of ‘ex aequo et bono’ as being 
‘unjust enrichment’ in embryonic form.194 Unless, we take ‘unjust enrichment’ to mean no more 
than that which ‘in equity and good conscience the defendant ought to do’ (in which case the label 
is so vague that it is uninformative), this is not the case.195 All that Lord Mansfield says is that ties 
of natural justice oblige one to return the money. He does not articulate an idea that this is based 
on unjustly receiving or retaining the benefit. 
Instead, the first formulation of the idea by Lord Mansfield is probably found in Hambly v 
Trott. Lord Mansfield saw trover not merely as an action to compensate for the losses due to 
interference with chattels, but also as an action to prevent unjust enrichment:  
 
In substance, trover is an action of property. If a man receives the property of another, his fortune ought to 
answer it…. if no other action could be brought against the executor, it seems unjust and inconvenient, that 
the testator's assets should not be liable for the value of what belonged to another man, which the testator 
had reaped the benefit of.196  
 
He confined the reach of the maxim to instances where the ‘offender acquires no gain to himself 
at the expence of the sufferer’197 but where  
 
besides the crime, property is acquired which benefits the testator, there an action for the value of the property 
shall survive against the executor. As for instance, the executor shall not be chargeable for the injury done by 
his testator in cutting down another man's trees, but for the benefit arising to his testator for the value or sale 
of the trees he shall.198 
 
                                                 
194 E.g. Fifoot (n 36) 245; Virgo (n 4) 45; Burrows (n 4) 3; R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (1st edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 1966) 12. 
195 W Swain, ‘Moses v Macferlan (1760)’ in C Mitchell and P Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Restitution 
(Hart Publishing 2006) 36. 
196 Hambly v Trott (n 38) [371] (Lord Mansfield). 
197 ibid [376] (Lord Mansfield). 
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Over 100 years later this was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Phillips v Homfray.199 However, 
Bowen and Cotton LLJ confined the principle to instances where the benefit consisted of the 
property or the proceeds thereof wrongfully appropriated by the deceased. By contrast Pearson J 
in the High Court and Baggallay LJ dissenting in the Court of Appeal thought that the principle 
should cover all instances where there was a benefit arising out of the wrongful act. So Baggallay 
LJ held that savings of expenditure would also fall within the unjust enrichment exception to the 
actio personalis moritur cum persona maxim.200 
 One point that is telling is that unjust enrichment is seen as flowing from property. That 
is, unjust enrichment is not in itself a source of rights. It is the property that gives the right to 
recover. The sole role of unjust enrichment is providing an exception to the rule that action dies 
with the defendant. Hence, unjust enrichment is derivative. This is different from unjust 
enrichment under the Birksian formula, where it is the source of the rights to get the value back.  
 In his 1802 essay, William Evans, after having explained that the basis of MHR was the 
retention of property, quoted the maxim from the Digest that ‘it is naturally just that one man shall 
not be enriched to the detriment of the other.’201 That statement alone is ambiguous as to which 
form of UE it refers to. As it is, in Roman law, it was not a source of obligation and there was no 
general enrichment action.202 However, given his statement about the proprietary foundation of 
the action, it is likely that he had a derivative idea of unjust enrichment in mind. It is the property 
rights in the money which makes it unjust not to return the money. If the law did not afford a 
remedy, then the defendant would be able to unjustly enrich himself. The injustice coming from 
the fact that the money was not his. 
 This derivative idea of unjust enrichment founded on property appears to be what Lord 
Dunedin had in mind in Sinclair v Brougham where he referred to ‘the higher equity that no one has 
a right to keep either property or the proceeds of property which does not belong to him.’203 At 
several points in his lecture on Sinclair v Brougham, Lord Wright refers to unjust enrichment as being 
based on property.204 He refers to the traceable possession of the plaintiff’s property or proceeds 
thereof as ‘in other words, simply unjust enrichment.’205 As he put it, ‘the basis of the doctrine of 
                                                 
199 Phillips v Homfray (No 2) (1883) 24 Ch D 439 (CA). 
200 ibid 471. 
201 D.50.17.206 (Pomponius). 
202 J Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (Gerard Noodt Instituut 1996) 1. 
203 Sinclair v Brougham (n 73) 436 (Lord Dunedin), see also ‘Now I think it is clear that all ideas of natural justice are 
against allowing A. to keep the property of B., which has somehow got into A.’s possession without any intention on 
the part of B. to make a gift to A’: ibid 431.  
204 Wright, ‘Sinclair v Brougham’ (n 85) 309, 320, 324. 
205 ibid 312. 
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unjust enrichment is, as has been so often stated here, that the defendant has received some 
property of the plaintiff or received some benefit from the plaintiff, for which it is just (as shown 
in the precedents) that he would make restitution.’206 It is true that Lord Wright suspected that not 
all of unjust enrichment was reducible to property: 
 
The property concept obviously would apply to the great mass of cases of restitution, but would not cover 
that important category of cases where a defendant is enriched (or advantaged) because the plaintiff under 
legal compulsion has paid in money or chattels or other property a debt, or has discharged a liability, which 
is properly the debt or liability of the defendant. The defendant has thus been enriched because his liabilities 
have been decreased and it would be unjust that the burdens should be left on the plaintiff.207 
 
However, he then wavered and wondered whether it could all be explained by the property concept 
on the basis that when a debt was discharged the proceeds of the money used to discharge it is the 
debt.208 That question is largely irrelevant here, but it supports the view of this Thesis that there are 
two principles – Property and Benefit-Burden – which work with a derivative conception of unjust 
enrichment. The point is that Lord Wright did not conceive unjust enrichment as a standalone 
source of rights. Rather, the enrichment was unjust because it was the property of another. In the 
case of discharge of debts what would make the enrichment unjust would be something else (which 
he did not address).  
That Lord Wright had the derivative concept of unjust enrichment in mind can be 
confirmed by looking at his review of Seavey and Scott’s Restatement, where he states: ‘Restitution 
[is concerned with] remedies for what, if not remedied would constitute an unjust benefit or 
advantage to the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff’ and ‘It is the unjust retention of what 
should be restored to the plaintiff which constitutes the relationship on which the remedy is 
based.’209 In that second sentence, Lord Wright makes it clear that the duty to restore arises prior 
to the unjust retention; the retention is unjust because there is a duty to restore. By contrast, with 
Birk’s conception of unjust enrichment it would be the unjust enrichment/retention which give 
rise to the duty to return. Therefore, the conception of unjust enrichment that Lord Wright had in 
mind is a derivative one and not the standalone one defended by Birks. 
If unjust enrichment is seen as derivative of property, then the role played by Lord 
Mansfield’s ex aequo et bono is to expand the types of ownership which count for the purposes of 
derivative unjust enrichment. So, there will be an unjust enrichment not just when the defendant 
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retains property legally belonging to the plaintiff, but also where he retains property which morally 
(ex aequo et bono) belongs to the plaintiff. That moral ownership right means that there is a moral 
duty to return the property. Keeping it (i.e. unjustly enriching oneself) would be a moral wrong. 
When in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Lord Wright says that: 
 
It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called 
unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit 
derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep.210 
 
He means that any civilised legal system must give a remedy for that wrong, although the underlying 
right (the ownership in the money) is one which the law itself does not recognise.211 If the law did 
not do that it would be ‘[allowing] a fragrant moral injustice to be committed with impunity’212 and 
be like allowing the Pharisee to say Corban.213 
 Lord Denning also shared the view that unjust enrichment was derivative from property 
rights, including moral ones. In an essay on the recovery of money he explained that ‘the action at 
law for money had and received was in fact a remedy for unjust enrichment. Its basis was the fact 
that the defendant received money which in justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff.’214 
 The civilian and theological learning on unjust enrichment also supports that view. The 
concept fully came to life under the impulse of the late scholastics of the School of Salamanca. 
Unjust enrichment was linked to Aquinas’ idea of restitutio ratione rei – that is the duty to restore 
based on having something that belongs (not just in a legal sense) to someone else.215 Theologians 
did not particularly care whether the legal ownership in the thing remained, but for the lawyers this 
was absolutely crucial. So, the matter was resolved as follows. When the thing itself was still in the 
possession of the defendant (and the plaintiff still had legal title to it) then restitutio ratione rei 
would be effected via the real actions, such as the vindicatio. But when the thing had disappeared 
or where legal title no longer existed, it was the enrichment actions that did the work for securing 
recovery.216 Hence, unjust enrichment was derivative from property. This can be seen clearly in 
Grotius, who was heavily influenced by the late scholastics, where he said that: ‘Obligation from 
                                                 
210 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 (UKHL) 61 (Lord Wright). 
211 C.f. Steuerwald v Richter (n 71) (‘the primary right is a creation of equity, the right to enforce it is a legal right the 
same as in case of any other legal obligation’) . 
212 Lindley (n 8) 33. 
213 See above Section II.D. 
214 AT Denning, ‘The Recovery of Money’ (1949) 65 Law Quarterly Review 37, 48. 
215 Hallebeek (n 202) 48. 
216 ibid 84. 
 Ch 3: Property Principle  
 
 
87 
enrichment arises when someone without legal title derives or may derive advantage from another 
person’s property.’217 
 This manner of looking at the relationship between unjust enrichment and property is quite 
different from the modern approach. Under that approach, unjust enrichment and property are 
either two separate events triggering restitution,218 or the property rights are a remedy for unjust 
enrichment.219 Neither of the two modern approaches gives a satisfactory analysis of Lipkin Gorman. 
In that case the House of Lords carried out a tracing exercise to show that the plaintiff’s money 
ended up in the defendant’s hand and so awarded MHR. This is also the case where the principle 
of unjust enrichment was first recognised in English law. According to Virgo’s view the case was 
all about the vindication of property rights and the judges were just confused when talking about 
unjust enrichment.220 According to Burrows this was a case where a personal proprietary remedy 
was awarded because of the rights created by unjust enrichment,221 notwithstanding the fact that 
the court did not engage in any unjust enrichment analysis.  However, under the historical analysis 
of unjust enrichment there is no difficulty. The defendant was liable because he had received 
property belonging to the plaintiff and because of this property right the enrichment of the 
defendant would be unjust and, hence, the law affords a remedy to the plaintiff. 
 
 
B. Implied contract and unjust enrichment: talking past each other? 
 
Most modern authors treat the implied contract theory as being opposed to unjust enrichment (or 
more specifically opposed to aequo et bono).222  But this is not the case. As Jackson put it:  
 
The aequum et bonum theory was not the basis of the action but the basis for deciding when the law will imply 
a contract. Adopting the language used by Salmon for describing sources of law we can say that aequum et 
bonum was the material source of the obligation, but that the formal source was a contract implied in law.223 
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It is this distinction I have tried to track with the difference between the normative basis of the law 
and the analytical structure used to give effect to it.224 When Lord Sumner started his ‘attack’ on 
Moses v Macferlan in Baylis v Bishop of London, he was concerned with the suggestion of deciding the 
case based on first principles. It is likely that Lord Sumner’s reaction was a backlash against the 
wide use of equitable weighing up by courts in deciding such matters.225 But nowhere in Baylis, 
Sinclair or subsequent cases was there any attempt to deny that Lord Mansfield’s theory was the 
normative basis for the action. Indeed, Lord Dunedin in Sinclair explicitly said that the fiction of a 
contract was English law’s way of working out ‘the higher equity that no one has a right to keep 
either property or the proceeds of property which does not belong to him.’226 Furthermore, as we 
have seen above, in Sinclair, Jones v Warring and Norwich Union v Price their Lordships, including Lord 
Sumner, tried to give further content to Lord Mansfield’s proprietary theory. And in Norwich Union 
the theory was used, along with the precedents, to expend recovery from liability mistakes to all 
fundamental mistakes. Lord Wright was correct when he concluded that there was no real conflict 
between Sinclair v Brougham and Moses v Macferlan.227 It is true that Lord Wright went further and 
argued for the recognition of unjust enrichment, not just as a normative principle, but also as a 
separate doctrinal concept. He opposed Sinclair v Brougham and faced the wrath of the traditionalists, 
especially Holdsworth,228 but he eventually prevailed. But none of the defenders of the implied 
contract theory actually criticised the use of unjust enrichment as the normative basis of the action. 
The apparent opposition between unjust enrichment and implied contract comes from the failure 
to distinguish between the normative and the analytical. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter set out to answer two questions: historically (1) what was the normative basis for 
recovery of a mistaken payment and (2) what analytical tools were used to obtain such recovery? 
A review of the cases and commentary in England and in other common law jurisdictions reveals 
                                                 
224 See also Baloch’s distinction between contract as a source of rights and as a method of classification. As he points 
out lawyers reasoning in terms of implied contract meant contract in the latter sense. This is why Lord Mansfield in 
Moses v Macferlan could give ex aequo et bono as the foundation whilst still using the language of implied contract: 
Baloch (n 6) 10–13. 
225 See the cases collected by Lobban (n 12) 54–58. 
226 Sinclair v Brougham (n 73) 436 (Lord Dunedin), see also ibid 432–3 (Lord Dunedin). 
227 Wright, ‘Sinclair v Brougham’ (n 85). 
228 WS Holdsworth, ‘Unjustifiable Enrichment’ (1939) 55 Law Quarterly Review 37. 
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that at least since Moses v Macferlan the normative basis was that the money belongs ex aequo et 
bono to the plaintiff, meaning that morally the money belonged to the plaintiff even though legal 
title had passed. Hence, the defendant was under a moral duty to return the money and courts 
would compel the defendant to fulfil that duty. The reason the courts had to use this basis rather 
than simply saying that legal title was retained was because this would affect the free flow of money. 
Legal title had to pass but as between the plaintiff and defendant there was no reason not to treat 
the plaintiff as still being the owner, as would have been the case had it been chattels rather than 
money. 
 We see this understanding of the normative basis of the law from Lord Mansfield’s 
judgement in Moses v Macferlan and from commentators in the 1950s such as Munkman and 
Denning. That view was shared both by those seen as the greatest opponents of unjust enrichment, 
such as Lord Sumner, and its greatest defenders, such as Lord Wright. It is undoubtedly true that 
the law changed a lot during that time, but it is not the normative basis that changed. Instead it is 
the concepts used by the courts to secure recovery. Once the law started moving away from 
classification based on the forms of actions, the proprietary notions which formed the basis of the 
action lead to the law taking a more wrong-based, remedial turn. There was a duty to return the 
money and failing to do so would be a wrong which the law would sanction.  
However, the wide moral language used in the cases lead to some courts deciding cases 
based on what the judges perceived as being fair. There was a backlash against this in the early 20th 
Century. This consisted in removing the moral language from the adjudicatory principles used by 
the courts and contractual concepts would be used to control the scope of the action. However, 
this was not a rejection of the proprietary normative basis of the action. It was refined and re-
affirmed.  
Unjust enrichment initially appeared as a principle to differentiate property claims that were 
based on loss from those that were based on gain. Lord Dunedin and Lord Wright then used it as 
an additional premise in the justification for imposing liability. Since it is unjust for a man to enrich 
himself from the property of someone else, the law will give a remedy when someone is enriched 
from the money which, morally, belongs to someone else. Unjust enrichment was part of the 
normative justification and did not operate as a standalone principle. As was seen in Chapter 2, 
Birks in 1985 introduced a different notion of unjust enrichment. It would operate as a standalone 
source of legal rights and it would not have any moral foundations.229 Unjust enrichment moved 
from being a normative principle to become an analytical tool. This was a wrong turning.  
 
                                                 
229 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 1985) 99.  
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CHAPTER 4: UNREQUESTED NON-
RETURNABLE BENEFITS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter concerns the recovery of non-returnable benefits which have not been requested or 
freely accepted. This means that money and goods are not within the scope of this chapter, nor are 
services which have been requested or freely accepted. As was explained in previous chapters, 
recovery of money and goods (insofar as they are returnable) can be explained by reference to the 
Property Principle. Where the benefit had been requested or freely accepted, it was argued in the 
previous chapter that this could be explained in terms of not letting the defendant have two things 
which he accepted were mutually exclusive. This now leaves us with non-money/goods benefits 
that have not been requested or freely accepted. This mostly concerns the performance of the legal 
obligations of another, the unrequested provision of necessary services and instances where work 
done has the consequence of unlocking value. 
II. WHAT IS THE LAW? 
 
A. Unjust Enrichment Orthodoxies and Generalisations 
 
Under the Birksian Unjust Enrichment structure there are three (and potentially four, if we count 
benefits realisable in money) situations where an unrequested non-returnable benefit would 
amount to an enrichment: (i) if it had the effect of discharging D’s legal obligation, (ii) if it spared 
D an expense which D would have had to incur, (iii) if the benefit D received was realised (or easily 
realisable) in money. What unjust factors would apply in these circumstances? There are two main 
ones at play here. One would be ‘necessity’1 and the other is characterised by some commentators 
                                                 
1 A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press 2012) s 19; A Burrows, The 
Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford Universtiy Press 2011) ch 18; G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) ch 19; C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson, Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust 
Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) ch 19.  
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as ‘legal compulsion’2 but by others as a policy-based factor called ‘secondary liability’.3 Legal 
compulsion/secondary liability will be the most common unjust factor where the enrichment 
consists of the discharge of an obligation. Necessity will have a residual role in such cases, but 
would play its main role where the enrichment is a factually necessary expense. Finally, other unjust 
factors, most importantly mistake, also have a role to play (especially where the enrichment is a 
benefit that has been realised in money). In Chapter 2 it was argued that the application of the 
Unjust Enrichment formula to such cases is incoherent and leads to ad hoc exceptions to the 
formula having to be recognised. There were two objections. The first is that such cases required 
the creation of an exception to the ‘at the expense of’ test. The second is that the unjust factor 
failed to identify anything defective with the transaction at issue. 
 Notwithstanding these objections, the Unjust Enrichment formula implies that recovery is 
generally available when the conditions laid down are met. This Part argues that the case-law reveals 
that in cases of performance of another’s duty and avoidance of a factually necessary expense, 
recovery is not generally available. Hence, the formula is wrong in suggesting that it would be. 
 
 
 
B. Performance of another’s duty 
 
The formula implies that if C discharges D’s duty then C can recover if: (i) C was legally compelled 
to do so, (ii) C’s performance was necessary, or (iii) C performed by mistake. That position is stated 
too widely to be consistent with the case-law. 
 
1. C was legally compelled to discharge the obligation 
 
If a public authority serves notice on an occupier of premises (C) requiring a nuisance to be abated 
on pain of penalty, and C discharges that obligation when actually D should have done so, then C 
may recover his payment from D. This rule came to be established in a trickle of cases in the late 
19th and early 20th century. The first such case was Gebhardt v Saunders,4 where the Public Health 
(London) Act 1891 empowered a local authority to direct the owner or the occupier of a building 
                                                 
2 Burrows, Restatement (n 1) s 18; Virgo (n 1) 252. 
3 C Mitchell, The Law of Contribution and Reimbursement (OUP 2003); Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 1) chs 20–22. 
4 [1892] 2 QB 452 (EWCA). 
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to abate a nuisance. If the nuisance arose out of a defect from a structural character then the owner 
was to be served with a notice requiring him to abate the nuisance, otherwise the occupier would 
be served. In this case the authority did not realise that the defect was of a structural character and 
so the occupier was served (rather than the owner). In the course of doing the work it was 
discovered that the defect was structural. The occupier sought to recoup his costs from the owner 
under the statute and he succeeded. But both judges of the Divisional Court also held that the 
occupier could have succeeded at common law under money paid: 
 
If two people are required to do certain work under a penalty in case of disobedience, and one does the work, 
and it turns out afterwards that the other ought to have done it, the expenses are properly money paid at the 
request of the person who was primarily liable, but who neglected to do the work.5 
 
In my opinion the ordinary principle of law is applicable to this case apart from the statute, the principle 
applicable to cases where one man has been legally compelled to expend money on what another man ought 
to have done, and, without having recourse to s. 11, the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants 
as having been legally compelled to incur expense in abating a nuisance which the defendants themselves 
ought to have abated.6 
 
This was followed in a number of other cases under this and similar Acts.7 What is important to 
note is that the notice to abate creates a legal obligation even if it turns out to be addressed to the 
wrong person. In other words, the fact that the occupier is not actually responsible for abating the 
nuisance does not have the effect of avoiding the notice.8 The corollary is that if the work was done 
before the notice was served then it would be deemed to be voluntary and so there would be no 
recovery. In Harris v Hickman9 there was a nuisance which was a threat to public health under the 
Public Health (London) Act 1891, but the plaintiff’s action failed because only an ‘intimation’, and 
not a formal notice, had been served on them under the Act. As such they were not legally 
compelled to do the work and so were ‘volunteers’ and so could not recover. 
 As far as I am aware these are the only cases where both parties were legally compelled to 
do the work, so it cannot be determined conclusively whether this is evidence of a general principle 
                                                 
5 ibid 456 (Day J). 
6 ibid 458 (Charles J). 
7 Andrew v St Olave’s Board of Works [1898] 1 QB 775 (QB); North v Walthamstow UDC (1898) 67 LJQB 972; Rhymney 
Iron Co v Gelligaer District Council [1917] 1 KB 589 (KB). 
8 ‘I look upon the section as putting upon the person served, not for all time, but prima facie and for the time being, 
the liability to do what it is necessary should promptly be done, leaving the question of his ultimate liability to be 
dealt with subsequently’: Andrew v St Olave’s Board of Works (n 7) 781 (Lord Russell of Killowen CJ). 
9 [1904] 1 KB 13 (KB). 
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or if it is just ad hoc. However, the reasoning of the courts in these cases strongly points to the 
view that recovery would be generally available in such cases. Indeed, the judges thought it was just 
a standard application of the rules on money paid. If, under a contract, C and D are both under a 
duty to do something and C does it, there seems to be no principled reason why C could not 
recover a share of the costs from D. So, it would seem that the unjust enrichment theory is correctly 
applicable here. 
 
2. C was not legally compelled but acted out of necessity 
 
Here the general rule seems to be no recovery, with very limited exceptions. The decision of the 
plaintiffs to act in Harris v Hickman was no more voluntary than was the one of Mr Exall in Exall 
v Partridge or of the plaintiffs in the The Zuhal K, yet there was no recovery because they had not 
(yet) been legally compelled to do the work. Nor does this seem to be an anomaly confined to the 
operation of the Victorian Public Health Acts. In Macclesfield Corp v Great Central Railway10 the 
respondent was under a statutory duty to repair a bridge. The plaintiff highway authority served 
notice on the respondent requiring them to do the work but they refused. So, the bridge being 
unsafe, the highway authority did the work themselves and sought reimbursement from the 
respondent. The Court of Appeal held that the action failed because the highway authority was not 
legally compelled so to act. Once again, the reality was that this was not, in the proper sense of the 
term, a voluntary decision by the plaintiff. Yet there was no recovery.  
 However, in some cases there has been recovery where another person’s duty was 
performed even though C was not legally compelled to do so. So if the plaintiff were to bury 
someone the person who was ultimately liable to carry out the burial shall be liable to reimburse 
the plaintiff for the costs of doing so (provided the plaintiff did not act officiously). In one of the 
leading cases, Lord Loughborough said that ‘common decency’11 required that the plaintiff organise 
the funeral. And he drew an analogy with the cases where someone paid another’s debt to secure 
the release of distrained goods.  
 Some of the burial cases dealt with instances where deceased wives had been abandoned 
by their husbands, which is why someone else buried them, even though the husbands were still 
subject to a legal duty to do so. Was the position regarding those who cared for deserted wives 
different during their lives? Until the late 19th century married women did not have contractual 
capacity of their own. They entered into contracts on the basis that they were their husband’s 
                                                 
10 [1911] 2 KB 528 (EWCA). 
11 Jenkins v Tucker (1788) 1 H Bl 90, 126 ER 55 [93] (Lord Loughborough). 
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agents. In straightforward cases this agency relationship was a real one. However, this was not so 
in the case of wives who had been wrongfully deserted by their husbands. The husbands very much 
wanted to end the agency relationship. Yet in such cases the courts held that tradesmen who 
provided necessaries to the wrongfully deserted wives could recover for them against the 
husband.12 But such liability ended if the wife did something wrong, e.g. committed adultery.13  
What was the basis for such liability? In 1878 Lush J characterised it as an agency of 
necessity.14 This is not particularly satisfactory. It is one thing to say, in maritime contexts, that in 
an emergency situation the scope of an agent’s authority can be extended due to necessity. At least 
in such cases this does not go directly against the will of the principal. But with the deserted wives 
cases such an agency does go directly against the will of the principal. Furthermore, an agency of 
necessity doctrine does not explain why adultery terminates this relationship (even in cases where 
the husband might be quite unaware of the adultery). A further difficulty with the agency 
explanation is that a husband who was a lunatic was still liable for necessaries supplied to his wife;15 
but if the principal has no capacity to contract, how can an agent bind him? 
The better explanation is the one taken in the United States. In Cunningham v Reardon16 Hoar 
J links the obligation to provide for the wife whilst she is living with the obligation on the husband 
                                                 
12 Bolton v Prentice (1744) 2 Strange 1214, 93 ER 1136. See also the cases discussed in J Kortmann, Altruism in Private 
Law: Liability for Nonfeasance and Negotiorum Gestio (Oxford University Press 2005) 128–130. 
13 Govier v Hancock (1796) 6 TR 603, 101 ER 726. 
14 Eastland v Burchell (1878) 3 QBD 432, 436 (Lush J). 
15 Read v Legard (1851) 6 Ex 636, 155 ER 698. 
16 Cunningham v Reardon (1868) 98 Mass 538 (SJC Mass) (Hoar J). ‘The husband who by his cruelty compels his wife 
to leave him is considered by the law as giving her thereby a credit to procure necessaries on his account; and is 
responsible to any person who may furnish her with them. This responsibility extends not only to supplies 
furnished her while living, but to decent burial when dead. Its origin is not merely and strictly from the law 
making her his agent to procure the articles of which she stands in need. If it were so, the consequence would follow 
for which the defendant contends, that the agency would end with the life of the agent. But it is rather an authority 
to do for him what law and duty require him to do, and which he neglects or refuses to do for himself; and is 
applicable as well to supplies furnished to the wife when she is sick, insensible or insane, and to the care of her 
lifeless remains, as to contracts expressly made by her. 
 
Nor is any notice to him requisite, in order to charge him for her funeral expenses, any more than for necessaries to 
sustain life. The burden is on the plaintiff in either case to prove the existence of the necessity, and that the husband 
has failed to make provision for it. But when this is established, nothing more is needed to create the liability; and it 
would seem to be an idle ceremony to give notice of his wife's death to a man who had refused her the means of 
sustaining life. The responsibility for funeral expenses is not a new and distinct cause of action, differing in 
kind, or in the rules by which it is created; but an incident to the obligation to furnish bodily support.’ 
Emphasis added 
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to provide a funeral. In wrongfully abandoning the wife the husband is no longer meeting the 
obligation to provide for her and so if a third party who acts non-officiously discharges the 
husband’s obligation, that third party can recover against the husband. But that obligation stops if 
the wife commits a wrong. This explains why, after adultery, the husband is no longer liable. 
Although it was not fleshed out by English commentators, this explanation is to be preferred as it 
provides a more coherent and unified explanation of the law.  
 What about children? It is clear that the necessaries for the deserted wife also included 
provisions for her children. But what about instances where the wife was absent and the father had 
declined to fulfil his duty to support his child? Can a third party who provided necessaries to the 
child recover their cost against the father? The position does not appear to have been settled in 
English law,17 but in the United States it would appear that recovery was available.18 The United 
States did not, however, appear to extend that position to abandoned slaves.19 
 It has been suggested that the ‘poor laws’ cases can also be explained on the basis of 
discharge of another’s liability. Under the poor laws a parish was responsible for the care of paupers 
under its jurisdiction. There arose a trickle20 of cases where someone else provided medical care to 
the poor and sought to recover the cost from the responsible parish. Day argues that these cases 
are best seen as ones where, as in Exall v Partridge, the discharge of another’s duty entitles one to 
recovery.21 However, Kortmann persuasively questions whether these are actually cases of 
unrequested benefits.22 In Simmons v Willmott23 and Lamb v Bruce24 the person ultimately responsible 
knew that the plaintiff was providing the care and did not stop it; these are facts from which a 
request can be inferred.25 Furthermore, in Paynter v Williams26 the possibility that a third party might 
recover for having discharged the duty without request seems to be excluded: 
 
                                                 
17 See the discussion in Kortmann (n 12) 129. 
18 W Keener, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Baker, Voorhis and Company 1893) 23. 
19 It was possible to recover in the case of necessaries provided to abandoned slaves but it was much harder than for 
supplies to deserted wives/children. See the discussion in William A Keener, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts 
(Baker, Voorhis 1893) 344–49. 
20 Simmons v Willmott (1800) 3 Esp 91, 170 ER 549; Lamb v Bruce (1815) 4 M & S 275, 105 ER 836; Tomlinson v Bentall 
(1826) 5 B & C 738, 108 ER 274; Paynter v Williams (1833) 1 C & M 810, 149 ER 626. 
21 W Day, ‘Against Necessity as a Ground For Restitution’ [2016] Restitution Law Review 27, 42–43. 
22 Kortmann (n 12) 120–122. 
23 (n 20). 
24 (n 20). 
25 Indeed, this was the argument of counsel for the defendant in Paynter v Williams (n 20). 
26 (n 20). 
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The legal liability is not alone sufficient to enable the party to maintain the action, without a retainer or 
adoption of the plaintiff on the part of the parish. The legal liability of the parish does not give anyone who 
chooses to attend a pauper and supply him with medicines a right to call on them for payment. It is their duty 
to see that a proper person is employed, and they are to have an option who the medical man shall be.27 
 
This leaves us with Tomlinson v Bentall,28 where a woman had an accident in the parish of Heybridge. 
Heybridge Parish Council refused to do its duty and treat her; she was ferried back and forth and 
eventually made it back to her home parish where she was treated by the plaintiff surgeon. He 
sought to recover his fee from the parish of Heybridge and succeeded even though there was no 
request for the treatment to be provided. Kortmann suggests that the best explanation for the case 
was that Heybridge could not be allowed to rely on its own dereliction of duty to avoid liability.29 
So, to conclude, it seems doubtful that, without more, the unrequested performance of the duty of 
the parish by a third person lead to recovery. Rather, it seems to be that there would only be 
recovery if the third party cares for the pauper when the parish has refused to do its duty. 
 So, in the end, the non-legally compelled unrequested performance of another’s duty will 
only lead to recovery in the burial, the deserted wives cases and some pauper cases. So, whilst it 
seems that there is a general principle that the discharge of another’s debt in situations of necessity 
would lead to recovery, this is not the case where one performs another’s (non-monetary) duty. 
The most general principle that can be laid down is that the only duties whose performance by 
another will lead to recovery are duties to provide basic necessities to a dependant, whether they 
are wives, children, or, perhaps, paupers. In such cases recovery would only be available where the 
primary duty holder has refused to perform his duty. The cases do not, however, support the view 
(implied by the unjust enrichment theory) that there would be recovery whenever one discharges 
the duty of another out of necessity. This is unlike the discharge of debts where, as argued above, 
there is recovery under a general test of necessity. So, the formula does not reflect the cases as it 
implies that there is recovery in all necessity situations where the duty is discharged, but the cases 
limit recovery to particularly narrow sets of situations. 
 
3. C’s performance was voluntary 
 
                                                 
27 ibid [819] (Lord Lyndhurst CB). 
28 (n 20). 
29 Kortmann (n 12) 122. 
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In J S Bloor v Pavillion Developments30 the claimant mistakenly built a road which the defendant was 
under a duty to build. The claimant tried to recover the cost of building that road. Without 
considering the authorities the court approved of Goff and Jones’s statement that if a legal duty was 
discharged there could be recovery.31 As indicated above, there is no authority for this beyond the 
cases where both parties are liable or the deserted wives/pauper cases. In the end the court held 
that special rules applied to case of improvement to land (which this was), that these required 
acquiescence and that there was no acquiescence on those facts.32 But the court still considered, 
obiter, the argument based on discharge of liability. It held that the defendant had not actually been 
incontrovertibly benefited because it had lost the opportunity to design and commission the road, 
and that this constituted a ‘disadvantage’.33 
 The loss of the opportunity to commission the work was not an issue in the abatement of 
public nuisance cases considered above (which were not considered by the court). Perhaps a way 
of distinguishing these cases is that in the nuisance cases the prime benefit of having the work done 
was to avoid liability for the nuisance, so it does not matter how exactly the work is done. However, 
in Bloor the road in itself would have been beneficial to Pavillion and so it was important that they 
had the freedom to decide how, and by whom, it should be built. This might be why it is easier to 
recover for having discharged another’s debt than it is for discharging a non-monetary obligation. 
There is only one way to do the former but there are many ways to do the latter, and the defendant 
would often have a strong interest in deciding exactly how it is done. 
 Indeed, this seems to be the common thread linking the three instances where recovery is 
allowed: in such cases imposition of liability does not unduly infringe the autonomy of the 
defendant. In the nuisance cases this is because the primary interest is in avoiding the liability for 
nuisance and in the work itself. In the burial cases the executor/husband/father is absent and so 
the fact a funeral happens in a certain way does not affect him. Finally, in the case of deserted 
wives, the husband clearly does not care what the wife purchases. The same goes for the pauper 
cases where the parish has refused to provide the care. 
 The most, therefore, that can be said is that there would be recovery for the performance 
of the duty of another only in cases where the duty-holder did not have a legitimate interest in the 
manner of the performance of the duty or if, by their actions, they disclaimed any such interest. To 
be fair to the Unjust Enrichment defenders, such a view could be accommodated within the 
formula by saying that the performance of the duties of another, where they had a legitimate interest 
                                                 
30 JS Bloor Ltd v Pavillion Developments Ltd [2008] EWHC 724 (TCC). 
31 ibid [7]-[10] (HH Kirkham). 
32 ibid [48] (HH Kirkham). 
33 ibid [44], [52] (HH Kirkham). 
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in deciding the manner of performance, is not an enrichment on the basis that this deprived them 
of the freedom to decide how the work should be done. However, the objections to such types of 
reasoning that have been given in Chapter 2 remain. 
  
C. Factually necessary expenses 
 
Once again, the restitution textbooks state the rule too widely when they suggest that the provision 
of a necessary service can, if coupled with an unjust factor (which might be necessity), lead to 
recovery. This generalisation first appeared in the 1970s in an article by Birks34 and another by 
Jones.35 Following these articles, the second edition of Goff and Jones stated that someone could be 
liable even though the benefit was not freely accepted provided that the benefit was 
incontrovertible; this would be satisfied in cases, for example, where the benefit was factually 
necessary.36 
 There was virtually no authority in the common law world to support that conclusion. 
Whilst it is true that the North American case law was more generous in awarding recovery in cases 
of legal necessity, recovery in cases of factual necessity was confined to cases where doctors saved 
the life of unconscious people. The First Restatement stated a general rule according to which such 
recovery was available when done to preserve property or credit but, as the Reporters’ Note 
acknowledges, this is an over-generalisation and such cases were confined to agency of necessity.37 
This accords with the English position which rejected recovery when it was done to preserve 
someone’s credit38 or property.39 There was no English case on whether there could be recovery 
where the intervention was to save someone’s life. Even if the North American case law was right 
on this point, this is such an exceptional case that it is hard to generalise it to all instances where 
the benefit was factually necessary. The only arguments given were that it was the best explanation 
for Craven-Ellis v Canons40 and that since legal necessity (in the sense of discharge of legal obligation) 
was recognised, so should factual necessity.41 In regard to Craven-Ellis, as will be argued in Chapter 
                                                 
34 P Birks, ‘Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law’ [1971] Current Legal Problems 110. 
35 G Jones, ‘Restitutionary Claims for Services Rendered’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 273. 
36 R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1978) 16. 
37 Seavey and Scott, Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Quasi-Contracts and Constructive Trusts (American Law Institute 
1937) s 117 Reporters’ Notes 171-174. 
38 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co (1886) 34 Ch D 234. 
39 Nicholson v Chapman (1793) 2 H Bl 254, 126 ER 536. 
40 Jones (n 35) 286–287. 
41 Birks (n 34). 
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5 Section II.C.3, this is not the best explanation of the case. Rather, the best explanation is the one 
that the court actually gave: the work was freely accepted, and the company could freely accept 
because of the knowledge and consent of its shareholders. As for the analogy with discharge of 
legal obligations, as was argued above, there is no general principle insofar as non-monetary legal 
obligations are concerned. Indeed, much the same concerns raised above could be raised here: 
there are many different ways of doing the work and the defendant should have the freedom to 
decide whether he wants the work to be done in the way that it was done. 
 Nonetheless, following the publication of Goff and Jones, the principle – that the provision 
of factually necessary services could lead to recovery – started to be used by courts. It is therefore 
necessary to consider whether those cases actually support that principle.  
 R (on the application of Rowe) v Vale of the White Horse42 was the first English case to explicitly 
make use of the principle. In many respects this was an unsatisfactory decision. The case started as 
administrative law proceedings and during trial it was realised that this it really involved a private 
law claim. The facts were that the Council had been providing sewage services to Mr Rowe since 
1982 but never charged for them due to an administrative oversight.  In 2001 the Council wrote to 
Mr Rowe informing him of that oversight and that it sought to recover the past six years’ worth of 
payments. Mr Rowe sought a declaration that he was not liable. Lightman J adopted Goff and 
Jones’s structure and said that the old requirement of a request could be satisfied either by (i) free 
acceptance or (ii) incontrovertible benefit (i.e. the service was factually necessary).43  That second 
requirement was common ground between the parties,44 so it cannot be said that this case is a 
binding authority for the incontrovertible benefit principle as an alternative to free acceptance. In 
any event, the claim failed because the Council had no intention of charging for the service at the 
time it was provided.45 This meant that there could not be any unjust factor, whether this was free 
acceptance or failure of consideration. This case illustrates the general redundancy of 
‘incontrovertible benefit’ where the putative unjust factor is failure of consideration or, if it is an 
unjust factor, free acceptance.46 In such cases, the fact there is failure of consideration ipso facto 
means that there is free acceptance47 and so ‘incontrovertible benefit’ is not needed at the 
enrichment stage. Incontrovertible benefit can only make a difference where the unjust factor is 
mistake or, if it is an unjust factor, necessity. In such cases the fact of the mistake or the necessity 
                                                 
42 [2003] EWHC 388, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep 418. 
43 ibid [12] (Lightman J). 
44 ibid (Lightman J). 
45 ibid [14] (Lightman J). 
46 Which Lightman J said it was: ibid 13. 
47 This is so because failure of consideration requires that the basis for the transfer was shared by both parties. 
Hence, the recipient must know that the benefit was not provided gratuitously.  
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will generally mean that there has been no free acceptance of the work by the defendant,48 hence 
‘incontrovertible benefit’ is needed at the enrichment stage in order for the claim to succeed. 
Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Wigan Athletic49 was the other case where the 
incontrovertible benefit principle was invoked. The defendant was entitled to normal levels of 
police protection for football matches for free. However, if they wanted an extra level of protection 
they would have to pay it. They did not want the extra level of protection, but the police supplied 
it nonetheless. The High Court had held that the police could recover the cost of this additional 
protection in restitution. However, it seems clear that Mann J did not understand the concept of 
incontrovertible benefit. He cited counsel as saying that ‘the club had received an incontrovertible 
benefit in freely accepting services from the GMP.’50 This confuses the fact that incontrovertible 
benefit and free acceptance are two different ways of establishing the enrichment requirement. In 
the end Mann J held that this requirement was met because:  
 
The club has incontrovertibly received a benefit from the policing. As well as having the match properly 
policed on the ground, it was able to fulfil the requirements of the safety certificate and thus play its matches; 
thus the first requirement is fulfilled.51  
 
But this is not what incontrovertible benefit means. All it shows is that the Club received a benefit. 
To show that it is incontrovertible one has to show that it anticipated a necessary expense or was 
a benefit that could be realised in money. Furthermore, Mann J also misunderstood what the 
‘unjust’ requirement was. Instead of establishing whether there was an unjust factor, he simply held 
that ‘it would in my view be unjust if the club could retain the benefit of that without some 
payment.’52 One should not be excessively harsh on Mann J. Instead of having the case before him 
argued on the basis of the previous authorities on quantum meruit, it was put on the basis of this 
new Birksian unjust enrichment structure. Reading his judgment, one might conclude that Lord 
Sumner’s warning in Sinclair v Brougham about the vagueness of unjust enrichment was right. 
                                                 
48 When the work is provided because it is necessary, it will typically be the case that the defendant did not know that 
it was being provided. Hence there is no opportunity to reject it and so free acceptance is not established. Similarly, 
in a typical situation where the work is provided by mistake, the defendant would not know about it and so it would 
not be free acceptance. This is not to deny that, in some cases of mistake or necessity, the defendant did have the 
opportunity to reject. Instead the claim is that this will rarely be the case. So, in the typical instances of work 
provided by mistake or due to necessity, the claimant would have to rely on ‘incontrovertible benefit’ in order to 
establish the enrichment. 
49 [2008] EWCA 1449, [2009] 1 WLR 1580. 
50 Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Wigan Athletic [2007] EWHC 3095 [125] (Mann J). 
51 ibid [126] (Mann J). 
52 ibid (Mann J). 
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In the Court of Appeal, the analysis was still somewhat problematic. The majority (Sir 
Andrew Morritt C and Smith LJ) held that there was no free acceptance and so denied recovery.53 
They also rejected the incontrovertible benefit analysis on the basis that the real question was 
whether the club had benefited from the extra level of policing and not the policing tout court. They 
criticised Mann J for not having recognised that distinction.54 Maurice Kay LJ, dissenting, accepted 
that there was no free acceptance but said that there should be recovery on the basis that Mann J 
had found that there had been an incontrovertible benefit.55 He did not explain how the benefit 
was incontrovertible. Insofar as the unjust factor analysis is concerned, he made the same mistake 
as Mann J in holding that ‘in those circumstances, it would be unjust for the club to take the benefit 
of the extra officers without paying for it.’56 So like Rowe, Wigan Athletic is not much of an authority 
for the proposition that the anticipation of a factually necessary expense can be a substitute for free 
acceptance. The majority in the Court of Appeal did not rely on factual necessity and the dissent 
adopts the analysis of the High Court judge, which analysis is so muddled that it does not actually 
support the view that factual necessity will be an alternative to free acceptance. So, it would appear 
that in the general case this principle is wrong. Let us consider particular situations where the courts 
have granted recovery to determine whether the principle has been applied. 
 
1. Agency of necessity. If there is a pre-existing relationship between the parties under which 
the claimant has a duty to look after the defendant’s interests or property, an unforeseen situation 
occurs, and the claimant expends extraordinary efforts in doing his duty, then the claimant is 
entitled to relief for that effort above and beyond the remuneration provided under that 
relationship.57 Importantly, this applies only if there is a pre-existing relationship between the 
parties.58  
2. Supply of necessaries to an incapax. This concerns instances where the claimant provided 
necessaries to someone lacking contractual capacity. In such instances the claimant can recover, 
but only if the supply actually happened, if they were necessaries (and not luxuries), and recovery 
is capped at the reasonable value of the necessaries supplied. This, however, does not establish a 
general principle of recovery. It would appear that those necessaries must actually have been 
requested/accepted by the incapax in question. This makes those cases different from instances 
                                                 
53 Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Wigan Athletic (n 49) [47], [59]. 
54 ibid [46], [58]. 
55 ibid [69]. 
56 ibid. 
57 China-Pacific SA v Food Corp of India (The Winson) [1982] AC 939 (UKHL); ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petroleo Brasileiro SA (No 
2) [2012] UKSC 17, [2012] 2 AC 164. 
58 Binstead v Buck (1776) 2 Blackstone W 117, 96 ER 660; Nicholson v Chapman (n 39). 
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where the service is provided without the defendant’s knowledge or consent. As such they do not 
assist the necessity principle in unjust enrichment. 
3. Salvage. If someone salvages a ship on the high seas, even if it is done without the owner’s 
knowledge or consent, the salvor may recover a salvage award for his services. Again, this cannot 
be of any general assistance. The law of salvage does not apply in non-tidal waters.59 In any event 
it is doubtful whether the law of salvage itself can be explained in terms of unjust enrichment. This 
is because of the way the salvage award is calculated. A number of factors will be considered such 
as the claimant’s loss, the value of the cargo saved, the saving to the environment and a measure 
of reward to incentivise salvage. For those reasons salvage is wider than merely recovery of what 
the defendant gained and so cannot be solely about unjust enrichment. 
4. General Average. If the Captain of a ship is required to incur extraordinary expense (this 
can include jettisoning cargo) in order to save the cargo and the ship, the owners of the surviving 
cargo will be required to pay a pro rata share to compensate those who suffered loss as a result. 
This ensures that the loss is equally shared amongst all the parties to the adventure. We will come 
back to General Average in the next section, where it will be argued that the principles from it can 
be generalised and this can explain recovery in all the instances where it is currently granted.  
5. Berkeley Applegate type orders. A case often cited in favour of the saved necessary expense 
rule is Re Berkeley Applegate.60 A company was in liquidation; some of the assets that it owned were 
held on trust for others. The non-trust assets would have been insufficient to pay the liquidator’s 
fees and so the liquidator sought a court order saying that he could be paid back from the trust 
assets. The Deputy High Court judge granted that order. However, this does not support general 
recovery for necessitous interventions. The crucial point about the case is that the benefit was in a 
sense solicited. It is true that it was not solicited in the same way as in a typical free acceptance 
case, but there was still an element of voluntariness. The beneficiaries could have decided to reject 
the services of the liquidator. But their assets were bundled together as one package with the 
liquidator’s service. It was one package that they could take or decline. If they declined it completely 
they could still have sought to recover their assets, but this would require the appointment of an 
administrator for which they would have had to pay. So, either way, their assets were bundled 
together with a package that included the cost of administration. All Berkeley Applegate said was that 
in such a situation they had to take the whole package. More will be said about Berkeley Applegate 
below, but for now it must be simply pointed out that it does not support the existence of a general 
rule for recovery for unrequested necessaries. 
                                                 
59The Goring [1988] AC 831 (UKHL); see also Nicholson v Chapman (n 39). 
60 Re Berkeley Applegate (Investment Consultants) No 1 [1989] Ch 32 (Ch). 
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To conclude, except in specifically delineated situations, the unrequested provision of 
necessaries combined with an unjust factor will not lead to recovery. The most that can be said is 
that there will be recovery where the claimant was under a duty to protect the defendant’s interest 
or property and where the fulfilment of that duty leads to a disproportionate burden on the 
claimant. It is, however, clear that there is no recovery where the claimant acts to protect the 
defendant’s interest or property where he is not under a duty to do so. 
D. Conclusion 
 
The formula does not fit the law insofar as the performance of another’s duty and the anticipation 
of a factually necessary expense is concerned. In those cases, the unjust enrichment principle 
implies that recovery is generally available, but this is not reflected in the case law. Instead, recovery 
is confined to a narrower set of circumstances.  In addition to that, there are the problems with 
using the unjust enrichment formula for such cases that we considered in Chapter 2 Section III. 
As was seen then, the problem with such cases is that they are not based on reversing a defective 
transaction. Instead, there is another principle at play: The Benefit-Burden Principle. 
III. THE BENEFIT-BURDEN PRINCIPLE: QUI SENTIT 
COMMODUM, SENTIRE DEBET ET ONUS. 
 
A. The maxim in English Law 
 
The maxim has ancient origins in the civilian world. It was taken to be the gist of the Lex Rhodia 
(which laid down the rules for General Average) and it appeared in Pope Boniface VIII’s 1298 
promulgation De Regulae Juris. These rules were taken to be basic principles of the Church’s Canon 
Law. 
The first mention of the maxim that I have been able to identify in English law was in 1560 
in Willion v Berkley.61 This was a land dispute concerning whether a particular estate was entailed or 
not. Anthony Brown J said: 
  
And if the King would say that his remainder is a fee-simple, he cannot say otherwise but that the estate 
precedent is also a fee-simple, for both the estates were made by one same fine at one same time, and both 
                                                 
61 (1560) 1 Plow 223, 75 ER 339. 
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the estates are by the donor limited to be in tail. And the King cannot say that the one is in tail and the other 
in fee, for thereby he affirms and disaffirms at the same time, that is, he affirms that in the first estate the 
statute divided the estate and made it in tail, and then in his own estate he disaffirms it, viz. that the statute 
did not divide the estate, but that it remains a fee-simple conditional; and by this means he would be within 
the purview and out of the purview in one same matter and at one same time, which he cannot be, but he 
shall be estopped to say so, nam qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus. 
 
The maxim was used to prevent the King from setting up inconsistent circumstances. More 
generally, if one took land which had certain conditions attached to it then one was under an 
obligation to perform those obligations. This is an ancient rule which can be found in Littleton’s 
1482 Treatise on Land Tenure.62 In Coke’s commentaries on Littleton he sees this rule as implying ‘an 
ancient maxime of the law, viz. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus, et transit terra cum onere.’63 (He 
who derives a benefit ought also to bear the burden, and the land passes with its burden). Later on 
in his Institutes Coke also cites the maxim to support the view that the owners of private chapels 
should repair them.64 
 William Whewell in his 1845 Elements of Morality lists this principle as one of the maxims of 
Equity. He explains the role of the maxims as follows: 
 
The administration of Equity has led to the currency of many Maxims which may be considered Maxims of 
Moral as well as Jurisprudential Equity since their acceptance in the Courts of Law has been due to their 
presumed agreement with Justice. We may notice some of these Maxims not as being always universally true 
or free from doubt and difficulty in their application but as bringing forwards some of the points on which 
Equity must principally depend and as showing by examples the kind of Equality in which it consists. Among 
such maxims are the following.65 
 
Of the maxim itself he said: 
 
Qui sentit onus sentire debet et commodum qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus; “He who bears the burthen ought 
to receive the profit; he who reaps the profit ought to bear the burthen.” Thus, if a man dying leaves his wife 
pregnant, so that it is uncertain who will be heir to his lands; if the next presumptive heir, in the mean time, 
sow the land, it is equitable that the harvest also shall be his And on the other hand, they who enjoy the 
                                                 
62 T Littleton, Treatise on Land Tenure (E Wambaugh ed, John Byrne & Co 1903) bk III Chapter 5 
<https://archive.org/details/littletonstenure00littiala>. 
63 E Coke, A Readable Edition of Coke Upon Littleton (T Coventry ed, Saunders and Benning 1830) [231a] 
<https://archive.org/details/areadableeditio00cokegoog>. 
64 E Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (E and R Brooke 1797) 489 
<https://archive.org/details/secondpartinsti01cokegoog>. See also TE Scrutton, The Influence of the Roman Law on the 
Law of England (Cambridge University Press 1885) 130. 
65 W Whewell, The Elements of Morality, Including Polity, vol 1 (John W Parker 1845) Article 503. 
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benefit of any improvement of land arising from public works; as, for instance from a general drainage; ought 
to contribute to the expense of the works.66 
 
The maxim is also cited in Broome’s Legal Maxims, the 10th Edition of which uses it to explain why 
covenants run with land, tenants are responsible for repairs, a principal must adopt a contract done 
for him in its entirety, that an assignee takes subject to all the equities to which it was subject in the 
hands of the assignor, grants of certain monopolies are subject to conditions, and why the burdens 
of partnership debts fall on the partnership estate.67  
 The maxim was also used in exposing the law of general average, recoupment and 
contribution. These will be addressed in the next section, but for now we will consider the maxim’s 
other applications in English law. The maxim has generated a principle of English law, the benefit 
and burden principle, which states that ‘a person who takes the benefit of an arrangement will be 
bound by any associated burden contained in it despite the fact that he was not a party to the 
original arrangement.’68 There is also, potentially, a wider principle according to which, ‘a person 
may, in appropriate circumstances, be bound by an obligation which is imposed by the same 
transaction that grants a benefit of which he wishes to take advantage but is not a condition of that 
benefit.’69 Davis has helpfully compiled the cases supporting these principles.70 Based on her survey 
it would seem that the principle of benefit and burden is well established in English law. It would 
appear that the conditions for the principle are that (i) the burden is a condition of the benefit, and 
(ii) the recipient freely accepts the benefit knowing or with notice of the burden. If these are met, 
then the intended beneficiaries of the burden can enforce it against the recipient. This is so even if 
they were not a party to the initial transaction. This principle transcends privity of contract. 
 In Tito v Waddell (No 2)71 Megarry V-C held that there was a more general principle of 
benefit and burden. The ‘pure principle’, as he called it, applied whenever a benefit and a burden 
were part of the same transaction. It was therefore, not necessary to show that the benefit and the 
burden were intrinsically connected. Of course, they still had to be linked such that it was intended 
that one could not have the benefit without the burden. But, by contrast with the narrower 
principle, they did not have to be linked by their nature.72  Finally, the use of the doctrine of benefit 
                                                 
66 ibid Article 506. 
67 H Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated (RH Kersley ed, 10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1939) 
482–486. 
68 C Davis, ‘The Principle of Benefit and Burden’ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 522, 522. 
69 ibid. 
70 Davis (n 68). 
71 [1977] Ch 106 (EWCA) 289–306 (Megarry VC). 
72 Davis (n 68) 539. 
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and burden to circumvent the Austberry rule in land – that freehold positive covenants are 
impossible – has been reaffirmed recently in three decisions of the Court of Appeal.73 We will 
return in more detail to the requirements of that principle in the final section where this principle 
will be used to explain the law concerning the restitution of unrequested benefits. 
 
B. Use of the maxim in the unrequested benefit cases 
 
In this subsection I will provide historical evidence that the courts decided cases of restitution for 
unrequested benefits by reference to the maxim and the Benefit-Burden Principle. 
 The first such mention was in 1787 in Deering v The Earl of Winchelsea,74 where the court was 
concerned with the proper basis for contribution between co-sureties. Having rejected contract, 
the court invoked the maxim to explain the nature of liability: 
 
If a view is taken of the cases, it will appear that the bottom of contribution is a fixed principle of justice, and 
is not founded in contract.75 
  
The maxim applied is qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus. In the case of average there is no contract express 
or implied, nor any privity in an ordinary sense. This shews that contribution is founded on equality, and 
established by the law of all nations.76 
 
As quoted above, Deering relied on the rules on General Average and quoted the maxim. The 
rationale seems to be as follows: if A and B are liable for the same debt to C and A discharges the 
whole of that debt then both A and B benefit equally (they are both no longer under a legal 
obligation to pay that debt). However, A bore the whole of the burden of obtaining that benefit 
whilst B got the whole benefit without bearing the burden. B’s position is in violation of the maxim. 
A contribution order means that they would bear the burden equally and so puts them in a position 
where the maxim is respected (as they both benefited and were burdened equally). 
 Recoupment is superficially slightly different because A would get a 100% contribution 
from B. Does that not violate the maxim? No, because an additional element in recoupment is that 
B must have been primarily liable for the debt, i.e. it should have been B’s burden to bear entirely. 
                                                 
73 Davies v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 1164, [2009] All ER (D) 104; Wilkinson v Kerdene [2013] EWCA Civ 44, [2013] 
EGLR 163; Elwood v Goodman [2013] EWCA Civ 1103, [2013] 4 All ER 1077. 
74 Deering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos & Pul 270, 126 ER 1276. 
75 ibid 272 (Eyre CB). 
76 ibid 274 (Eyre CB). 
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The reason A is made liable is to make things easier for a third party, but it was never really A’s 
proper burden (in the ordinary course of things A should have been called to pay it). So, it is B 
who derives the entirety of the benefit from the discharge of the debt. But since B did not bear the 
burden of obtaining that benefit the maxim is breached. A recoupment order restores equilibrium. 
 That a similar principle operates for recoupment and contribution was noticed early on. In 
Craythorne v Swinburne,77 Sir Samuel Romilly (a counsel in the case) made submissions about both 
the rights of co-sureties and the rights of the sureties against the debtor. He said that the ‘right of 
a surety [against the debtor] also stands, not upon contract, but upon a principle of natural justice: 
the same principle, upon which one surety is entitled to contribution from another.’78 The court 
agreed with him. That they were thought of as deriving from the same principle, which was first 
stated in 1787 in Deering, might explain why in 1799 Lord Kenyon thought it obvious79 that recovery 
should be granted in Exall v Partridge. Indeed, in Exall v Partridge, Lawrence J explained that the 
‘justice of the case indeed is, that the one who must ultimately pay this money, should alone be 
answerable here.’80 
 Indeed, the cases generalising Exall v Partridge also seem to be based on that rationale. In 
Bonner v Tottenham and Edmonton Permanent Investment Building Society81 Vaughan Williams LJ said that 
there could be recovery in 
 
cases in which there is community of interest in the subject-matter to which the burden is attached, which 
has been enforced against the plaintiff alone, coupled with benefit to the defendant, even though there is no 
common liability to be sued.82  
 
Again, the idea seems to be that the parties are all in this together, that the payment benefits them 
all but that since one party bore the whole burden, he ought to be able to recover from the others. 
 Other cases of recoupment also invoked a benefit and burden rationale. For example, in 
Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Bros83 the owners of a bonded warehouse were 
compelled to pay customs duty on goods stolen from the warehouse, and successfully claimed 
recoupment from the owners of the goods. The outcome and reasoning of the case was 
                                                 
77 (1807) 14 Ves 160, 33 ER 482. 
78 ibid 162 (Sir Samuel Romilly, counsel). 
79 R M Jackson points out that the principle in Exall was stated ‘without discussion or precedent’: RM Jackson, A 
History of Quasi-Contract (Cambridge University Press 1936) 51. 
80 Exall v Partridge (1799) 8 Term Rep 308, 101 ER 1405 [311] (Lawrence J). 
81 [1899] 1 QB 161 (EWCA). 
82 ibid 174 (Vaughan Williams LJ). 
83 [1937] 1 KB 534 (EWCA). 
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unexceptional and the main matter in dispute was whether the company which owned the 
warehouse had been negligent. Lord Wright MR explained the basis for recovery as follows: 
 
(1) The essence of the rule is that there is a liability for the same debt resting on the plaintiff and the defendant 
and the plaintiff has been legally compelled to pay, but the defendant gets the benefit of the payment, 
because his debt is discharged either entirely or pro tanto, whereas the defendant is primarily liable to 
pay as between himself and the plaintiff.  
 
(2) These statements of the principle do not put the obligation on any ground of implied contract or of 
constructive or notional contract. The obligation is imposed by the Court simply under the circumstances of 
the case and on what the Court decides is just and reasonable, having regard to the relationship of the parties. 
It is a debt or obligation constituted by the act of the law, apart from any consent or intention of the parties 
or any privity of contract.  
 
(3) The defendants would be unjustly benefited at the cost of the plaintiffs if the latter, who had received 
no extra consideration and made no express bargain, should be left out of pocket by having to discharge what 
was the defendants' debt.84 
 
The argument seems to be that the defendant gets the benefit of the payment, without bearing the 
burden of it (which he was meant to bear). 
 It is true that there is no explicit reference to the benefit and burden principle in the burial 
cases, but lawyers in the 19th century certainly considered them to be analogous to Exall v Partridge. 
So, for example, the annotations to Jenkins v Tucker in the fourth edition of Blackstone’s report 
reference Exall v Partridge as the foundation of that principle.85 The same goes for the abatement 
of nuisance cases under the Public Health (London) Act 1891.86 Again, the defendant receives a 
benefit but without having had to bear the connected burden. 
 The contribution cases under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1977 also appear to 
make use of the principle. The general approach of the statute is to assess the sum each party ought 
to pay based on their responsibility.87 That is their burden and the benefit is the discharge of the 
liability. If a party paid more than their proper burden, then they can get contribution from the 
others in order to even things out. But what about cases where the defendant also retains some of 
the proceeds of the wrongful act committed? For example, A and B stole £1000 from C and B 
remains in possession of the money. C ends up suing A and recovers £1000 from A. In such a case 
the approach of the courts is not to award a 50% contribution order to A against B, rather A will 
                                                 
84 ibid 544–5 (Lord Wright). Numbering and emphasis added. 
85 Jenkins v Tucker (n 11) Notes 2, 6. 
86 Gebhardt v Saunders (n 4) 458 (Charles J). 
87. Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 s 2. 
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be able to recover the whole £1000 from B.88 The reasoning of the courts in such cases fits with 
the benefit and burden principle.  
 
 A B C 
Before theft 0 0 £1000 
After theft 0 £1000 0 
After C sues A -£1000 £1000 £1000 
Court makes 50% 
contribution order 
-£500 £500 £1000 
Court makes 100% 
contribution order 
0 0 £1000 
 
As can be seen from the table, a 50% contribution order would require B to pay £500 to A but this 
would not leave A and B in the same position; A would be £500 worse off than before the theft 
and B would still retain half of the benefit of the theft. So, instead the court makes a 100% 
contribution order and this ensures that neither A nor B keeps any of the benefit of the theft. This 
also means that the benefit and burdens of the theft have been shared equally between A and B.  
 Similarly, in the bundling cases the benefit burden principle also seems to be at work. Recall 
the reasoning of the court in Re Berkeley Applegate: 
 
where a person seeks to enforce a claim to an equitable interest in property, the court has a discretion to 
require as a condition of giving effect to that equitable interest that an allowance be made for costs incurred 
and for skill and labour expended in connection with the administration of the property. It is a discretion 
which will be sparingly exercised; but factors which will operate in favour of its being exercised include the 
fact that, if the work had not been done by the person to whom the allowance is sought to be made, it would 
have had to be done either by the person entitled to the equitable interest (as in In re Marine Mansions Co., L.R. 
4 Eq. 601 and similar cases) or by a receiver appointed by the court whose fees would have been borne by 
the trust property (as in Scott v. Nesbitt, 14 Ves. Jun. 438); and the fact that the work has been of substantial 
benefit to the trust property and to the persons interested in it in equity (as in Phipps v. Boardman [1964] 1 
W.L.R. 993 ).89 
 
The idea seems to be that the burden needed to be incurred in order to receive the benefit and that 
if the benefit is taken then so must the burden. The principle can also be seen in the improvement 
cases. In Greenwood v Bennett Lord Denning said that, ‘It would be most unjust if the company could 
not only take the car from him, but also the value of the improvements he had done to it, without 
                                                 
88 City Index Ltd v Gawler [2007] EWCA Civ 1382, [2008] Ch 313. 
89 Re Berkeley Applegate (n 60) 50–51 (Edward Nugee QC). 
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paying for them.’90 Again the objection is that the company would take the benefit (i.e. the surplus 
value) without bearing the associated burden (i.e. the cost of the repairs).  
 To conclude, one can see that in deciding such cases the courts have relied on the principle 
that if one takes a benefit then one must take the associated burden. The focus of the courts was 
remedial. It was to intervene in cases where for one reason or another this principle was departed 
from because someone got the benefit of something without bearing the burden, and the courts 
intervened by redistributing the burdens. 
IV. RECONCEPTUALISING THE LAW ON 
UNREQUESTED BENEFITS USING THE BENEFIT-
BURDEN PRINCIPLE 
 
The following terminology will be adopted in this section. The performance is what the party 
seeking to recover actually did. This could be paying a debt, rescuing property or improving 
property. The benefit will refer to any benefit consequential on the performance. The burden will 
be the cost of the performance. In some cases, for example a payment to discharge a debt, all three 
are actually the same. But in others, for example mistakenly repairing property, they are not. A will 
refer to the provider of the performance. B will refer to the recipient of the benefit. Note that B is 
not necessarily the recipient of the performance. In cases, such as Exall v Partridge, it is a third party 
who receives the performance.  
  
 There are three key categories where there will be recovery: 
 
1. B has requested or freely accepted the performance -> there will be recovery in such cases 
subject to not undermining the contract. This will be dealt with in Chapter 5. 
2. The benefit is readily returnable and was not provided officiously by the claimant. 
3. The benefit is incontrovertibly benefiting to the recipient and was not provided voluntarily 
by the claimant. 
 
In this Chapter we are concerned with the second and third categories. There remains one 
miscellaneous exception which concerns recovery to save someone’s life. Whether there is actually 
recovery in English law in such circumstances is unclear but let us assume for the sake of argument 
                                                 
90 Greenwood v Bennett [1973] QB 195 (EWCA) 202 (Lord Denning). 
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that there is and that such recovery is not confined to those who have a duty to look after that 
person. As with Salvage it is unclear whether it is the Benefit-Burden Principle which does the 
work in this area. Instead, recovery is best seen as being a reflection of the importance which the 
law assigns to the sanctity of life. Since it does not fall under the Benefit-Burden Principle it will 
not be considered further. 
 
A. Benefit is readily returnable 
 
Here we are concerned with situations where the benefit provided can readily be returned by the 
defendant. The clearest example is a Greenwood v Bennett91 type of situation: the defendant owns an 
asset which the claimant improves or repairs (this is the performance) and as a result a benefit 
accrues to the defendant, namely the increase in the value of the asset. However, if the defendant 
is in possession of the asset and has not sold it, the benefit cannot be separated from the asset. In 
such an instance there would be no recovery. This is because, as Pollock CB put it, if the claimant 
‘cleans another’s shoes, what can the other do but put them on?’92  The point is that the defendant 
as owner of the asset is allowed to do what he wants with it and he cannot be required to sell the 
asset, nor can he be required to pay a sum to the claimant to have unencumbered use of the asset. 
Prior to the intervention of the claimant he had the full right to use the asset and so the intervention 
of a stranger without consent should not burden him. 
 But the matter is different if the asset is sold. Suppose the asset in question was a car which, 
prior to the repairs, was worth £10k. The repairs cost £1k and following the repairs the value of 
the car increased by £2k. It was then sold for £12k. The performance cost is therefore £1k but the 
benefit is the surplus value, i.e. £2k. In such an instance, if the defendant were to keep the £2k he 
would have obtained the benefit of it without the burden. Prior to the sale he could claim that his 
having the benefit was an unavoidable side-effect of his exercise of property rights in the asset. 
But, after the sale, that is no longer the case. Although he was not free to reject the performance, 
he is free to reject the benefit thereof. As such, holding him liable on the basis of the Benefit-
Burden Principle would not infringe his autonomy.  
So, if the defendant does decide to keep the benefit then he must bear the burden thereof. 
In other words, he must pay for the burden, i.e. the performance cost of £1k. Alternatively, the 
defendant is also free to reject the benefit. This means returning it to the claimant. In such a case 
he would not be liable for anything. This will be advantageous if the cost of the performance 
                                                 
91 (n 90). 
92 Taylor v Laird (1856) 25 LJ Ex 320, 332 (Pollock CB). 
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exceeds the benefit. So, if the repairs had cost £2k but only lead to a surplus of £1k then it would 
not make sense for the defendant to elect to keep the surplus and pay the cost thereof. Instead, he 
would reject the benefit and not be liable for anything. 
This is why, under Greenwood v Bennett, the liability of the defendant is the lesser sum of the 
cost of the repairs/improvements and the surplus. A corollary of that is that if the surplus is nil or 
negative then the defendant will not be liable for anything. In the case where the repairs have 
reduced the value of the asset the defendant may have a remedy against the claimant in the tort of 
trespass. 
The same principle can be seen to be at play in Phipps v Boardman,93 Re Berkeley Applegate,94 
and Foster v Spencer.95 In Phipps v Boardman fiduciaries realised for themselves a corporate opportunity 
that ‘belonged’ to the beneficiaries. This was in breach of fiduciary duty, but the fiduciaries had 
acted in good faith in the genuine but mistaken belief that they were entitled to exploit it. The 
House of Lords ordered them to hand over their profits to the beneficiaries, but one of them was 
allowed to deduct their expenses and reasonable remuneration for the work they had done 
exploiting that opportunity. This is different from Greenwood v Bennett in the sense that in that case 
there was no asset belonging to the defendant which was improved by the claimant. But the basic 
principle is the same. The actions of the claimant led to the defendant having a benefit (the profit 
from the exploitation of the corporate opportunity) which they would not otherwise have. That 
benefit was one which they could reject and so their acceptance of it triggers the Benefit-Burden 
Principle and so the claimant is allowed to recover in respect of their burden. 
Berkeley Applegate and Foster v Spence are also slightly different from Greenwood v Bennett 
because there the work of the claimant did not repair or improve an asset of the defendant. Neither 
did it, as in Phipps v Boardman, lead to the creation of a completely new benefit for the defendant. 
Rather, in those two cases, the defendant had an equitable but not legal entitlement to some assets, 
but certain work was necessary to obtain a legal entitlement to it. In that sense the position is 
different from Taylor v Laird where the defendant already had an unconditional legal entitlement to 
the asset. So here the benefit is obtaining the legal entitlement to proceeds of the trust property. 
This is again a benefit which they could have rejected. And so, the Benefit-Burden Principle kicks 
in and so they are liable for the burden if they accept the benefit. 
At this juncture it is necessary to contrast these cases with Nicholson v Chapman.96 In that 
case the claimant rescued timber belonging (legally) to the defendant. The claimant sought to 
                                                 
93 [1967] 2 AC 46 (UKHL). 
94 Re Berkeley Applegate (n 60). 
95 [1996] 2 All ER 672 (Ch). 
96 (n 39). 
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recover their costs in doing so but the claim failed. There are three possible objections to recovery: 
(i) no benefit was actually provided, (ii) non-realisability of the benefit, (iii) the claimant acted 
voluntarily. The first explanation is that actually no benefit was provided. Unlike with repairs or 
improvements, there was no physical change in the asset. And, unlike Berkeley Applegate and Foster 
v Spence, the defendant already had legal title to the assets. This, however, seems to take a too narrow 
a definition of benefit. In the context of General Average the law accepts that rescuing the property 
counts as a benefit. Why should it be different here? It is true that the law recognises differences 
between the maritime and the non-maritime context, but these are best accounted for using the 
requirement of voluntariness by characterising non-maritime rescuers as volunteers whilst 
characterising maritime rescuers as acting out of necessity.97 Furthermore, the performance 
provided does affect the overall market value of the asset. There is a difference in the price of 
timber somewhere in the bottom of the Thames and dry timber on land. Hence, it should be 
accepted that, if the asset is realised then a benefit has been provided. 
The second explanation is that the asset had not been realised and so the benefit itself (the 
increase in value of the timber due to it having been saved) was not readily returnable. But it is 
implausible that this was the basis of the decision. This is because this was an action for trover to 
recover the timber. In such a case the remedy is given in money rather than by an order to deliver 
up. So, the case already works on the assumption that the asset will be sold. Hence, no issue of lack 
of returnability of the benefit arises. 
 The third explanation, which is the one the court actually gave, is the correct one. The 
rescuer had acted voluntarily and so he could not recover. This is unlike Berkeley Applegate and Foster 
v Spence where the claimants were under a duty to do the work in question. Nor was the rescuer 
acting under a mistake, as in Phipps v Boardman and Greenwood v Bennett. The position is also unlike 
that where a bailee of goods is allowed to recover for the rescue of the property because in such a 
case he is under a duty to safeguard the property.98 Similarly, in General Average the captain of the 
ship is under a duty to safeguard the cargo. The law of Salvage is the only area where one can 
recover for having rescued the property of another, in the absence of a duty to do so. It is an ad 
hoc exception justified by special policy considerations. 
 So, we can now see our final limitation to the operation of the Benefit-Burden Principle. 
The claimant cannot recover if he was acting voluntarily. In this context – where the benefit is 
readily returnable – a claimant will not be deemed to be acting voluntarily if he is under a duty to 
                                                 
97  There are principled policy reasons for this. In the maritime context there is no central body which has a duty to 
rescue people, but emergency services do exist in the non-maritime context. So, there is a gap in maritime cases and 
the law encourages the filling of it by characterising maritime rescuers as acting out of necessity so that they may 
recover. 
98 Great Northern Railway Co v Swaffield (1873-74) LR 9 Ex 132 (Exch); The Winson (n 57); The Kos (n 57). 
 Ch 4: Unrequested Non-Returnable Benefits  
 
 
114 
act or if he is labouring under a mistake. In particular, acting in an emergency to rescue a stranger’s 
property will still count as acting voluntarily. 
 
B. Incontrovertible benefit 
 
In such instances the benefit provided is not readily returnable. The most typical example would 
be the discharge of a debt in a recoupment/contribution type situation. It is not possible for the 
defendant to reject the discharge. It happens without his consent and indeed can happen without 
his knowledge. The challenge in such a case is how to ensure that the operation of the Benefit-
Burden Principle does not infringe the defendant’s autonomy. One possible suggestion is that the 
law should ensure that the defendant is not worse off. But that is stated too widely. Suppose the 
defendant receives a benefit with a market value of £1k. If he is required to pay £1k he is no worse 
off, but his autonomy has still been infringed by the fact that he is put in a position of forced 
exchange by being required to exchange £1k for something else. So, the imposition of liability must 
not make the defendant worse off and it must do so without requiring any exchange. But, of course, 
there will be a change, in the typical example the defendant will owe a debt to the claimant instead 
of a third party. So, rather the defendant must be put in a position which the law considers to be 
equivalent. We already dealt with a similar principle in Chapter 3 Section III where we saw that the 
law treated a duty to return a particular note as being equivalent to a duty to pay a debt 
corresponding to the face value of that note. Exactly the same principle operates here. Take Exall 
v Partidge. Prior to the claimant’s intervention the defendant owed money to a third party. The 
operation of the law means that the defendant now owes that same sum to the claimant. This 
means that the imposition of liability does not make the defendant worse off and this conclusion 
does not necessitate any conversion of one benefit into money using market value. Instead, here 
the value is expressed on the face of the obligation and so can be compared without reference to 
market values. 
 In general, the position concerning the performance of a non-monetary obligation is also 
not a problem. In the typical case, non-monetary obligations would be enforced by an order to pay 
damages, and if the claimant performs the obligation for the defendant after the deadline for 
performance has passed then the position is exactly the same as with monetary obligations: instead 
of having a monetary obligation to the right-holder the defendant has the same obligation towards 
the claimant. But matters are more complicated in cases where such a conversion to a monetary 
obligation would not have happened. This can arise in three situations: (i) the beneficiary of the 
duty cannot sue to enforce it, (ii) a suit is possible but the duty would be specifically enforced, or 
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(iii) the claimant performs the duty before the deadline for performance and at a time where the 
defendant is ready, able and willing to perform it. 
 The burial and deserted wives cases are an example of the first category.99 There the 
beneficiary of the duty could not sue either because they were dead or because married women 
(and children and slaves) had no standing to sue. As such the failure to perform would not have 
led to the possibility of a suit for damages. Hence, the argument goes, the above reasoning cannot 
apply to such cases. A difficulty with this reasoning is that it assumes that it is the suit which 
transforms the primary duty into a secondary duty to pay damages. But that is ordinarily not the 
case; it is the breach of the duty which has that effect. So, the inability of the beneficiary of the 
duty to sue is neither here nor there. 
 For the same reason, the objection to the second type of case also fails. At the point of 
breach, a secondary duty to pay damages arises. In a suit brought by the beneficiary of the duty 
against the defendant it would be for the beneficiary to decide whether they would elect for specific 
performance or damages. It is not for the defendant to make that choice. Hence the defendant is 
not put in any worse position by the claimant’s performance of that duty and, following from that, 
the law’s imposition of a duty for the defendant to reimburse the claimant. 
 The final objection is much stronger and, subject to one exception, succeeds. Indeed, in all 
cases bar perhaps Gebhardt v Saunders,100 the deadline for performance had either passed or it was 
clear that the defendant was not ready, able or willing to perform the obligation. So, in Jenkins v 
Tucker101 the husband, being far away and unaware of the death of his wife, would not have been 
able to perform the obligation to bury his wife. In the deserted wives (and other dependents) cases 
it is clear by his conduct of desertion that the husband/father/master is unwilling to perform his 
duty. In Tomlinson v Bentall102 the parish council had refused to perform its duty to care for the 
pauper. Conversely, it would appear that if the claimant intervenes before the deadline for 
performance when the defendant is still ready, able and willing to perform, there would be no 
recovery. So, in Paynter v Williams,103 Bayley B said: 
 
The legal liability of the parish does not give anyone who chooses to attend a pauper and supply him with 
medicines a right to call on them for payment. It is their duty to see that a proper person is employed, and 
they are to have an option who the medical man shall be.104 
                                                 
99 Bolton v Prentice (n 12); Jenkins v Tucker (n 11). 
100 (n 4). 
101 (n 11). 
102 (n 20). 
103 (n 20). 
104 ibid 819 (Bayley B). 
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The same principle seems to have been at play in J S Bloor v Pavillion Developments105 where recovery 
was denied on the ground that the defendant had the right to choose how to perform the obligation. 
The point is, until the defendant is in breach they have the right to choose how to perform the 
obligation and an intervention by the claimant would deprive them of that choice.  
 So, to sum up, because in the case of non-monetary obligations the claimant can only 
recover for the performance of the defendant’s duty when the defendant was in breach (either by 
failing to perform by the deadline or by having refused to perform or by being unable to perform) 
such cases are just like the discharge of debt cases: an obligation to pay money to X is replaced by 
an obligation to pay money to the claimant. The sum due to the claimant cannot exceed what the 
liability to X would have been. This limitation can be gleaned from the burial cases where it was 
said that recovery was limited to what the cost of the funeral for a person of that standing would 
have been. That limitation ensures that the imposition of the liability to benefit the claimant does 
not make the defendant worse off. The constraint is then respected. 
 There is, however, one exception. This concerns cases where both the claimant and 
defendant are under a joint duty to perform the non-monetary obligation for X. An example of 
such a case is Gebhardt v Saunders,106 where the claimant, under threat of legal proceedings, abated a 
nuisance which the defendant ought to have abated.  Both the claimant and the defendant were 
under a duty to do so and, as between them, the defendant was primarily liable. But, because of the 
threat of legal proceedings, the claimant ended up performing first. Strictly, this is a case where 
performance happened after breach (this is why a notice requiring performance on threat of 
contempt was issued) and so the case itself is not an exception to the principles developed above. 
However, the court stated its reasoning in terms which would be applicable in a case where the 
claimant performed prior to breach: 
 
If two people are required to do certain work under a penalty in case of disobedience, and one does the work, 
and it turns out afterwards that the other ought to have done it, the expenses are properly money paid at the 
request of the person who was primarily liable, but who neglected to do the work.107 
 
In my opinion the ordinary principle of law is applicable to this case apart from the statute, the principle 
applicable to cases where one man has been legally compelled to expend money on what another man ought 
to have done, and, without having recourse to s. 11, the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants 
                                                 
105 (n 30). 
106 (n 4). 
107 ibid 456 (Day J). 
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as having been legally compelled to incur expense in abating a nuisance which the defendants themselves 
ought to have abated.108 
 
Recall that the objection to recovery by the claimant prior to the defendant being in breach was 
that this deprived the defendant of the freedom to decide how to perform the obligation. However, 
such an objection does not have much strength where both the claimant and the defendant are 
under a joint duty to do the work. Here both parties are free to decide how to do it. So, the claimant, 
by performing first, does not deprive the defendant of anything. Hence, there is no objection to 
recovery. 
 To conclude, in cases where the defendant does not have the freedom to reject the 
performance or the benefit, the operation of the Benefit-Burden Principle must not infringe the 
defendant’s autonomy. The law ensures that this is the case by requiring that recovery does not 
make the defendant worse off. Furthermore, it does so without requiring any exchange or reliance 
on market valuation of benefits. This means that it must ensure that the duty to reimburse the 
claimant only replaces another monetary obligation and that the sum due to the claimant does not 
exceed the sum due to the original beneficiary of the duty. 
This covers one limitation on recovery. But, as discussed above, there is another. Not 
everyone can perform another’s duty and gain recovery. In particular, ‘volunteers’ cannot recover. 
The claimant can only recover if he had a duty to act or if it was necessary for him to act. The 
particular forms of necessity which will suffice are somewhat unclear and depend on the particular 
context. But it is clear that outside of such situations there would be no recovery. Why is that? One 
response is that, if the claimant acted voluntarily, he wanted to make a gift of the benefit to the 
defendant and so he should not be able to recover. This is true as far as it goes. It is not necessarily 
the case that the claimant wants to make a gift. Instead the position is that if someone acts 
voluntarily but for non-gratuitious purposes the law expects him to bargain for his remuneration. 
If he does not, then the law will not help him. However, the law will help him if he was not acting 
voluntarily in providing the performance and the benefit was an inevitable side-effect of providing 
the performance. In such a case it would have been impossible for him to bargain with the 
defendant because the defendant would have obtained the benefit anyway and indeed would not 
have been able to reject it.  Whether the parties want it or not, the defendant would have obtained 
the benefit because the claimant had to perform; the claimant could not prevent the defendant 
from getting the benefit and even if he wanted to do so the defendant could not reject the benefit. 
 This also explains why there is recovery in mistake cases when the benefit is readily 
returnable but not in cases where the benefit is not. In cases of returnable benefit, the defendant 
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retains a choice to accept it or not. But why then not extend recovery in returnable cases to 
instances where the claimant knows full well what is going on but does not intend to act 
gratuitously? The difference is that in such cases the claimant is intentionally trying to get around 
the bargaining process. So, it makes sense for the law not to assist him in that. But that is not the 
case where he is mistaken and since the defendant retains the freedom to reject the benefit there is 
no infringement of the defendant’s autonomy at all. 
 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
The task of the law is to seek harmony between the Benefit-Burden Principle and the Autonomy 
Principle. The law does so by confining recovery to three instances. First, where the performance 
was requested or freely accepted. Second, where the benefit is readily returnable. Third, where the 
law replaces one obligation to pay money with another obligation to pay money, provided the sum 
is not greater. In the first and second instances the Autonomy Principle is not violated because the 
defendant retains the choice to receive or keep the performance/benefit. In the third instance there 
is no breach because the law replaces an obligation to pay a sum of money with another such 
obligation. This does not make the defendant worse off nor does it amount to a forced exchange. 
 Another concern of the law is to disincentivise attempts to avoid the bargaining process. 
This is why the law denies recovery for volunteers. It is only those who had no choice but to 
provide the benefit to the defendant who will recover. Of course, how this principle is to be applied 
will vary depending on the context. In some instances, acting for the benefit of the defendant in 
emergency situations will qualify but not in others. Similarly, in some instances acting under a 
mistake will qualify but not in others. Therefore, when applying the ‘no recovery for volunteers’ 
rule it is very important to look at the context in question. Ultimately the judgement of who counts 
as a volunteer will come down to a range of factors including, in particular, whether the law wants 
to encourage the behaviour in question (for example, salvage on the high seas). 
The question we now need to consider is how, given those normative foundations, should 
the law be organised. From the above analysis, it can be seen that the way the principles operate 
varies depending on each situation. Furthermore, the circumstances where there is recovery are not 
the same in each situation. For example, in some cases recovery where the claimant was mistaken 
is possible whereas in others it is not. This should strongly point against imposing a common 
structure on this area of the law. This is on top of the concerns identified in Chapter 2. Put simply, 
none of the above cases are about reversing defective transactions. 
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 So, how should the law be organised? The better approach to take is simply to follow the 
existing structures. Cases of discharge of debts or performance of non-monetary obligations are 
currently analysed in terms of recoupment and contribution. We should keep using those analytical 
structures rather than wanting to subsume the whole thing under Birksian Unjust Enrichment. 
 Cases concerning the preservation of property already fall within three well established 
areas of law: bailment, General Average and Salvage. As the Supreme Court pointed out in The Kos 
– in the context of bailment – there is no need to analyse such cases in terms of Birksian Unjust 
Enrichment. 
 Cases of improvement/unlocking of benefit seem to be an orphan category which formally 
exist as a component of the ability of the court to impose certain conditions on the making of an 
order. So, for example, in Phipps v Boardman the award was an allowance which the court made 
when ordering the defendant to hand over profits to the claimants. I believe that those cases can 
be analysed in a more coherent manner. This would also make it clear that such claims are not 
merely defensive but can also be brought against the other party. The best structure for such cases 
is, I believe, Birksian Unjust Enrichment. This is because the availability of the remedy turns on 
the returnability of the benefit that was received. In that sense, it is very similar to the Unjust 
Enrichment cases explained under the proprietary theory: the reason why there is recovery is 
because there is something which can be returned. Furthermore, with such cases recovery is 
available for mistake: another similarity with Unjust Enrichment. As such, even though the 
normative basis for recovery is different, the similarities are strong enough that such cases can be 
analysed under Birksian Unjust Enrichment. The requirements needed for recovery would be the 
same ones as for the goods cases. The claimant will have to show that, as a result of his actions, 
the defendant has a benefit which is readily returnable and that the action which lead to that benefit 
was not done voluntarily.  
 This, finally, leaves us with the case of the preservation of life. This is an ad hoc category 
on which we do not actually have any case in English law and which we are unlikely to have a case 
in the future. In terms of analytical structure, it is entirely sui generis.   
CHAPTER 5: SERVICES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
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We are here concerned with services, and other things that are not returnable, which have been 
provided at the request of – or been freely accepted by – the defendant. For the sake of simplicity 
these will be referred to as ‘requested services’.  This Chapter considers the historical basis for 
recovery in such instances and argues that the principle underpinning recovery is the Benefit-
Burden Principle. 
 A necessary requirement for recovery in such cases is the presence of a mutual 
understanding that the services are provided non-gratuitously. This is typically shown by means of 
a request or using free acceptance. Identifying such a mutual understanding enables the law to 
imply an obligation to pay a reasonable sum for the services. However, the law will not do so when 
there is an express agreement governing the provision of the services, since the enforcement of 
such an obligation to pay a reasonable sum would contradict what the parties had agreed to. The 
contract must give way before the obligation to pay the reasonable sum can be enforced. 
 This raises two questions. First, what is the basis of the obligation to pay a reasonable sum? 
Second, in what circumstances and on what basis may the express agreement between the parties 
be discarded so that the obligation to pay the reasonable sum will be enforced? This Chapter will 
seek to provide the answer to those two questions. 
 Part II will consider the historically dominant quasi-contractual model. It was quasi-
contractual because recovery happened by imputing a contract to pay the reasonable value of the 
services. But such imputation was only a partial fiction. In other words, it happened because there 
were certain facts taken in isolation, from which one could legitimately infer a promise to pay the 
reasonable sum. The main exponent of the theory was Denning, as he then was,1 but the theory 
finds wide support in the historical literature. This model answers the first question by recognising 
that an obligation to pay the reasonable sum is an inference that can legitimately be drawn from 
the mutual understanding alone. However, if we add the fact that there is an actual agreement 
between the parties, then such an inference can no longer be drawn; the express contract blocks it. 
This bring us to the second question. In what circumstances and why, according to the quasi-
contractual model, can the express agreement be prevented from blocking the inference of the 
promise to pay the reasonable sum? The answer to this question, given by the quasi-contractual 
model, is that this will be the case where the defendant has repudiated or seriously breached the 
express agreement. It will also be shown that cases concerning unenforceable and void contracts 
are explicable under this reasoning; there is no special rule for such contracts; their unenforceability 
or voidness is analytically irrelevant. Why did the law allow recovery when the defendant repudiated 
or seriously breached the express agreement? The formal reasoning of the courts was grounded on 
                                                 
1 AT Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit and the Statute of Frauds’ (1925) 41 Law Quarterly Review 79; AT Denning, 
‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (1939) 55 Law Quarterly Review 54. 
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peculiarities of the pleading system but the normative reason was that the defendant could not be 
allowed to take the benefit of an agreement that he was unwilling to bear the burden thereof (by 
performing his side of the bargain). Hence, it is actually the Benefit-Burden Principle which does 
the analytical work to justify recovery. 
 Part III will argue that the answer the quasi-contractual model gives to the first question – 
what is the basis of the obligation to pay the reasonable sum – is not the correct one. Such an 
obligation, pace the quasi-contractual model, does not arise due to the consent or agreement of the 
parties. But instead it arises due to the Benefit-Burden Principle. Someone who freely accepts a 
service knowing that it is not gratuitous would, if he did not have to pay for it, have the benefit of 
the services without bearing the burden thereof. Hence, to avoid a breach of the Benefit-Burden 
Principle, the law imposes an obligation to pay the reasonable sum. This scenario will, therefore, 
be explained as an attempt by the law to mediate between the Benefit-Burden Principle and respect 
for the contractual autonomy of the parties. Ordinarily, contract will win, but, in some cases where 
the defendant has not respected the contract, the contract will give way to the Benefit-Burden 
Principle. 
 Finally, Part IV will consider alternative explanations of the law and argue that they all fail. 
The first set of theories are Birksian unjust enrichment accounts. They were first propounded by 
Birks2 and then Jones,3 but it is Baloch4 who has provided the greatest theoretical defence thereof. 
Under such accounts recovery happens because the transfer of the service was conditional and that 
condition failed. Hence the transaction is defective and has to be reversed. In Chapter 2 Section 
III the application of the unjust enrichment formula to service cases was critiqued and this will not 
be repeated here. One important point to note is that under the Birksian model recovery for 
services provided under a contract which is void for incapacity was justified on the ground that the 
service was necessary. This is an aspect of the theory which will be criticised in this chapter Baloch’s 
model of conditional transfer will also be criticised. It will be argued that his theory can only apply 
to things that are returnable and, hence, it cannot apply to services. It will follow that the benefit-
burden explanation is the correct one to adopt in respect of all restitutionary claims relating to 
services. 
  
                                                 
2 P Birks, ‘Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law’ [1971] Current Legal Problems 110; P Birks, ‘Restitution for 
Services’ [1974] Current Legal Problems 13; P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 
1985); P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005). 
3 G Jones, ‘Restitutionary Claims for Services Rendered’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 273. 
4 T Baloch, Unjust Enrichment and Contract (Hart Publishing UK 2009). 
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II. HISTORICAL POSITION: QUASI-CONTRACT 
 
A. Incomplete performance 
 
We are here concerned with a case where C and D agree that C will do certain work for D in 
exchange for something else (typically payment of a certain fee). In order for D’s duty to provide 
the counter-performance to be triggered, C must have substantially completed his task. What if C 
has not finished the agreed task? Can C recover for the services provided under a quantum meruit 
(‘QM’)? The position is that C cannot recover unless C failed to complete the task because D 
prevented C from doing so. In order to properly appreciate what is going on here, it is necessary 
to examine the nature of linked promises and how the pleadings worked. 
 
1. Linked promises 
 
In the 21st Century, it is second nature to think of contractual promises as being linked. This means 
that if A promises to do x in exchange for B doing y, then if A wants to sue B for having failed to 
do y, A must have done x or must state that he is willing and able to do x. If A fails to do so, then 
A will not be able to recover. But this was not always the position; prior to the middle of the 18th 
century the presumption was that promises were independent.5 So, for example, in Nichols v 
Raynbred6 the claimant could sue for the price of a cow without offering to deliver it. In such a case, 
if the cow was not actually delivered, the defendant’s remedy would be a cross action for failure to 
deliver. However, with the judgments of Lord Mansfield in Kingston v Preston7 and Boone v Eyre8 the 
principle of dependency of promises was recognized. The details of such cases need not detain us,9 
but what is of interest is the impact that these decisions have had on cases of incomplete 
performance. 
                                                 
5 ibid 98–100. 
6 (1615) Hob 88, 80 ER 238. 
7 (1772) cited in argument in Jones v Barkley (1781) 2 Doug 684, 99 ER 434 [689].  
8 (1778) cited in argument in Duke of St Alban’s v Shore (1789) 1 H Bl 270, 126 ER 158 [273]. 
9 For a discussion of such cases see JL Barton, ‘Contract and Quantum Meruit: The Antecedents of Cutter v. Powell’ 
(1987) 8 The Journal of Legal History 48.  
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 How would a case such as Sumpter v Hedges10 have been decided if the promises were 
independent? The builder started to build a house for the owner, but abandoned the work before 
completion. The builder had promised to build a house and the owner had promised to pay a 
certain sum for it. If the promises were independent, then the builder would sue for the whole 
contractual sum (and not just for the value of the work he did) and the owner would countersue 
for the failure to complete the house. Presumably those damages would amount to the cost of 
completing the house. The end result would be that the builder would pocket the contractually 
agreed sum minus the cost of completion. 
 By contrast, if the promises are dependent, the builder is unable to sue for the contractually 
agreed sum because the duty to pay such sum only arises on completion of the builder’s promise 
to do the work. The owner is able to sue for damages for non-completion but only if he undertakes 
to pay the contractually agreed sum. In all likelihood that total sum would exceed the damages he 
could recover; hence, the owner would not do that. The result, therefore, is that the owner keeps 
the partially built house gratis.  
 Hence the dependent promise situation can be seen as giving a windfall to the owner. This 
might seem particularly unfair if there was only a minor shortfall in the work done by the builder; 
in such a case it seems preferable to allow the builder to recover the contractually agreed sum 
subject to a cross action by the owner for the shortfall. This was a problem that did not arise with 
independent promises. 
 Having recognised the principle of dependency of promises in Kingston v Preston, Lord 
Mansfield then partially qualified it in Boone v Eyre by holding, that where one party had substantially 
performed his obligation, then, even if there were minor shortfalls, the promises would be treated 
as independent (i.e. the claimant could get the contractually agreed sum subject to payment of 
damages for the shortfall). Tellingly, Saunders, in his notes on the case, justified such an outcome 
on the basis that: 
 
 Hence it appears that the reason of the decision in these and other similar cases, besides the inequality of the 
damages, seems to be, that where a person has received a part of the consideration for which he entered into 
the agreement, it would be unjust that because he has not had the whole, he should therefore be permitted to 
enjoy that part without either paying or doing any thing for it. Therefore the law obliges him to perform the 
agreement on his part, and leaves him to his remedy to recover any damage he may have sustained in not 
having received the whole consideration.11 
 
                                                 
10 [1898] 1 QB 673 (EWCA). 
11 Pordage v Cole (1669) 1 Wms Saund 319, 85 ER 449 [320 n 4] (at p. 453 in ER). 
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Saunders appears to be saying that if there was no recovery in such a case there would be an unjust 
enrichment (in the abstract moral sense and not the factual Birksian sense) of the defendant. 
 Yet the principle recognised in Boone’s case only goes so far. In cases where the promises 
are dependent and the claimant’s performance was not substantial, there was no recovery. So, for 
example, in Cutter v Powell12 a man was hired to be a seaman on a ship but died before completing 
the journey, dying intestate. His widow sued to recover either the whole sum or a pro-rata sum but 
the action failed. The court held that the promises were dependent, he had not substantially 
completed his performance and so he was not entitled to be paid the whole sum. What about a 
pro-rata sum on a QM basis? Such a claim was dismissed on the basis that the principle that ‘where 
the parties have come to an express contract none can be implied has prevailed so long as to be 
reduced to an axiom in the law.’13 As Barton has demonstrated, the case was not exceptional and 
the judges were applying settled principles.14 But to properly understand these principles it is 
necessary to understand the way the pleadings worked. 
  
                                                 
12 (1795) 6 TR 320, 101 ER 573. 
13 ibid 324 (Lord Kenyon CJ). 
14 Barton (n 9). 
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2. Pleadings 
 
There were three ways one could bring an action for services provided: (i) suing for damages under 
a special contract, (ii) suing for debt under indebitatus, (iii) suing for a QM. The first of these required 
alleging the existence of a special contract (i.e. an express agreement) under which the defendant 
was required to do something which the defendant had not done. This requires proving the 
agreement pleaded. If no agreement was proved the action would fail but it would also fail if the 
actual agreement turned out to be different, even in a minor way, from the one pleaded.15 
By contrast, both the second and the third actions did not require one to plead that there 
was a special agreement, but only a general declaration was required. So, for example, the claimant 
would merely plead that he had done work at the request of the defendant; there was no need to 
plead a particular agreement. But, conversely, the proof of a special agreement would defeat the 
claim. In other words, if the claimant alleged that he did the work at the request of the defendant 
and the defendant showed that they had made a contract governing this, the claim would fail.16 
The difference between (ii) and (iii) was that the former was for certain sums whereas the 
latter was for indefinite sums. So, for example, under (ii) the claimant would plead that the 
defendant requested him to do work in exchange for £20, but in (iii) the pleading would not allege 
a particular sum and it would be up to the jury to award whatever they thought the work was worth. 
However, the difference between indebitatus and QM was eclipsed during the 19th century because 
it was held that an indebitatus would not be defeated by a failure to prove an agreement for a certain 
sum; in such a case the jury could award a reasonable sum as if it was a QM.17 As such, for the sake 
of the discussion, we can just consider them as one mechanism. 
So, in Cutter v Powell the reason why the QM claim failed was that there was a special contract 
governing the issue. As such what was required for the claim to succeed was not proven. However, 
it would be a mistake to see this merely as a procedural hurdle, for three reasons. First, the law had 
already been willing to show some flexibility; as indicated above, an indebitatus claim would not be 
defeated by the absence of a promise to pay a certain sum. Second, by the late 19 th century it had 
been accepted that, if the claimant had tried to prove a special contract and failed, he could still, if 
it had been pleaded, recover under a general issue (i.e. QM). Third, there were a number of cases 
where the defendant could not rely on the special contract (to defeat the QM) on the basis that the 
contract had been ‘rescinded.’ 
                                                 
15 Weaver v Boroughs (1725) 1 Strangr 648, 93 ER 757. 
16 Barton (n 9) 54.  
17 ibid 52; D Ibbetson, ‘Implied Contract and Restitution: History in the High Court of Australia’ (1988) 2 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 312, 316; Baloch (n 4) 130. 
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3. ‘Rescinded’ contracts18 
 
Just before Cutter v Powell was decided, it was held that the action for money had and received could 
not be brought whilst the contract was still open: 
 
The distinction between those cases where the contract is open, and where it is not, is this; if the contract be 
rescinded, either, as in this case, by the original terms of the contract, where no act remains to be done by 
the defendant himself, or by a subsequent assent by the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover back his 
whole money; and then the action for money had and received will lie. But if the contract be open, the 
plaintiffs demand is not for the whole sum, but for damages arising out of that contract.19 
 
Cutter v Powell essentially applied the same rule to claims for QM. When would a contract count as 
being ‘rescinded’? In Giles v Edwards20 it was held that the claimant could rescind the contract and 
bring money had and received if the defendant’s default left him unable to perform his side of the 
bargain. The position was the same insofar as QM was concerned.21 So, for example, in Withers v 
Reynolds22 the parties had an agreement whereby Reynolds would deliver straw to Withers with 
payment due at the time of each delivery. Withers insisted in paying in arrears rather than on 
delivery and so he kept one bundle of straw which had not been paid for. Reynolds, therefore, 
refused to deliver anymore. Withers sued him for failing to deliver. The court held, that because of 
Withers’ refusal to pay, Reynolds was relieved from further performance. The contract was 
terminated.  What did this mean for the bringing of QM?  
In Planché v Colbourn23 it was held that if the defendant had abandoned the contract with the 
claimant, then the claimant could sue on a QM for the value of the work he had done. If the 
contract was still open no such claim could be brought, but it was held that the abandonment by 
the defendant meant that the claimant could treat the contract as rescinded. Another illustration 
can be found in Philips v Jones,24 where the claimant (a minor) agreed to work for free for some two 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that rescinded was used at the time to mean terminated. Today, rescission refers to the process 
of setting aside a voidable contract. 
19 Towers v Barrett (1786) 1 TR 133, 99 ER 1014 [136] (Buller J). 
20 (1797) 7 TR 181, 101 ER 920. 
21 Ibbetson (n 17) 318. 
22 (1831) 2 B & Ad 882, 109 ER 1370. See also Franklin v Miller (1836) 4 Ad & El 599, 111 ER 912 (accepting the 
principle but distinguishing Withers v Reynolds: non-payment is different from express refusal to pay). 
23 (1831) 8 Bing 14, 131 ER 305. 
24 ((1834) 1 Ad & El 333, 131 ER 305. 
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years with the defendant and, in consideration for £10 (paid by the claimant’s father), the defendant 
agreed to take him as an apprentice after that period of time. Before that time elapsed the defendant 
sent the claimant home. The claimant sued to recover remuneration for the work he had done. It 
was held that if the conduct of the defendant would have warranted the father taking his son away 
then the father was entitled to treat the contract as rescinded and so the son was entitled to recover 
for the work he had done on a QM. The rule was pithily restated by Alderson B in 1853: 
 
Where one party has absolutely refused to perform, or has rendered himself incapable of performing, his part 
of the contract, he puts it in the power of the other party either to sue for a breach of it, or to rescind the 
contract, and sue on a quantum meruit for the work actually done.25 
 
4. Making sense of it all 
 
Why is it that if the contract was still open a claim for QM could not be brought, but that it could 
be brought if the defendant had seriously breached his side so that the contract could be treated as 
terminated? In a 1939 article Denning sought to provide a rationalisation of the law. We must first 
understand why the presence of a special contract meant that a contract to pay the reasonable sum 
could not be implied. 
 To see the point let us consider the case of Britain v Rossiter,26 which illustrates a common 
fact pattern at the time. The claimant was employed as a worker by the defendant for a period 
exceeding one year, with payment to be provided at the end of the year. According to the Statute 
of Frauds 1677 such agreements were valid but unenforceable if they were not in writing;27 the 
agreement was not in writing. The claimant left the employment before the year was complete. He 
could not sue under the special contract because he had not performed for the entire agreed 
duration and, in any event, that contract was unenforceable. So, he sought to get around this by 
claiming under an implied contract. The facts were that the express contract was concluded on a 
Saturday, but the work started on a Monday and the contract was meant to run for one year from 
that Monday. As such, if the implied contract was actually deemed to begin on Monday the 
agreement would comply with the Statute of Frauds and so would be enforceable. Hence, the 
claimant sought to argue on the basis of a ‘fresh contract of service […] implied from the acts of 
the parties’28 and since such contract would be based on the acts of the parties it would begin when 
                                                 
25 De Bernardy v Harding (1853) 8 Ex 822, 155 ER 1586 [824] (Alderson B). 
26 (1879) 11 QBD 123 (EWCA). 
27 Statute of Frauds 1677 s 4. 
28 (1879) 11 QBD 123, 126. Britain v Rossiter (n 26) 126 (Brett LJ). 
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the work actually began (i.e. on Monday) and so would not need to be in writing because it would 
not last more than a year.29 Brett LJ did not think much of that argument: 
 
(1) It seems to me impossible that a new contract can be implied from the doing of acts which were clearly 
done in performance of the first contract only, and (2) to infer from them a fresh contract would be to draw 
an inference contrary to the fact. It is a proposition which cannot be disputed that no new contract can be 
implied from acts done under an express contract, which is still subsisting; all that can be said is that no one 
can be charged upon the original contract because it is not in writing.30 
 
Where there is an express contract there are two problems with inferring, from the mutual 
understanding that the services will be paid for, a promise to pay the reasonable sum. The first 
difficulty is that, according to the doctrine of Stilk v Myrick,31 doing an act which one is already 
contractually required to do is not valid consideration.  So, when the claimant argued that his 
performance on Monday formed a new contract, he was arguing that a new contract should be 
formed based on the fact that he was doing his duty under the original contract. But such a putative 
new contract would not be supported by consideration and so would not be valid.32 Hence, as Brett 
LJ pointed out, no new contract can be implied from doing work which was done in performance 
of the first contract. 
The second difficulty, as Brett LJ pointed out, is that it is simply contrary to the facts to say 
that the defendant promised to pay for the reasonable value of the services. The defendant did not 
promise to pay a reasonable sum for whatever work was done, instead the defendant promised 
something else: payment of a fixed sum and only when all the work was done. 
To sum up, the move from (A) ‘mutual understanding between the parties that the work 
should be paid for’ to (B) ‘defendant promised to pay the reasonable value of any work done’ can 
only be made in the absence of an express contract. The presence of an express contract blocks 
that inference. That is why proving the existence of a contract could defeat actions for QM. 
So why did things change if the express contract was terminated? Here the language of 
rescission is misleading. It suggests that the contract – once rescinded – had actually never existed. 
As Baloch has shown, the courts did not actually think that this was rescission ab initio, they knew 
                                                 
29 Ibbetson (n 17) 324 fn 65. 
30 Britain v Rossiter (n 26) 127 (Brett LJ). Numbering added.  
31 (1809) 2 Camp 317, 170 ER 1168. 
32 Following the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1 
(EWCA); MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 553, [2017] QB 604, the 
position is a bit more complicated. But the better view is that the type of claim made in Britain v Rossiter would still 
fail, as the labourer provided no ‘practical benefit’ to the employer by simply performing his contractual duties in 
such circumstances.  
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that it was only prospective.33 And in Heymans v Darwins Ltd Lord Porter confirmed that termination 
was prospective and that QM was still available.34 It is inaccurate to see the availability of QM as 
grounded on a ‘rescission fallacy.’35 So why is it that, if the defendant has refused to perform his 
side of the bargain, the claimant can sue under a QM? Denning explained this as follows, using 
estoppel-like reasoning: 
 
the defendant cannot set up the express contract as an answer because he has by his own conduct disentitled 
himself from relying on it. The obligation to pay in such a case is not truly consensual. The circumstances are 
inconsistent with a promise in fact to pay a reasonable remuneration, but the law imputes it, because the 
defendant cannot set up the inconsistent circumstances.36 
 
As Denning stresses we are only concerned with cases where, in the absence of an express contract, 
one could infer (B) a promise to pay the reasonable sum,37 i.e. this might be a case where there is 
(A) ‘a mutual understanding of the parties at the time that the services should be paid for’.38 In the 
ordinary instance the defendant would seek to defeat the move from (A) to (B) by invoking the 
express contract. But, because he has broken the express contract, the defendant cannot rely on it. 
Indeed, by attempting to rely on it the defendant would be saying ‘No, I did not promise to pay 
you the reasonable sum because instead I promised to do X under the contract, which I have now 
refused to do’. This would indeed be, as Denning says, ‘setting up inconsistent circumstances’. 
 We see a similar reasoning in Keener. When explaining why, in such circumstances, the 
claimant can bring an action for money had and received, he says that ‘it would seem to be for the 
reason that the defendant should not be allowed to blow hot and cold, and to profit by a contract 
the burdens of which he refuses to perform.’39 Abbot, who was writing a scathing review of Keener, 
expressed agreement with this point, calling it ‘an excellent statement of the obligation of restitution 
upon a breach of contract’.40 He says that the obligation is explained by 
 
the proposition that the defendant cannot occupy two inconsistent positions at one and the same time, that 
is, that having by his refusal to perform denied his obligation, and the plaintiff having accepted the situation 
                                                 
33 Baloch (n 4) 124–128.  
34 Heymans v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356 (UKHL) 397–398 (Lord Porter). 
35 C.f. Sopov & Anor v Kane Constructions Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 141 [10]. 
36 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 61. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid 57. 
39 W Keener, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Baker, Voorhis and Company 1893) 299. 
40 E Abbot, ‘Keener on Quasi-Contract I’ (1896) 10 Harvard Law Review 209, 226. 
 Ch 5: Services  
 
 
130 
by demanding back the consideration paid, by the act of both parties the contract is rescinded, and the 
defendant cannot alone, without the plaintiff's consent, reinstate it.41 
 
Such language is also found in the cases. In Philips v Jones counsel for the claimant – whose 
submissions were accepted – said that the defendant ‘could not set up in defence the contract 
which he had abandoned.’42 In Prickett v Badger Crowder J cites with approval the following passage 
from Smith’s Leading Cases which gives the rationale for the recovery under QM: 
 
it is clear that the defendant cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong, and screen himself from 
payment for what has been done, by his own tortious refusal to perform his part of the contract, which refusal 
alone has enabled the plaintiff to rescind it. He cannot, however, recover on the special contract, and must 
therefore be entitled to sue upon a quantum meruit, founded on a promise implied by law on the part of the 
defendant to remunerate him for what he has done at his request; and, as an action on a quantum meruit is 
founded on a promise to pay on request, and there is no ground for implying any other sort of promise, he 
may of course bring his action immediately. This point is decided by Planché v. Colburn.43 
 
 What then is the nature of the obligation to pay the reasonable sum? Such a promise is a 
fiction which is based on a germ of truth. It is a fiction because this is not actually what the 
defendant promised. The fiction arises because the law prevents the defendant from raising the 
express contract. As such, the decision of the court is made simply on the basis – which is true but 
incomplete – that there was a mutual understanding that the services would be paid for. Hence, 
Denning was correct in saying that it was quasi ex contractu.44 The term ‘quasicontract’ to describe 
that theory is appropriate. ‘Contract’ is appropriate because that is the conceptual tool the law uses: 
it implies a contract. It is also appropriate because there is a germ of truth in the contract: if we 
ignore certain facts, a contract to pay the reasonable sum can legitimately be implied.45 But ‘Quasi’ 
because such an implied contract does not fully reflect the reality. 
 To conclude, where there had been incomplete performance of an entire obligation there 
could be no recovery under the contract because the promises were linked. Hence, the right to be 
paid under the contract only arose on completion of the obligation and if, for whatever reason, 
performance was not substantially completed then there would be no recovery. In addition, there 
could be no recovery under a contract implied from the mutual understanding that the work would 
                                                 
41 ibid. 
42 Philips v Jones (n 24) [336] (counsel for plaintiff). 
43 Prickett v Badger (1856) 1 CB NS 296, 140 ER 123 [306] (Crowder J). 
44 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 61. 
45 The use of the word ‘implied’ as opposed to ‘impute’ or ‘infer’ is deliberate for reasons that will become clear in 
Section III.A below. 
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be paid for. Ordinarily, such a mutual understanding would lead to an obligation to pay the 
reasonable sum being implied. However, such a contract could not be implied where there was 
already an express contract governing the work. This is because implying such a contract would be 
to draw an inference contrary to fact and that, in any event, such a putative implied contract would 
not be supported by consideration because of the rule in Stilk v Myrick. Hence, an incomplete 
performer was in a very difficult position; he could not recover under the contract but nor could 
he recover the reasonable value of the work he had done so far. 
 This, however, lead to unfair outcomes, especially in cases where the defendant had 
repudiated or breached the contract in a serious way or prevented the claimant from performing. 
To avoid this unfair outcome the courts used an estoppel-like device to prevent the defendant from 
invoking the express contract as a means of blocking the implication of a contract to pay the 
reasonable value of the work done. The judges held that if the defendant had breached the express 
contract to such a level as would entitle the claimant to treat it as terminated then the defendant 
could not, when the claimant alleged there was an implied contract, rely on the express contract to 
block the implied contract. Hence, the claimant managed to prove the existence of the implied 
contract and so could recover under it despite the express contract. 
  
 Ch 5: Services  
 
 
132 
B. Unenforceable contract 
 
1. Two modes of recovery  
 
We are here concerned with cases where the claimant has provided services to the defendant under 
a contract which is unenforceable. There were two ways the claimant could recover. The first way 
was a technical one and the second one was actually the rescission solution considered above. 
The leading case for the technical solution was Souch v Strawbridge.46 It distinguished between 
executed and executory contracts. When the contract was executed it created a debt which could 
be recovered under the common count of indibitatus assumptit for work done (QM). The effect of 
the Statute of Frauds was to make the contract unenforceable and not void. Since the contract still 
existed, this meant that a debt was indeed created when it was executed. The courts further held 
that the Statute of Frauds barred enforcement of the contract but not enforcement of the debt it 
created. It followed that, when the contract was executed, there was no bar to recovery. As 
Ibbetson put it, this had: 
 
 nothing to do with quasi-contractual or restitutionary obligations: the claimant obtains the remuneration due 
to him as specified under the contract, rather than recovering back sums already laid out by him or the 
reasonable value of his services.47 
 
The ‘rescission’ solution is simply the one considered in section II.A above. The failure by the 
defendant to perform his side of the bargain means that the claimant is entitled to treat the contract 
as terminated and so can sue under a QM to obtain the reasonable value of the services done. As 
Ibbetson put it, there was no special rule for unenforceable contracts.48 Where the contract was 
executed the claimant recovered on the basis of the debt that arose from completion of the contract 
and the Statute of Frauds did not bar this action.49 And where the claimant is entitled to ‘rescind’ 
the contract on account of the defendant’s refusal to perform, he can sue for a QM based on the 
implied contract which arises from the defendant’s acceptance of the services. In that instance the 
fact that the contract was unenforceable ‘is analytically irrelevant.’50 
                                                 
46 (1846) 2 CB 808, 135 ER 1161. 
47 Ibbetson (n 17) 320. 
48 ibid 322. 
49 ibid 320. 
50 ibid 322. 
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This means that if the unenforceable contract was not executed or ‘rescinded’ (i.e. 
terminated for breach) there could be no recovery. As seen above in Britain v Rossiter, the claimant 
sought to recover for services provided under a valid but unenforceable contract. The claimant 
could not recover under Souch v Strawbridge because the contract was not fully executed. Instead he 
sought to argue that an implied in fact contract had arisen from the conduct of the parties. Since 
this contract would have arisen a few days after the express contract, it would be performed within 
less than one year and so would not be caught by the Statute of Frauds.51 This argument was 
rejected on the basis of Cutter v Powell. An implied contract could not be inferred where there was 
a valid express contract. 
Nonetheless, courts were still able to grant recovery. In Scott v Pattison52 the claimant was 
able to recover under a QM notwithstanding the fact that there was an unenforceable express 
contract between the parties. The court had wrongly rejected the Souch v Strawbridge rule and so the 
judge had to find another solution. In Scott v Pattison it was said: 
 
If a party to a contract, which is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, has rendered services under that 
contract to the other party, and the other party has accepted and benefited by those services, then I think 
that the party who has rendered the services can sue the other party in debt on an implied contract to pay 
him according to his deserts. That is not enforcing the unenforceable contract but a different contract which 
is quite enforceable.53 
 
This appears to be plainly inconsistent with Britain v Rossiter, which was cited to the court by 
counsel.54 The presence of the unenforceable contract should prevent the court from implying a 
contract from the acceptance of the services. On this basis Denning argued that Scott v Pattison was 
wrongly decided but the correct outcome could have been reached based on Souch v Strawbridge 
which had been wrongly rejected by the court.55 Alternatively, as Ibbetson points out, the case 
could have been decided with reference to the Planché v Colburn principle. The defendant’s refusal 
to perform his side of the bargain allows the claimant to recover under an implied contract.56 This 
is something which Denning had failed to consider. This lead him in his taxonomy to create a 
special category for unenforceable contracts when, actually, there was no need. 
                                                 
51 ibid 324 fn 65. 
52 [1923] 2 KB 723 (KB). 
53 ibid 727 (Salter J). 
54 ibid 725. 
55 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit and the Statute of Frauds’ (n 1). 
56 Ibbetson (n 17) 323. 
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2. Contractual conceptual tools replaced with unjust enrichment 
 
Deglman v Guaranty Trust Company of Canada57 was the first case in the common law world to analyse 
the recovery of services in terms of unjust enrichment. A nephew had done some work around the 
house for his aunt. In exchange for such work she promised him that he would get some land in 
her will. This agreement was not in writing and the aunt died intestate. The nephew sought to 
enforce the agreement, but this claim was unenforceable because the agreement was not in writing. 
However, the nephew could recover a QM for the work he had done. Rand J said:  
 
On the findings of both courts below the services were not given gratuitously but on the footing of a 
contractual relation: they were to be paid for. The statute in such a case does not touch the principle of 
restitution against what would otherwise be an unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the 
plaintiff. This is exemplified in the simple case of part or full payment in money as the price under an oral 
contract; it would be inequitable to allow the promissor to keep both the land and the money and the other 
party to the bargain is entitled to recover what he has paid. Similarly is it in the case of services given.58 
 
Cartwright J agreed with Rand J. He cited Lord Wright’s speech in Fibrosa where he said that liability 
in unjust enrichment is different from liability in tort and contract.59 He then agreed with Denning’s 
criticism of the reasoning in Scott v Pattison (although he did not cite it) to the effect that a second 
contract could not be implied when there was a valid but unenforceable contract. The court did 
not, however, rely on the technical solution under Souch v Strawbridge. This makes sense. Here the 
agreement was that the aunt would convey property if the nephew did the work, as such the 
agreement did not actually create a debt of money. Hence the Souch v Strawbridge technical solution 
was unavailable. 
 What about giving recovery on the basis of implying a duty to pay the reasonable sum as 
in Planché v Colbourn? The Court did not directly consider this reasoning, but it did hold that a 
contract could not be implied because of the presence of an express contract. As Cartwright J put 
it: 
 
all the acts for which the respondent asks to be paid under his alternative claim were clearly done in 
performance of the existing but unenforceable contract with the deceased that she would devise 548 Besserer 
Street to him, and to infer from them a fresh contract to pay the value of the services in money would be, in 
the words of Brett L.J. [ in Britain v Rossiter] quoted above, to draw an inference contrary to the fact.60 
                                                 
57 [1954] SCR 725 (SC Canada). 
58 ibid 728 (Rand J). 
59 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 (UKHL) 61 (Lord Wright). 
60 Deglman v The Garanty Trust Company of Canada and Constantineau (n 57) 735 (Cartwright J). 
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This is of course true, but the point of Planché v Colbourn is that where the contract is terminated 
because the defendant does not want to perform their side of the bargain, then the claimant is able 
to rely on such an implied contract because the defendant is unable to rely on the contract to block 
the move from the mutual understanding that the services will be paid for to the implied promise 
to pay the reasonable sum. It seems clear that on those facts the defendant did refuse to perform 
her side of the bargain and that therefore the claimant was entitled to treat the contract as 
terminated. But the Court did not consider this point. Instead, the Court held that there would be 
recovery on another basis:  
 
In my opinion when the Statute of Frauds was pleaded the express contract was thereby rendered 
unenforceable, but, the deceased having received the benefits of the full performance of the contract by the 
respondent, the law imposed upon her, and so on her estate, the obligation to pay the fair value of the services 
rendered to her.61 
 
The substantive reasoning seems to be similar as that of the Planché v Colbourn rule: that the 
defendant having invoked the unenforceability of the contract could not then rely on it to block 
the obligation to pay for the reasonable value of the services. But what the Court seems to have 
done is to free this reasoning from its contractual language and replaced it with unjust enrichment. 
To strengthen the reasoning based on unjust enrichment, Rand J drew an analogy with cases where 
money was paid to purchase land under an oral contract. In such a case it would be inequitable for 
the defendant to be allowed to retain both the land and the money. Similarly, Keener put the matter 
as follows: 
 
The defendant in pleading the statute of frauds simply avails himself of his statutory right and does nothing 
inequitable, that is, nothing that a court can say is inequitable. His inequitable conduct consists in his 
attempting to enrich himself at the plaintiff’s expense, not simply in pleading the statute of frauds.62 
 
The final nail for the use of contractual language came from the discussion of whether the claim 
was time-barred. After all, if there was an implied contract under which the services should be paid 
for then this duty would arise on the completion of the work and so the claim would be time-
barred. But that was not the basis of the claim: 
 
I have already indicated my reasons for holding that, in the case at bar, no such promise can be implied. In 
my opinion the obligation which the law imposes upon the respondent administrator did not arise until the 
                                                 
61 ibid (Cartwright J). 
62 Keener (n 39) 287–288. 
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deceased died intestate. It may well be that throughout her life it was her intention to make a will in fulfilment 
of the existing although unenforceable contract and until her death the respondent had no reason to doubt 
that she would do so. The statutory period of limitation does not commence to run until the plaintiff’s cause 
of action has accrued; and on the facts of the case at bar the cause of action upon which the respondent is 
entitled to succeed did not accrue until the death of the deceased intestate.63 
 
So, the duty imposed by law to pay for reasonable value of the services only arises when the 
defendant failed to perform the agreement under which the services were provided. 
 To summarise, whilst the normative basis for recovery seems to have remained the same – 
the defendant cannot invoke the benefit of the contract (to prevent the duty to pay the reasonable 
sum) whilst having disavowed the contract by failing to perform it or by pleading its 
unenforceability – the conceptual tools to realise that normative basis have changed. The 
contractual solution in Planché v Colbourn made sense given the pleading system at the time (the 
defendant is prevented from pleading the express contract as a means of defeating a claim for a 
contractual QM) but once this had gone it was no longer necessary and it made more sense to use 
a scheme which more directly reflected the reasons for recovery. 
 The High Court of Australia in Pavey & Matthews v Paul64 confirmed such rejection of the 
contractual tools where it was said that it was more honest to say that unjust enrichment did the 
work of explaining why there was recovery.65 In addition, the High Court also rejected the Souch v 
Strawbridge solution on the ground that there was no real distinction between suing on the debt and 
suing on the agreement. It was also doubted whether it was a correct interpretation of the Statute 
of Frauds.66  
Must the unenforceable contract be terminated before there is recovery? This was a point 
which was not explicitly addressed in Deglman and James v Thomas H Kent. Deane J suggests that the 
restitutionary obligation will only arise where there is ‘no applicable genuine agreement or where 
such an agreement is frustrated, avoided or unenforceable.’67 Based on that, Virgo argues that 
termination is not required with unenforceable contracts, instead all that is required is that the 
Thomas v Brown68 requirement (that the defendant is not ready, willing or able to comply with the 
contract) is met. But it is almost impossible to think of one situation where the fact that this 
                                                 
63 Deglman v The Garanty Trust Company of Canada and Constantineau (n 57) 736 (Cartwright J). 
64 (1987) 162 CLR 221 (HC Aus). 
65 ibid 255 (Deane J). 
66 ibid 254 (Deane J). 
67 ibid 256 (Deane J). 
68 (1876) 1 QBD 714 (QB). 
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requirement is satisfied will not constitute a repudiatory breach. This is consistent with Williams’s69 
analysis of when a contract which does not comply with the Statute of Frauds can be used as a 
defence. His analysis is that a contract can be used as a defence to a claim to recover money paid 
or property transferred under the contract. It does not matter for those purposes whether such a 
contract complies with the Statute of Frauds or not.70 It follows that for the claim to succeed the 
contract must be set aside and this is the case regardless of whether the contract is enforceable or 
not. Hence, notwithstanding that dictum by Deane J, Pavey & Matthews did have the effect of 
putting the Planché v Colbourn line of cases upon a restitutionary footing. There is, therefore, no 
special rule for unenforceable contracts.71  
A drawback of both the Souch v Strawbridge and Planché v Colbourn approaches is that they do 
not consider whether awarding recovery would be inconsistent with the policy of the statute which 
makes the contract unenforceable. Although Pavey & Matthews v Paul moves to an unjust 
enrichment analysis, the High Court nonetheless considered that awarding a QM must not pervert 
the policy of the statute. As I argued in Chapter 3 Section III.B this was what the courts were 
actually doing in Sinclair v Brougham72 and R Leslie v Sheill.73 
We finish the story with a recent case, Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management.74 This decision falls 
into the same category as Deglman and, much before it, Gray v Hill75 where work is done in the 
expectation of land being sold under an oral contract. The claimant had obtained planning 
permission on some land belonging to the defendant. The oral agreement was that the two parties 
would own and develop that land together. The defendant did not follow through on her agreement 
and kept the land for herself. She used the claimant’s work in obtaining planning permission to 
develop the land as envisaged. The claimant’s claim for breach of contract failed, as the agreement 
was unenforceable for lack of writing.76 However, the QM succeeded on the basis that the 
defendant had been unjustly enriched and that it was established that the defendant accepted the 
services of the claimant knowing that they were not provided gratuitously.77 Unfortunately, the 
                                                 
69 Williams was one of the first persons to be awarded a PhD in Law in Cambridge. His thesis was on section 4 of 
the Statute of Frauds. It was published by CUP in 1932: The Statute of Frauds, Section Four, in the Light of Its Judicial 
Interpretation. (Cambridge University Press 1932). 
70 J Williams, ‘Availability by Way of Defence of Contracts Not Complying with the Statute of Frauds’ (1934) 50 Law 
Quarterly Review 532. 
71 Ibbetson (n 17) 325. 
72 [1914] AC 398 (UKHL). 
73 [1914] 3 KB 607 (EWCA). 
74 [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752.  
75 (1826) Ry & M 420, 171 ER 1070. 
76 Law of Property Act 1925 s 53. 
77 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd (n 74) [40]-[44] (Lord Scott).  
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House of Lords did not consider whether granting this remedy was compatible with the statute 
making the transaction unenforceable. 
To conclude, as Ibbetson argued, unenforceable contracts were not at all special and 
difficulties raised by their lack of enforceability were dealt with using contractual tools applicable 
to all contracts; the most common one being the Planché v Colburn solution of preventing the 
defendant from using the unenforceable but valid express contract to block the implication of an 
obligation to pay the reasonable value of the work done. However, such reasoning had developed 
very much as a product of the 18th and 19th Century pleading system. So, from the middle of the 
20th Century we see courts in the common law world disentangling this mode of recovery from its 
contractual trappings. The normative basis remains the same – the defendant cannot be allowed to 
rely on the contract which he has breached/repudiated as a means of preventing the obligation to 
pay a reasonable sum – but the tools of contract are no longer used to give recovery. 
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C. Void Contracts 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A contract can be void for two reasons: because there is properly speaking no agreement between 
the parties or because there is an agreement but the law considers that such an agreement has no 
legal effect. The second category includes cases where the agreement is illegal or where the law 
requires a formality for validity (and not merely for enforceability). One might be tempted to think 
that contracts void for incapacity fall within the first category, but this is not universally true. In R 
v Oldham MBC Ex p. Garlick78 the Court of Appeal recognised that lack of capacity cases fall into 
one of two categories. There were cases where it could be said that there was an agreement between 
the parties, but the law holds that such an agreement is void because of lack of capacity; and other 
cases where the party in question is so unable to understand the nature of what is happening that 
there can be said to be no agreement. Under the law contracts are not binding on minors unless 
they are beneficial to them.79 The cases often involved older children and the question was whether 
the contracts were beneficial or not. In other words, there was no doubt that all the other 
requirements for a valid contract were met, but validity depended on the agreement being 
beneficial. But the position is different for very young children, who might not even understand 
the basic nature of the transaction (unlike older children who might understand it but still act 
imprudently). In such cases, even if the agreement is found to be beneficial, there would be no 
valid contract because there was no agreement in the first place. As Scott LJ put it in Garlick: 
 
If a minor is to enter into a contract with the limited efficacy that the law allows, the minor must at least be 
old enough to understand the nature of the transaction and, if the transaction involves obligations on the 
minor of a continuing nature, the nature of those obligations.80 
 
In Garlick the issue was whether children aged four could enter into valid contracts for their 
accommodation.81 The Court of Appeal held that that they could not because they were unable to 
understand the basic nature of a lease, though they might be able to enter into a simpler contract 
such as one for buying sweets. 
                                                 
78 (1992) 24 HLR 726 (EWCA). Subsequently affirmed by the House of Lords [1993] AC 509. 
79 Minors’ Contracts Act 1987. 
80 R v Oldham MBC Ex p Garlick (n 78) 741–2 (Scott LJ). 
81 In the context of deciding whether they could apply for housing under the Housing Act 1985 s 62. 
 Ch 5: Services  
 
 
140 
 So, under incapacity cases there are two categories: (i) those where there is a factual 
agreement and (ii) those where there is not. In this discussion we are only concerned with cases 
where it is possible to say that there is a factual agreement but this amounts to a void contract for 
a number of possible reason. 
 Birks was the main challenger of Denning’s view. He argued that there is no need to show 
that the services were freely accepted. This is because he thought that contract has nothing to do 
with it, but rather this is about unjust enrichment (as he understood it, not in the moral sense). So 
Birks argued that it is sufficient to show that the services saved a necessary expense in order to get 
recovery.82 
 
2. Corporate Formalities in the 19th Century 
 
Having set the scene, let us first consider corporate contracts which were void for lack of 
formalities. In the 19th century companies had to enter into contracts via deed (so that the corporate 
seal could be affixed). If this was not done the contract would be void. However, the courts still 
gave recovery to the suppliers of those companies. Lawford v The Billericay Rural District Council83 
illustrates a long line of cases where the courts held companies liable for contracts within their 
purpose which were not under the seal of the company. If the following conditions were met then 
the company would be liable even though there was no seal: (i) the goods/services were supplied, 
(ii) they were accepted by the defendant and (iii) their supply fell within the purpose of the 
company. The position appears to be that if the goods/services were not actually supplied and 
accepted then there would be no liability. Furthermore, the amount to be recovered was the 
contract price. It is important to note that the request or acceptance of the goods or services had 
to be done by a duly authorized agent of the company.84 
Contrast that with the position where the agreement substantively exceeded the powers of 
the company. This is what happened in Sinclair v Brougham.85 In such a case there was no recovery 
                                                 
82 Birks, ‘Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law’ (n 2) 120–122. See also Jones (n 3) 286–287. 
83 [1903] 1 KB 772 (EWCA). 
84 Clarke v Cuckfield Union (1852) 21 LJ (QB) 349, 354 (Wightman J): ‘the corporation cannot keep the goods or the 
benefit, and refuse to pay on the ground that though the members of the corporation who ordered the goods or 
work were competent to make a contract and bind the rest, the formality of a deed or of affixing the seal were 
wanting, and then say, no action lies, we are not competent to make a parol contract, and we avail ourselves of our 
own disability.’ (emphasis added) See also Lawford v The Billericay Rural District Council (n 83) 781–2 (Vaughan Williams 
LJ), 785 (Stirling J), 786 (Matthew J). 
85 (n 72). 
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in contract and, furthermore, there was no recovery in the action for money had and received. The 
reason for this was that granting such a remedy would be tantamount to enforcing the agreement. 
The case law on companies seems to reveal that the courts take a different approach depending on 
the seriousness of the defect. When it is an intra vires act which fails for merely technical reasons 
the courts will still seek a way of enforcing the agreement. However, if the defect is substantive 
then courts will deny recovery both in contract and quasi-contract. This is best rationalized by 
saying that when the act is intra vires but the defect is one of form (e.g. the seal is wanting) this is 
a case where there is a factual agreement. But in cases where the act was ultra vires it is not possible 
to say that there was a factual agreement and so recovery is denied even under an imputed contract. 
Denning explained the corporate formality cases using his theory. He said that, since the 
agents of the company have authority to accept the services (and this is not ultra vires of the 
company), then, in the absence of the void contract, there would be an implied contract to pay for 
the services. So, the law imputes such a contract.86 Why is it acceptable for the court to impute 
such a contract given the presence of the void contract?87 Denning did not say. But it would appear 
to be some form of unconscionability in freely accepting the benefit and then pleading one’s own 
disability to avoid having to pay for it. As Whitman J put it: 
 
the corporation cannot keep the goods or the benefit, and refuse to pay on the ground that though the members 
of the corporation who ordered the goods or work were competent to make a contract and bind the rest, the 
formality of a deed or of affixing the seal were wanting, and then say, no action lies, we are not competent to make a 
parol contract, and we avail ourselves of our own disability.88 
 
Such language is similar to the one used by the courts in cases where the contract is unenforceable. 
The reasoning again appears to be that the defendant cannot take the benefit of the contract whilst 
also disavowing their duties under it. 
As for Birks’s explanation in terms of necessity, the court rejected this. Vaughan Williams 
LJ explained that in Nicholson v Bradford Union there was recovery, but it could not be said to be on 
the basis that ‘there was any necessity for giving the order, or contracting for the supply, without 
                                                 
86 The uses of ‘infer’, ‘imply’, and ‘impute’ will be explained in Section III.A below. But, very briefly, the appropriate 
word to use is ‘impute’ because the contract to pay a reasonable sum would indeed be a fiction. It would be a fiction 
because, due to the existence of the void contract, this is not actually what the parties agreed.  
87 Recall that, in the case of valid contracts, such an imputation was only legitimate if the defendant had behaved in 
such a way as to entitle the other party to treat the contract as terminated. 
88 Clarke v Cuckfield Union (n 84) (Whigtman J). Emphasis added. This passage was approved of by Vaughan Williams 
LJ in Lawford v The Billericay Rural District Council (n 83) 782. 
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waiting to put a seal on the contract.’89 Hence, he did not ‘understand that the case was decided 
upon the recognised exception arising from necessity.’90 
 
3. Craven-Ellis v Canons 
 
Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd91 is a case where there was recovery for services provided to a company 
under a void contract. Ever since it was decided, a number of commentators have sought to argue 
that it supports their theory for why there is recovery. So Denning argued that the Court was simply 
applying the quasi-contractual approach and Birks thinks there is liability because the services were 
necessary.  
The claimant worked as the managing director of a company. Due to some corporate 
formalities not being met there was no actual contract between the claimant and the company. The 
claimant sued in QM and failed at first instance but recovered on appeal. At first instance the 
claimant failed because the court would not imply a contract when there already was an express 
contract, albeit void.92 As we saw above, this is because the presence of an express agreement 
blocks the implication from a mutual understanding that the services be paid for to a promise to 
pay the reasonable sum.  
On appeal it was said that the obligation to pay the reasonable value of the services was an 
obligation ‘imposed by a rule of law, and not by an inference of fact arising from the acceptance 
of services or goods’.93 Nonetheless such an obligation would only be imposed when the services 
were freely accepted. In addition, the court characterised the company’s defence as being purely 
technical. It was said that the company and its shareholders ‘would be in the position of having 
received and accepted valuable services and refusing, for purely technical reasons, to pay for 
them.’94 This is similar to the language in Clarke v Cuckfield Union. 
There is a puzzle about Craven-Ellis. How could it be that the company accepted the 
services? The failure to meet the corporate technicalities would presumably also mean that the 
company could not have accepted the services. Denning explained that the shareholders’ 
                                                 
89 Lawford v The Billericay Rural District Council (n 83) 781 (Vaughan Williams LJ). 
90  ibid (Vaughan Williams LJ). 
91 [1936] 2 KB 403 (EWCA). 
92 ‘but in his Lordship’s opinion such a cause of action [i.e. quantum meruit] depended on an implied request, and an 
express request negative an implied request’ ibid 405 (Goddard J). 
93 ibid 412 (Greer LJ). 
94 ibid 409 (Greer LJ). 
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acquiescence cured the technical defect.95 Although the judgment does not say so explicitly, it 
comes close to acknowledging that this is what happened: ‘Messrs. du Cros as the principal 
shareholders in the company, and the company, would be in the position of having received and 
accepted valuable services.’96 But if that is the case this raises another question: why did this 
acquiescence (which is said to cure the technical defect) not ratify the contract between the claimant 
and the company? Denning’s explanation is that the contract was void due to a shared fundamental 
mistake: the parties both assumed that the claimant was a director when he was not.97 Once again, 
this is supported in the judgment.98  
In the 1970s Birks99 and Jones100 sought to explain the case on the basis of unjust 
enrichment, the enrichment being established because the services were necessary. They both 
argued that there could not have been any free acceptance by the company because the corporate 
formalities were not met; hence there was no capacity to freely accept the services. Instead they 
argued that the real basis of the decision was that the provision of the services was an 
‘incontrovertible benefit’ because it was factually necessary for the company to have the services 
of a general manager. They accused Denning’s rationalisation based on the shareholder’s 
acquiescence of not being the true basis of the judgment. However, Denning was certainly much 
more faithful to the reasoning of the court than were Birks and Jones. 
One thing Birks, Jones, and Denning all seemed to agree on was that for free acceptance 
to create an obligation to pay the reasonable sum, the acceptance had the same capacity 
requirements as the making of a contract by the company. So, for Denning, there would not have 
been liability had there not been ratification by the shareholders. Birks and Jones agree that 
ratification by the shareholders would have meant the free acceptance was valid, but they deny – 
somewhat implausibly – that this was a material fact in Craven-Ellis.  
Who is right? Denning’s explanation is certainly the most faithful to the judgment. The 
rationale that there needed to be informal unanimous approval from the shareholders in order to 
ratify the invalid appointment or remuneration of a director was reaffirmed in Re Duomatic,101 and 
the rule was more widely stated that informal unanimous approval of the shareholders would cure 
                                                 
95 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1). 
96 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd (n 91) 409 (Greer LJ). 
97 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 55. 
98 ‘This belief that the plaintiff was a director was essential to the making of the agreement and formed the basis 
upon which the parties purported to contract. The agreement was accordingly void ab initio’: Craven-Ellis v Canons 
Ltd (n 91) 413 (Greer LJ). 
99 Birks, ‘Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law’ (n 2) 120–122. 
100 Jones (n 3) 286–287. 
101 [1969] 2 Ch 365 (Ch). 
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any deficiencies. The House of Lords in Guinness Plc v Saunders102 confirmed this. A QM was denied 
in that case because many members of the company did not know about the activities of the rogue 
director, and there was a breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, Lord Templeman (pace Birks) 
approved of Denning’s explanation of Craven-Ellis.103 In addition there was no suggestion by their 
Lordships, including Lord Goff, that a QM could be awarded on the basis of anything other than 
a valid free acceptance.  
On the other hand, the necessity explanation of Birks and Jones has very little support in 
the judgment and is also explicitly rebuked by the 19th century case law. Furthermore, as was seen 
in Chapter 4 Section II.C the number of cases where recovery has been granted on the ground of 
factual necessity – without valid free acceptance – is almost nil.  
 Hence, it appears that Craven-Ellis supports Denning’s quasi-contractual view. As for the 
possible inconsistency between Denning’s requirement of ratification by the shareholders and the 
lack of such requirement in the 19th century corporate seal cases, perhaps the explanation is that 
with the corporate seal cases the defect was merely procedural – the company had the power to 
hire those services, but it needed to follow a certain procedure to do so – whereas in Craven-Ellis it 
was substantive. And so ratification is needed in the latter case but not the former. 
 One puzzle remains. On Denning’s view the claimant alleges that there is a promise to pay 
the reasonable sum based on the ‘mutual understanding that the services will be paid for’. The 
defendant seeks to block that inference by invoking the express contract but in certain cases – for 
example, where he has fundamentally failed to do his bit under the contract – he is disabled from 
pleading the express contract as a defence. Why is he under such a disability where the contract is 
void? Denning merely says, ‘the defendant cannot set up the express contract as an answer because 
it is void.’104 But that does not seem to explain it. Recall that Britain v Rossiter identified two reasons 
why an express contract blocks the inference of an implied contract to pay the reasonable sum.105 
First, because acts done by the claimant in the performance of a contract cannot be valid 
consideration for another contract. Second, because saying that the defendant promised to pay the 
reasonable sum is inconsistent with the fact that he promised something else. The first of these 
reasons does not apply to a void contract, but the second one does. So, it cannot be that the mere 
fact that the contract is void entitles the claimant to sue on a QM. If the defendant had been ready, 
willing and able to perform his side it is unthinkable that claimant could instead sue on a QM. The 
better view, therefore, is that as with unenforceable contracts there is no special rule governing 
                                                 
102 [1990] 2 AC 663 (UKHL). 
103 ibid 693 (Lord Templeman). 
104 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 61. 
105 See Section II.A.4 above. 
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void contracts. Rather, it is the fact that the defendant is unwilling to comply with the agreement 
which prevents the defendant from raising it to block the implication of the obligation to pay the 
reasonable sum. This is supported by various statements from the courts that it would be 
unconscionable for the defendant, having taken the benefit of the contract, to seek to avoid its 
burdens: 
 
the corporation cannot keep the goods or the benefit, and refuse to pay on the ground that though the members 
of the corporation who ordered the goods or work were competent to make a contract and bind the rest, the 
formality of a deed or of affixing the seal were wanting, and then say, no action lies, we are not competent to make a 
parol contract, and we avail ourselves of our own disability106 
 
and ‘the company would be in the position of having received and accepted valuable services and 
refusing, for purely technical reasons, to pay for them.’107 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
In the 18th and 19th Century the position adopted was a quasi-contractual one grounded in the 
pleading system. The claimant would bring an action for a QM. This, on its face, was a genuine 
contract as it required proof of a mutual understanding that the services would be paid for, from 
which a promise to pay the reasonable sum was inferred. The defendant could defeat that inference 
by showing that there was an express contract between the parties. This would defeat the inference 
for both a legal and a factual reason. Legally, it would mean that the act of supplying services was 
done under a contractual duty and hence it cannot be valid consideration for a promise to pay the 
reasonable sum. Factually, because the undertaking made under the express contract is inconsistent 
with a promise to pay the reasonable sum. However, the law prevented the defendant from raising 
the express contract as defence if the defendant had so fundamentally broken his side that the 
claimant was entitled to treat the contract as ‘rescinded’. The lawyers at the time understood that 
this was not genuine rescission ab initio but instead was merely prospective termination. Since the 
defendant was unable to rely on the express contract there was then nothing to block the 
implication of a promise to pay the reasonable sum. Whilst it appears that there were also rules 
which provided that the express contract could not be relied on if it was unenforceable or void, it 
appears that on closer inspection both of those instances could be explained in terms of the 
                                                 
106 Clarke v Cuckfield Union (n 84) (Whigtman J). Emphasis added. This passage was approved of by Vaughan Williams 
LJ in Lawford v The Billericay Rural District Council (n 83) 782. 
107 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd (n 91) 409 (Greer LJ). 
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termination rule. Hence, the unenforceability or voidness108 of the contract was ‘analytically 
irrelevant.’109 It is important to note that, for there to be liability, there must actually have been a 
mutual understanding that the services would be paid for. If that was not present, then there would 
be no liability. 
 Is it possible to identify a principle at play in this scheme which can be isolated from the 
pleading context in which it arose? The answer is ‘yes’, since what seems to be at play is the Benefit 
and Burden Principle. The defendant, having refused to perform his side of the express agreement 
(i.e. the burden) cannot invoke the benefit of the agreement to block the implication of a promise 
to pay a reasonable term.110 Seen this way, the Benefit and Burden Principle’s role is negative. It 
does not explain why there is liability, but it merely explains why a defence cannot be invoked. 
What does the positive work seems to be a contractual principle: the inference that the defendant 
promised to pay the reasonable sum. However, it will be argued in Section III.A that this is not the 
case and, actually, the Benefit and Burden Principle also does the positive work.  
  
                                                 
108 Recall that the void contracts under discussion were all instances where there was an actual agreement but which 
the law treated as not creating any legal obligations. Nonetheless, there was an agreement and so it can be said that 
such an agreement could be terminated for breach/repudiation.  
109 Ibbetson (n 17) 322. 
110 This reasoning which applies whether the agreement in question creates legal obligations or not. Hence, it applies 
also to the void contract cases. 
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III. THE BENEFIT BURDEN PRINCIPLE AS THE 
GROUND FOR RECOVERY 
 
The argument of this section is that the law of restitution for services is best explained as the 
mediation of two principles: (i) the Benefit-Burden Principle and (ii) the need to respect the 
contractual arrangements of the parties. The Benefit-Burden Principle itself is relevant at two 
points. First, it will be argued that it is the Benefit-Burden Principle and not the consent of the 
parties which explains why there is an obligation to pay a reasonable sum for services requested or 
freely accepted. The parties with their contractual arrangements can agree to a specific scheme for 
payment of the services. Ordinarily this scheme should be followed even if it would leave the 
supplier of the services without any payment for the work. This clashes with the Benefit-Burden 
Principle, but the contractual arrangements must prevail. However, sometimes the contractual 
arrangements will give way. This is the second way in which the Benefit-Burden Principle is 
relevant. It prevents the party who has committed a fundamental breach of the contract from 
invoking it to prevent liability for the value of the services. 
A. The true basis of the duty to pay the reasonable sum 
 
Above in Part II, I often referred to the ‘implication’ of a promise to pay a reasonable sum. But 
this is pregnant with an ambiguity. Does ‘imply’ mean ‘infer’ or does it mean ‘impute’? If it is the 
former, then the parties did actually agree to pay a reasonable sum but they just did not say so 
explicitly. If it is the latter, they did not actually promise that but the law imposes such an obligation 
on them as if they had. Which is it? It would appear to be ‘impute’. For example, in Craven-Ellis the 
obligation was said to be ‘imposed by a rule of law, and not by an inference of fact arising from 
the acceptance of services or goods’.111 This makes a difference. But to see the point we need to go 
back to the basics. 
If A requests or freely accepts services from B, knowing that such services are not being 
provided gratuitously, then A comes under a duty to pay for the reasonable value of the services. 
This is the most common instance of QM. The declaration pleaded alleged ‘that in consideration 
that the plaintiff had at the like special instance and request of the defendant performed work and 
labour the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff so much as he deserved.’112 Virtually all 
                                                 
111 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd (n 91) 412 (Greer LJ). 
112 W Swain, ‘Cutter v Powell and the Pleading of Claims in Unjust Enrichment’ (2003) 11 Restitution Law Review 
46, 49. 
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commentators classify such a claim as being an instance of a genuine contract.113 This is on the 
basis that the term will only arise if there is ‘a mutual understanding of the parties at the time that 
the services should be paid for’114 and so, the argument goes, a promise to pay a reasonable sum 
can be inferred from that understanding. 
 There are, however, a number of problems with such reasoning. The first is that this 
promise does not follow as a matter of logical necessity from the mutual understanding. It is 
perfectly logical and conceivable to have a legal system which does not imply such a promise; 
indeed, that was the position in Roman law.115 It was also the position in English law until the 
seventeenth century.116 The first recorded instance of such liability can be seen in Lord Coke’s 
report of the Six Carpenters’ Case.117 The second difficulty is that English law itself did not say that 
the promise was inferred from the conduct or that it was implied in fact. Instead, as Denning 
recorded, the position was that ‘[o]nce a request was proved, the law ordinarily implied the promise 
to pay a reasonable remuneration. Note that it was the law which made the implication.’118 This is 
confirmed by the cases. In Prickett v Badger the court rejected a submission that the decision to imply 
the obligation should have been left to the jury. Crowder J said ‘that is a question of law, and not 
a question for the jury. It would be idle to put it to the jury to imply what of necessity they must 
imply.’119 
Does this, therefore, mean that the obligation is not actually contractual? Not so according 
to Denning: 
 
But the fact that the implication is one of law does not mean that the obligation arises quasi ex contractu. In 
regard to every contract, the question whether a term is to be implied is a question of law which the Court 
decides. In making such implications the Court is in theory only declaring the presumed common intention of the 
parties.120  
                                                 
113 RH Kersley, Quasi-Contract (The Law Notes Publishing Offices 1932) 43; Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of 
Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 56; PH Winfield, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell 1952) 53; Birks, 
‘Restitution for Services’ (n 2) 15; Jones (n 3); Ibbetson (n 17) 315; Swain (n 112) 49. 
114 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 57. 
115 H Roby, Roman Private Law in the Time of Cicero and the Antonines, vol 2 (Cambridge University Press 1902) 142. 
116 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 56. 
117 (1610) 8 Co Rep 146a, 77 ER 695 [147a]. 
118 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 56. 
119 Prickett v Badger (n 43) [306] (Crowder J). See also the passages of Smith’s Leading Cases approvingly cited (‘[plaintiff] 
must therefore be entitled to sue upon a quantum meruit, founded on a promise implied by law on the part of the 
defendant to remunerate him for what he has done at his request; and, as an action on a quantum meruit is founded 
on a promise to pay on request, and there is no ground for implying any other sort of promise, he may of course 
bring his action immediately.’) 
120 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 57. 
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The truth is that the circumstances from which a genuine contract can be established by inference are 
infinitely various, and it is unwise to lay down any special formula. And it must be remembered that the 
inference is one of law just as it is the law which implies terms in an express contract, declaring in each case the presumed common 
intention of the parties.121  
 
So, according to Denning, the fact that the law implies the term does not make it quasi-contractual 
because such a term is giving effect to the ‘presumed common intention of the parties’. In addition, 
Denning also seems to acknowledge, by using ‘in theory’, that the implied term might not actually 
reflect the common intention (presumed or actual) of the parties. 
 But why might one think that the promise to pay a reasonable sum does not reflect the 
intention of the parties? It is undoubtedly the case that in the vast majority of cases this is indeed 
what the parties intend, but this is not necessarily the case. Writing in 1950 Munkman is, as far as 
I can identify, the only commentator who does not think that the promise necessarily arises from 
the intention of the parties. After stressing that the services had to be accepted, Munkman says  
 
It is this cardinal fact which gives rise to a quasi-contractual obligation; not, let it be noted, the acceptance of 
a contract – which was excluded by the circumstances – but the acceptance of benefits.122 
 
But does acceptance of the benefit – knowing that they are not provided gratuitously – not entail 
a contract? Accepting a benefit is not the same as accepting an offer, after all ‘a man may receive a 
benefit with every intention of refusing to pay for it.’123 He criticizes Denning for not having seen 
that distinction in his 1939 article. Instead, Munkman thinks that the basis of recovery is that ‘a 
man cannot voluntarily take a thing and refuse to pay for it, and the law imposes an obligation of 
recompense as soon as the thing is voluntarily accepted.’124 
 One might object to Munkman that the point he makes – that one could intend never to 
pay for it – could apply to all sorts of contracts. After all, if I sign a contract to buy goods and 
privately think ‘I have no intention for paying for these’ I am still contractually bound. Does 
Munkman not make the mistake of looking at the subjective intentions of the parties rather than 
at the intentions objectively ascertained? I do not think he does. The cases we are dealing with are 
unlike cases where there is ascertainable conduct of the parties; we only have silence and silence is 
inherently ambiguous. The reality is that the situation looked at objectively does not actually reveal 
                                                 
121 ibid 58. 
122 Emphasis in original: J Munkman, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons 1950) 89. 
123 ibid 97. 
124 ibid. 
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an intention to pay the reasonable value of the services. So Munkman is right in saying that it is 
perfectly possible for one to accept such services intending never to pay for them. 
 What then is the basis of the obligation to pay? As Munkman puts it, ‘a man cannot 
voluntarily take a thing and refuse to pay for it’125 This is an instance of the Benefit and Burden 
Principle defended in Chapter 4; in the same way that if one takes land with notice of a restrictive 
covenant, the basis of liability is the Benefit and Burden Principle and not an intention to obey the 
covenant (which might not be present). If, as argued in Chapter 4, a situation of unjust enrichment 
arises when the Benefit and Burden Principle is not followed, then the obligation to pay a 
reasonable sum seeks to prevent unjust enrichment. 
 How does this then fit in with the contractual analysis of such types of QM? This only 
threatens the analysis if one thinks that every contractual term must be intended by the parties. 
Whilst this might have been the position in 1939 when Denning was writing126 we now know that 
this is not true. As Peden has argued, terms are implied in law on the basis of policy and fairness 
considerations.127 Such a view has also been judicially approved.128 So the better view is that the 
obligation to pay a reasonable sum arises to prevent the recipient from unjustly enriching himself 
but that it can be implied in a contract because (i) implication in law can be based on fairness 
requirements and, (ii) in any event, it probably does reflect the intention of the parties in the 
majority of cases. 
 Such an account can be confirmed when one considers cases where there was no capacity 
to contract but QM was nevertheless awarded on the basis that the services were freely accepted. 
As seen in Section II.C.2 above, in the 19th Century corporate seal cases the corporate seal was 
lacking and so there was no capacity to contract. Yet it was held that there was liability based on 
the acceptance of the services. What is really going on here is that the acceptance of the services 
creates a situation of imbalance which must be remedied. But it would not be consistent with the 
lack of corporate capacity to say that the duty to pay the reasonable sum was assumed by the 
company: it was not, because of the lack of seal. Instead, it suffices to say that there was capacity 
to accept the services, that such acceptance creates a situation of imbalance which must be 
remedied by a duty to pay the reasonable sum but without any suggestion that this duty was 
assumed by the company. This is why it is a duty imposed by law. 
                                                 
125 ibid. 
126 The use of ‘in theory’ and ‘presumed’ by Denning suggests that he was aware that it was fictional to think that all 
implied in law terms reflected the intention of the parties. 
127 E Peden, ‘Policy Concerns behind the Implication of Terms in Law’ (2001) 117 Law Quarterly Review 459. 
128 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 (UKHL) 258 (Lord Cross); Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd 
[2004] EWCA Civ 293, [2004] 4 All ER 447 [34], [36] (Mance LJ). 
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B. Respecting contracts 
 
So the request or free acceptance of the services creates a duty to pay the reasonable sum. This is 
because otherwise one would have the benefit of something without bearing the associated burden. 
However, the parties can agree between themselves that, for example, the services should only be 
paid for when the work is completed. This is an entire obligation.  
 We can imagine various types of contracts for services between the parties. Suppose we are 
concerned with the building of a house. These are the possible contractual arrangements between 
the parties:129 
• Contract for work actually done - The parties reach no agreement on the price to be paid: in 
such a case the law implies an obligation to pay the reasonable value of the work actually 
done in accordance with the Benefit-Burden Principle 
• Infinitely severable contract - The parties agree that a consideration for the work but there is an 
express or implied agreement for payment pro-rata 
• Milestone contract – The parties agree to divide the whole performance into various tranches 
for which a payment is due when completed but completion of that part is required for 
payment and no further subdivision is possible. A Milestone contract is basically a series of 
entire obligations combined together. 
• Entire contract – The parties agree that full completion of the work is necessary before the 
payment is due. 
In the first two instances the provider of the services will always be paid for every unit of work that 
he has done. As such there will never be a situation where part of the work he has done has not 
been paid for. This is not the case in the last two instances. There it is possible for the defendant 
to have done quite a bit of work but, because he failed to reach the milestone or the completion, 
he has not earned the right to be paid. The end result is that he has provided valuable work for 
which he has not been paid. 
 A pair of cases illustrate the differences between those two types. We are here concerned 
with a scenario where the claimant is hired to do some work, for example building or repairs, but 
before completion the thing he worked on is destroyed; this frustrates the contract. In Menetone v 
Athawes130 the court held that the contract was an infinitely severable one and so the claimant could 
recover on a pro rata basis for the work he had done repairing the defendant’s ship, even though 
                                                 
129 This division is helpfully provided in Glanville Williams, ‘Partial Performance of Entire Contracts I’ (1941) 57 
Law Quarterly Review 373, 371. 
130 (1764) 3 Burr 1592, 97 ER 998. 
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the ship had been destroyed by fire. By contrast, in Appleby v Myers131 it was held that the contract 
was entire. Hence, the claimant, who built machinery for the defendant which was destroyed before 
completion, recovered nothing. 
 The result therefore is that with contracts in the first two categories the Benefit-Burden 
Principle will always be complied with but this is not the case in the last two categories. The breach 
of this principle is why many people see something prima facie unfair with the outcomes in cases 
such as Appleby v Myers and Sumpter v Hedges. It is why complaints that recovery should be allowed 
in Sumpter v Hedges on the basis of unjust enrichment (provided we understand unjust enrichment 
in a manner derivative from the Benefit-Burden Principle) have a lot of strength. However, there 
is ultimately no recovery because this is what the parties have agreed. As the Exchequer Chamber 
put it in Appleby v Myers, ‘there is nothing to render it either illegal or absurd in the workman to 
agree to complete the whole, and be paid when the whole is complete, and not till then’.132 There 
are two competing principles: benefit-burden and freedom of contract; and the latter wins. There 
are, however, two exceptions where the Benefit-Burden Principle wins. These are when there has 
been substantial performance and where the other party has repudiated the contract. 
 A detailed treatment of the substantial performance exception is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. But, very briefly, according to this exception – which finds its origin in Lord Mansfield’s 
judgment in Boone v Eyre,133 was stated in Dakin v Lee134 and was reaffirmed in Bolton v Mahadeva135 - 
if an entire obligation is substantially but not entirely performed then the claimant can still sue for 
the price subject to a cross action in damages by the defendant. This, therefore, appears to be a 
slight modification of the entire obligation doctrine. This exception is based on the Benefit-Burden 
Principle overriding contractual freedom. A strict application of the contract would mean that the 
defendant would get the benefit of a substantially complete performance without having had to 
pay anything for it. Such an outcome is a gross breach of the Benefit-Burden Principle. But, on the 
other hand, the infringement of contractual freedom which would happen if the claimant could 
claim the price subject to a cross action in damages is almost de minimis. So, we have a situation 
where there is a gross infringement of the Benefit-Burden Principle but which can be cured by a 
very minor departure from what the parties agreed. Hence, the scales of justice point very strongly 
to giving the claimant a remedy and so the law does so. 
 
                                                 
131 (1866-67) LR 2 CP 651 (Exch). 
132 ibid 660 (Blackburn J). 
133 (n 8). 
134 H Dakin & Co v Lee [1916] 1 KB 566 (EWCA). 
135 [1972] 1 WLR 1009 (EWCA). 
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C. Repudiated contracts 
 
The other instance where one may recover for part performance of an entire obligation is if the 
defendant has prevented completion of the work or if the defendant has committed a repudiatory 
breach of the contract. As was seen in II.A above, this was the main ground of recovery in QM.136 
This doctrine has sometimes been called the ‘prevention principle’137 but the name is misleading. 
It applies not just to cases where the defendant has prevented the claimant from performing but 
to all cases where the defendant’s refusal to perform his side of the bargain entitles the claimant to 
terminate the contract. As such, recovery in Planché v Colbourn (where there was prevention) and 
Pavey & Matthews v Paul (where there was not) are both based on that principle.138 
 Rather, the relevant distinction is whether the claimant has performed or substantially 
performed his obligation or not. If he has then he has acquired the contractual right to be paid (or 
receive the counter-performance) but otherwise he has not. In cases where the claimant has not 
performed, the fact that the contract might or might not be valid and enforceable is analytically 
irrelevant; the claimant is entitled to treat the contract as terminated and to sue for a QM. So, for 
example, the analysis in Planché v Colbourn is exactly the same as in James v Thomas H Kent. 
 But where the claimant has acquired a contractual right to be paid (or to receive the 
counter-performance) the position is different. Where the claimant is unable to sue on the contract, 
because it is void or unenforceable, then it is clear that he is able to sue for a QM.139 This can be 
seen from the outcomes in Gray v Hill,140 Deglman v Guaranty Trust Company of Canada,141 Pavey & 
                                                 
136 The rationale for which is as follows ‘it is clear that the defendant cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own 
wrong, and screen himself from payment for what has been done, by his own tortious refusal to perform his part of 
the contract, which refusal alone has enabled the plaintiff to rescind it. He cannot, however, recover on the special 
contract, and must therefore be entitled to sue upon a quantum meruit, founded on a promise implied by law on the 
part of the defendant to remunerate him for what he has done at his request; and, as an action on a quantum meruit 
is founded on a promise to pay on request, and there is no ground for implying any other sort of promise, he may of 
course bring his action immediately. This point is decided by Planché v. Colburn.’ : Prickett v Badger (n 43) [306] 
(Crowder J). 
137 J Bailey, ‘Repudiation, Termination and Quantum Meruit’ (2006) 22 Construction Law Journal 217; Baloch (n 4) 
164–166; S Magintharan, ‘The Prevention Principle and the Contractor’s Remedies’ (2017) 33 Construction Law 
Journal 455. 
138 Ibbetson (n 17) 322. 
139 This is, of course, subject to the proviso that recovery should not be granted if it would undermine the policy 
behind the invalidity of the contract. 
140 (n 75). 
141 (n 57). 
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Matthews v Paul,142 and Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management.143 Note, in the case of valid but 
unenforceable contracts, that this would only apply in cases where the defendant has repudiated 
the contract by being unwilling or unable to perform it.144 As for where the contract is void, it is 
now the position, though it was not historically so, that the fact that there was full counter-
performance does not prevent restitution.145 
 But what about the position where the claimant has done everything he needed to earn the 
contractual counter-performance, that the contract is valid and enforceable but that the defendant 
refuses to perform it (in a way that allows the claimant to treat the contract as discharged for 
breach). The claimant is plainly able to sue for expectation damages for the failure to perform but 
can he alternatively sue on a QM?  
 The point is unclear. On the one hand there does not seem to be any English authority 
directly on this point; all the cases where the claimant had completed the work are cases where the 
contract was unenforceable. On the other hand, all the statements in the cases about the right of 
the innocent party to sue for QM are not qualified by any proposition about the unavailability of 
contractual damages. 
 Courts in the Commonwealth have responded differently to this doctrinal uncertainty. In 
Canada, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia confined QM to cases where the claimant had 
partially performed and excluded it from cases where there was full performance.146 The decision 
was reached on the basis that none of the authorities positively supported such a conclusion and 
that ‘justice does not require that a QM be available’ because the party has an adequate remedy, 
which he bargained for, under the contract.147 
In England, the High Court in Taylor v Motability Finance148 adopted the same position; QM 
was not available where there had been full performance.149 The Court did, however, add that in a 
similar fact pattern if the claim was for money, rather than services, then it could be recovered 
                                                 
142 (n 64). 
143 (n 74). 
144 Thomas v Brown (n 68). 
145 The old case law, Linz v Electric Wire Co of Palestine [1948] AC 371 (PC); was not followed in Guinness Mahon & Co 
Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [1999] QB 215 (EWCA). 
146 Morrison-Knudsen Co Ltd v British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 186 (CA BC Can) 230–4 
(Noted 7 Const LJ 227). 
147 ibid 234. 
148 Taylor v Motability Finance Ltd [2004] EWHC 2619 (Comm) [23]-[26] (Cooke J). 
149 See also Elek v Bar-Tur [2013] EWHC 207 (Ch), [2013] 2 EGLR 159; Howes Percival LLP v Page [2013] EWHC 
4104 (Ch). 
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notwithstanding the availability of contractual damages. This has been criticised as illogical by some 
commentators.150 
However, in Australia, the Court of Appeal of Victoria expressed considerable sympathy 
with the view that QM should not be available to the fully performing party but declined to follow 
it on the basis that the right to sue on a QM following repudiation of a contract ‘has been part of 
the common law of Australia for more than a century.’151  
 With this background in mind, there are six types of situations to consider. Can the 
approach taken in such cases be justified? 
  
                                                 
150 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 334. 
151 Sopov & Anor v Kane Constructions Pty Ltd (n 35) [12]. 
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 A: Partial 
performance, Not 
D’s fault 
B: Partial 
Performance, D’s 
fault 
C: Full Performance 
1: Contract 
Enforceable 
QM not available: 
Sumpter v Hedges 
QM available: 
Planché  v Colbourn 
QM available in 
some jurisdictions 
but not others: 
Taylor v Motability 
Finance; Sopov v Kane 
Constructions 
2: Contract 
Unenforceable 
QM not available: 
Britain v Rossiter 
QM available: James v 
Thomas H Kent 
QM available: Cobbe 
v Yeoman’s Row 
Management 
 
To simplify, let us imagine that the contract in all these fact patterns provide that the builder will 
build a house for the owner and that the owner will pay the builder £1m. The contract is an entire 
contract and there are no milestones.  
It is important to distinguish two different benefit-burden bundles.152 The general position 
is that the burden associated with a benefit is either (i) the counter-performance agreed by the 
parties, or, if there is no agreement between them, (ii) the reasonable value of the work done. So, 
the first bundle has as its benefit the full performance (i.e. the house) and the burden is the contract 
price (i.e. £1m). The second bundle has as its benefit the partial performance (i.e. the work done 
so far) and the burden is the value of this partial performance. Since there is no agreement between 
the parties the burden is the reasonable value of the work done so far. In situations A and B the 
full performance has not been done so the Benefit-Burden Principle will not require any remedy 
for the first bundle because it simply has not been provided. 
Situations A1 and A2 can be considered together. Whilst the first bundle has not been 
provided, the second bundle has. So why is there no recovery? Recall that according to the Benefit-
Burden Principle the recipient of a bundle will only be liable to bear the burden if he requested or 
freely accepted the benefit, knowing of the burden. But it is not the case that the owner requested 
or freely accepted the second bundle (i.e. the work done so far). Put bluntly, what the owner 
                                                 
152 By ‘bundle’ I mean a benefit which comes with an associated burden. So, for example, if a plot of land has a right 
of way over it the bundle consists of the land (the benefit) and the fact that it is subject to a right of way (the 
burden).  
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requested was the finished product, not a half house nor the labour in building the house. If he 
had requested half the house or the labour, then the contract would have been a milestone contract or 
an infinitely severable contract. So, the fact of the matter is that the owner has not requested the second 
bundle. It is important to note that this argument does not say that the second bundle was wholly 
unrequested. Rather it was requested on the basis that the owner would get the final product and 
not the work for its own sake. So, the request was conditional. If a bundle is requested on a 
condition and some benefit is provided but the condition is not met, is there an obligation under 
the Benefit-Burden Principle to pay for it? There is not. This can be seen from Boulton v Jones,153 
where the request for the pipes was on the condition that Brocklehurst would supply them.154 That 
condition was not complied with and so there was no liability. Hence if a bundle is conditionally 
requested there will only be liability to bear the burden if the condition of the request was met. If 
the condition is not met then this is no different from a case of unrequested benefit. Here, the 
work was requested on the condition that the house would be finished, that condition was not met, 
so there could be no liability. 
Has the claimant freely accepted the benefit if he finishes the house himself? This is not 
free acceptance; he had no choice but to do it; as Pollock CB put it, ‘[if the claimant] cleans 
another’s shoes, what can the other do but put them on?’155 Of course, it would be otherwise if the 
claimant uses some materials which are returnable. In such a case there is free acceptance and so 
under the Benefit-Burden Principle the owner would be liable.156 But otherwise there is no recovery 
on QM for the reasonable value of the work done so far 
Why then is there such recovery in B1 and B2? The first reason against recovery – that the 
parties agreed that there would not be recovery for partial performance – cannot be invoked by 
the owner because he has so breached the contract that it has now been terminated; the owner 
cannot simultaneously refuse to follow the contract whilst also invoking the protection of the 
contract to avoid having to pay. As Denning put it, the owner cannot set up inconsistent 
circumstances.157 What about the second argument, that the second bundle was not 
requested/freely accepted?  This depended on showing that the condition for the request – that 
the house be completely built – was not met. But in the case where the reason the condition was 
                                                 
153 Boulton v Jones (1857) 2 H & N 564, 157 ER 232. 
154 Because the defendant had a credit with Brocklehurst. 
155 Taylor v Laird (1856) 25 LJ Ex 320, 332 (Pollock CB). 
156 Sumpter v Hedges (n 10). 
157 Denning, ‘Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd’ (n 1) 61. 
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not fulfilled was because the owner prevented the builder from finishing, the owner is not entitled 
to rely on that condition. This is, properly speaking, the ‘prevention principle’.158 
What about cases where there was a repudiatory breach by the owner but there was no 
prevention? Here the reasoning is the same as with the first argument. The owner would at once 
be saying, ‘I have no intention of paying you for the house once built but you must build it in order 
to earn the price.’ This is contradictory and, once again, is setting up inconsistent circumstances. 
The duty to pay is the flipside of the condition for the request (i.e. completion of the house). If the 
owner abandons his duty to pay, then the condition is also abandoned. By doing so he has in effect 
waived the condition. Hence, the work done so far can be treated as having been requested by the 
owner. Therefore, the Benefit-Burden Principle bites and so the owner is required to pay for the 
second bundle (i.e. the work done so far). 
One might object that there is no need for recovery based on the Benefit-Burden Principle. 
Why not confine the builder to an action for breach of contract?159 In situation B2 this would not 
be possible, because the contract is unenforceable, and so we would be left with an un-remedied 
breach of the Benefit-Burden Principle, so recovery must be given in such a case. But what about 
in situation B1, where the contract is enforceable? There are two problems with this argument. The 
first is it that it wrongly assumes that a condition for the award of QM is the unavailability or 
inadequacy of contractual damages; therefore, so the argument goes, if damages are adequate then 
there should not be a QM. But this assumption is wrong. QM is awarded because there is a breach 
of the Benefit-Burden Principle not because contractual damages are inadequate. This brings us to 
the second problem; this argument assumes that an award of damages is sufficient to remedy a 
breach of the Benefit-Burden Principle. But, again, this is not necessarily the case. There are two 
ways to remedy the breach: give back the benefit or make the recipient pay for the burden and only 
the last one is possible. Ordinarily the burden would be whatever amount the parties agreed but 
here there was no agreement on partial performance, so the burden is the reasonable value of the 
services. And this is different from an award of damages. A final objection might be: why should 
the claimant recover when he made a bad bargain? People should indeed not be entitled to escape 
a bad bargain. This is why in situations A1 and A2 there is no recovery. But here, having announced 
his intention not to comply with the contract, why should the owner be entitled to say that the 
builder should not be able to recover more than under the contract? 
There is another, more practical point. Suppose the builder made a bad bargain so that his 
recovery for expectation damages would only be nominal. If this were the only remedy available to 
                                                 
158 S Stoljar, ‘Prevention and Co-Operation in the Law of Contract’ (1953) 31 Canadian Bar Review 231; 
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him the owner could take advantage of that situation by telling the builder, ‘reduce the price of the 
contract or I will not pay you on completion’. If the builder’s only remedy is to sue for expectation 
damages, then the builder would not be able to resist such a demand. But if the builder is able to 
sue for a QM he is in a stronger position. In other words, the availability of QM helps prevent the 
owner from seeking to escape the bargain he made. 
This brings us to C1, where the contract is enforceable and there has been full performance. 
Here the Benefit-Burden Principle favours the Canadian and English approaches. The builder has 
built the house according the contract but the owner refuses to pay. The solution to any breach of 
the Benefit-Burden Principle is to order the defendant to bear the burden. But here we are 
concerned with the first bundle and so the burden is the contractually agreed price. So the solution 
under the Benefit-Burden Principle is the same as under the contract. This is why it can be the only 
solution and why there is no scope for a QM action. 
What about C2, where the contract is unenforceable? The difficulty is that ordering the 
defendant to bear the burden involves enforcing the contract and so it cannot be done. But not 
giving a remedy would be a breach of the Benefit-Burden Principle. So an award for the reasonable 
sum is made. The defendant is not entitled to complain that this was not the contractually agreed 
remuneration because he has refused to comply with his obligations under the contract. If the 
defendant insists on ignoring the contract by invoking its unenforceability he cannot complain if 
the law ignores the contract by awarding the reasonable sum instead the contract price. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the true basis of the obligation to pay a reasonable sum for the work done is not an 
inferred consent or promise (although this will often be present) but is the Benefit-Burden 
Principle. By requesting or freely accepting the work (the benefit) the defendant comes under a 
duty to bear the burden of that work (the reasonable value thereof). This, however, only operates 
in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties about how the work should be paid; the 
law will respect such an agreement. So, if the parties decide that the obligation is an entire one then 
there will not be a duty to pay for the reasonable value of uncompleted work. This is because, in 
such a case, the request for the work is a conditional one; the condition being that the work be 
completed. So, properly speaking, the partial performance was not requested and, therefore, there 
is no liability under the Benefit-Burden Principle. 
 But this might lead to a harsh outcome in cases where the defendant has repudiated the 
contract. Here the law prevents the defendant from setting up inconsistent circumstances. He 
cannot, on the one hand, say that the contract overrides the Benefit-Burden Principle whilst, on 
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the other hand, treat the contract as breached fundamentally. So, in such a case the law prevents 
the defendant from relying on the contract. It follows, that the defendant is no longer able to say 
that the request for the work was conditional on full completion. In the absence of that 
qualification, the work was indeed requested and so the Benefit-Burden Principle creates an 
obligation to pay for the reasonable value of the work done. 
 As for cases where there has been full performance, there is a contractual entitlement to be 
paid. But the Benefit-Burden Principle also gives the same answer. This is because the agreed 
burden associated with the benefit of full performance is the contractually agreed sum. So either 
way the only remedy should be the contractually agreed sum.  
IV. THE FAILURE OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
 
We must now consider the alternative explanations for recovery of services and we will see that 
they all fail. 
 
A. Birks, Jones and the defective transaction model 
 
As explained above,160 the problem for Birks’s unjust enrichment theory is that, for void contracts, 
it requires the ‘incontrovertible benefit’ principle to do more work than it actually can by proving 
that the services were factually necessary. But instances where the law has awarded recovery on 
that basis have been extremely rare.161 In addition, as explained in Chapter 2 Sections III.A and 
III.B the difficulty for the Birksian model in incorporating services is that it requires artificial 
definitions of ‘enrichment’ and ‘at the expense of’. There are also difficulties at the unjust factor 
stage. Take a Planché v Colbourn type situation; how has there been a total failure of consideration? 
True the claimant received nothing in return for his work but that is also the case in Appleby v Myers 
and Sumpter v Hedges. As explained in Chapter 2 Section III.C.2, an unjust factor analysis cannot 
explain why there is recovery in one type of case but not in the other. Indeed, Birks accepted that 
conclusion and argued that Sumpter v Hedges is wrong.162 
                                                 
160 II.C.3 Craven-Ellis v Canons above. 
161 W Day, ‘Against Necessity as a Ground For Restitution’ [2016] Restitution Law Review 27. 
162 Birks, ‘Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law’ (n 2) 128–129; Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 2) 
239. 
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More generally, there is a difficulty in saying that there is a defective transaction in such 
cases. One might have been tempted to say that, for the void and unenforceable contract cases, the 
defect of the transaction is the defect that makes the contract invalid or unenforceable. But, as we 
saw in Sections II.B and II.C above, the fact the contract is void or unenforceable is analytically 
irrelevant. Instead, there is recovery solely on the basis that the defendant has fundamentally 
broken the contract by refusing to perform his side of the bargain. But this does not mean that 
there is a defective transaction in providing the service. Recovery in such cases simply does not fit 
the defective transaction model. 
 
B. Baloch and the conditional transfer theory 
 
Baloch argues that restitution in a contractual context is explained on the basis of a conditional 
transfer theory; the benefit was transferred on a condition, there was a qualifying breach of that 
condition and so the benefit ought to be returned.163 He argues that this applies equally to money 
and non-money benefits such as services, though he recognises that the special nature of services 
raises some complications.164Pace Baloch, I argue that the conditional transfer theory cannot apply 
to non-returnable benefits such as services.  
We first start with the historical observation that, whilst failure of consideration was 
recognised from early on as a ground of recovery for money,165 it was never part of the equation 
for services. Almost all commentators argue that this is illogical and that symmetry requires that it 
be available for service claims. But this argument makes two mistakes: (i) it assumes, without 
argument, that money and services should be treated in the same manner, and (ii) it fails to note 
that the law managed perfectly well without needing failure of consideration for services, so, why 
attempt to extend it to services? Matters would be different if there was a gap in the law to be filled, 
but there was no gap. 
 This brings us to the normative argument. We need to ask why failure of consideration lead 
to recovery of money and whether such a reason is applicable to services. As we saw in Chapter 3 
the recovery of money was based on a proprietary rationale. The claim was that the money 
‘belonged ex aequo et bono’ to the claimant and the grounds of restitution, of which failure of 
consideration was one, were simply instances where the law recognised that ‘ex aequo et bono’ the 
                                                 
163 Baloch (n 4) 93–94. 
164 ibid 167–174. 
165 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burrow 1005, 97 ER 676. 
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money belonged to the claimant. So, for example, in case such as Martin v Andrew166 where money 
is paid on the condition that an event will occur, the rationale is that if the event does not occur 
the money belongs ‘ex aequo et bono’ to the claimant. Such a proprietary rationale is available for 
goods167 but is not available for services; it is not possible to talk of a service as conditionally 
belonging to a party. 
 An alternative explanation is that the parties have agreed that the money will be returned if 
the condition fails. Consider a situation where C agrees to buy 100 widgets from D for £100. In 
such a case the parties agree that the payment of the £100 is conditional on the transfer of the 100 
widgets. Suppose that the defendant is not under a duty to return the £100 if he fails to transfer 
the widgets. If that were true then the transfer of the £100 would not have been conditional. To 
see the point consider the following pair of statements:  
 
(a) the transfer is conditional on x,  
(b) If x fails, D does not have a duty to give the thing back to C.  
 
Those two statements are contradictory. So, the argument goes, it follows that the negation of (b) 
is true. But the negation of (b) (call it (c)) is that 
 
(c) D is under a duty to give the thing back to C when x fails. 
 
Hence, the argument goes, whenever the parties agree that a transfer is conditional it follows as a 
matter of logical necessity that they agree that D is under a duty to give it back if the condition 
fails. So we can conceive of a conditional transfer as an agreement under which C gives something 
to D and D agrees to give it back if x does not happen. To put the point another way, if there was 
not a duty to return the thing if x does not happen, the transfer of the thing would actually have 
been an unconditional one and not a conditional one. In other words, the conditionality of a 
transfer implies, as a matter of logical necessity, that there must be a duty to return the thing if the 
condition fails. Hence, the argument goes, by agreeing that the transfer is conditional the parties 
have agreed that the recipient is under a duty to give the thing back if the condition fails. 
 The above reasoning is elegant but is not quite true. In particular, there is another pair of 
statements which is not contradictory:  
 
(a) the transfer of the thing is conditional on x,  
                                                 
166 (1856) 7 E&B 1, 119 ER 1148. 
167 Indeed, it seems to underline retention of title clauses: Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium [1976] 
1 WLR 676 (EWCA). 
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(d) if D receives the thing, D is under a duty to do x.  
 
So, the move from (a) to (c) (i.e. the logical implication of a duty to give the thing transferred back) 
only works in the absence of a duty (d). Hence, for the above argument – that the conditionality 
of the transfer necessarily implies a duty to give the thing back if the condition fails – to work, one 
would have to show that there is actually no duty on the part of the recipient to make the condition 
happen. To put the point another way, the above argument wrongly assumes that a duty to give 
the thing back was the only way of ensuring that the transfer would indeed be conditional. But this 
is false. Another way of protecting the conditionality of the transfer would be to have a duty on 
the recipient to ensure that the condition happens. So, the above argument only works in the 
absence of a duty to perform the condition.  
But this actually makes perfect sense of the case law. Recall that the action for money had 
and received could not be brought to recover a conditional payment if the contract it was made 
under was ‘open’168, i.e. duty (d) is present. In such a case the conditionality of the payment is 
protected by the fact that the recipient is under a duty to perform the condition. But if that duty 
ceases to exist then another means of protecting the conditionality of the payment is required, and 
the only other means is (c). So, in other words, there are two ways of protecting the fact that a 
payment was conditional:  
 
(c) requiring the return of the payment if the condition fails, and  
(d) requiring the defendant to perform the condition.  
 
When the contract is still in existence (d) does the work of protecting the conditionality but when 
it is terminated duty (c) comes into existence as a means of protecting the conditionality. But it is 
not the case, as said above, that the parties agreed on duty (c). Rather duty (c) follows from  
 
(i) the parties’ agreement that the transfer is conditional and  
(ii) the failure of the primary/agreed mode of protecting the conditionality.  
 
So, it is wrong to say that the parties – when they agreed that the transfer would be conditional – 
also agreed that the recipient would be under a duty to return the thing if the condition failed (i.e. 
duty (c)). Of course, this will not always be the case. Sometimes the payment is made on the 
condition that an event will happen, and the recipient is not under a duty to procure the happening 
of this event. In such a case the matter is straightforward: the parties agreed that the money will be 
returned if the event does not happen. But the point remains: in the vast majority of instances, it 
                                                 
168 Weston v Downes (1778) 1 Doug 23, 99 ER 19; Towers v Barrett (n 19). 
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is wrong to say that the parties have impliedly (let alone explicitly) agreed that if the condition fails 
there would be a duty to return the thing. Therefore, it cannot be said that the duty to return the 
thing is one which is consensual (i.e. one to which the parties actually agreed).169  
 Be that as it may, the duty to return the thing arises to protect the conditionality of the 
transfer when the primary means of protecting such conditionality (i.e. the duty to perform the 
condition) no longer exists (or can no longer be enforced). Whilst such a reasoning can apply to 
goods170 it is not applicable to services. This is because services are not returnable and as such there 
can be no duty to return them. Of course, it is possible to return the value of the service, but this 
is quite different from an obligation to return money or goods. This is because this puts the 
defendant in the position of having purchased the service when this might not have been what he 
wanted. Consider the following example. D is about to get married. As a wedding present A gives 
her £1000, B gives her a ring and C paints her house. The wedding is called off. A and B are clearly 
able to recover the money and the ring,171 because the transfer was understood by all the parties to 
be conditional on the wedding happening. Hence there is an agreement between the parties that 
the money/ring will be returned if the wedding is called off.172  
 Whilst we are presumably all comfortable with A and B recovering, many people are likely 
to conclude that C ought not to recover. Why is that? The legal reason C’s claim would fail is that 
D did not freely accept the services. As far as D was concerned this was provided gratuitously. D 
did not freely accept A and B’s gifts either but that does not matter. The fact that they are returnable 
means that there can be an obligation to return them if the condition fails. To see that C cannot 
recover, consider E’s gift. On hearing of D’s engagement, E decided to give a bottle of wine to D 
and encouraged her to consume it straight away. When the wedding is later cancelled it seems E 
cannot recover the value of the bottle. Why is that? It would seem that the fact that the bottle was 
intended to be consumed straight away meant that there was no obligation to return it if the 
condition failed. In other words, whilst the wedding was a motive for the gift, it was not conditional 
upon it. Services are in many respects analogous to goods meant to be consumed straight away. So 
it could be said that in C’s case the service was not actually given conditionally on the wedding, 
rather the wedding was just a motive. 
                                                 
169 This is not to say that such a duty goes against the intention of the parties. Had they been asked by the officious 
bystander, ‘if the condition is not performed will D have to return the thing?’, they would both answer ‘of course.’ 
But the point is that this is, typically, not something to which they would have addressed their minds. 
170 See e.g. engagement rings are given on the condition that they be returned if the engagement is called off without 
good cause: Cohen v Sellar [1926] 1 KB 536 (KBD). 
171 See ibid. 
172 This is a case where it is possible to say that this is what the parties actually agreed. This is because there clearly 
was not a promise to A, B and C that D would get married. 
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As Goff and Jones put it 
 
In the majority of cases the nature of the gift is likely to be the conclusive feature. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
court will order restitution in respect of services provided by one engaged person to another, even though 
the marriage fails to come about by reason of the fault of the recipient; and small gifts, and gifts which may 
be consumed before the marriage or may otherwise be not necessarily intended for use after the marriage, 
will tend to be construed as out and out gifts.173 
 
In any event, it seems that for services conditionality of transfer is not sufficient to get recovery. 
Instead, what is required is a mutual understanding that the service is provided non-gratuitously 
(which can be established by free acceptance). Therefore, it is free acceptance that is doing the 
work in explaining recovery, whereas with money and goods free acceptance is not necessary and 
the conditionality of transfer alone is sufficient to ground recovery. 
Finally, for further confirmation of this point, consider the different treatment of money 
and services under partially performed entire contracts. We know that, outside the prevention 
doctrine, there is no recovery for services provided. But there is no such entire contract bar insofar 
as money is concerned. The point can be illustrated by this modification of the facts of Dies v British 
and International Mining and Finance Corp174 proposed by Baloch: 
 
A agrees to buy 1,000 rifles from B for £10,000, to be paid in advance in five equal instalments. Only when 
the instalments are fully paid will the obligation to deliver the rifles arise. After paying one instalment of 
£2,000, A fails to pay the balance, and B accepts this repudiatory breach and terminates the contract. A can 
then bring a claim for the return of the £2,000, even though payment was a condition precedent to the 
delivery of the rifles. 175 
 
If instead of money this was services, then the situation would be analogous to Sumpter v Hedges and 
there would be no recovery. Baloch correctly points out that the reason for the difference is the 
non-returnability of the benefit. As he puts it, when the benefit is returnable the ‘effect is not, as 
in the quantum meruit claim, to partially enforce the contract (as it would be if rifles were claimed) 
but to reverse the transfer.’176 And the trouble with partial enforcement is that the defendant, by 
making the contract entire, intended not to pay for a partially built house. Holding him liable would 
fail to respect his autonomy but there is no such risk if one is merely reversing the transfer. 
                                                 
173 R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1966) 365. 
174 [1939] 1 KB 724 (KB). 
175 Baloch (n 4) 170. 
176 ibid 171. 
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 The difficulty is that Baloch does not take this insight far enough. With services what does 
the work is not that the service is conditional but that the defendant requested or freely accepted 
the service on the basis that it was not gratuitous. The relevance of any condition or quid pro quo is 
only negative, it serves to ensure that any QM does not undermine the contractual bargain. 
 To sum up, there are three possible reasons why money paid on a condition that fails should 
be recoverable: (i) the money morally belongs to the claimant in the event that the condition fails, 
(ii) the parties actually agreed that the money will be returned if the condition fails, (iii) an obligation 
to return the money must be implied in order to preserve the conditionality of the payment. 
However, none of those reasons apply to services because services cannot be owned nor can they 
be returned. With services the only possible remedy is a duty to pay their reasonable value, but to 
avoid a forced exchange/purchase such a duty can only be found if there is a mutual understanding 
that the services are not provided gratuitously. But this is different from a conditionally provided 
service. Hence, the conditional transfer theory cannot apply to services. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The problem with the Birksian model of unjust enrichment is that it saw services through the same 
lens as it saw the recovery of money. But there are a number of important differences. Cases 
concerning services did not involve defective transactions and the remedy was not restoring the 
status quo ante but was a form of enforcement: it requires the defendant to engage in an exchange. 
This is in addition to the difficulties of identifying an ‘enrichment’ in service cases. Further, a 
conditional transfer analysis, like the one proposed by Baloch, cannot apply to services as it 
depends on the returnability of the thing transferred. But services, by their nature, are not 
returnable. 
 Furthermore, alternative explanations which saw QM as either the enforcement of a non-
contractual promise or adopted a wider definition of contract have also been found to be wanting. 
In most cases the defendant did not promise to pay the reasonable sum for the work actually done. 
And the adoption of a wider definition of contract would be a significant departure from precedent 
and would not account for recovery in cases where the contract is unenforceable. 
 Not being satisfied with those explanations, this chapter went back to the history and 
sought to identify the basis for recovery. It was found that the basis for it was quasi-contractual 
and grounded in the forms of action. Part of the facts (i.e. the presence of a mutual understanding 
to pay for the services) supported an action for QM, but the defendant was able to defeat this 
action by invoking the express contract between the parties. However, the courts prevented the 
defendant from invoking the contract where he had repudiated it. 
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 Part III sought to extricate this reasoning from the no longer existent procedural 
background it emerged from. It was first argued that, in the absence of an express agreement, the 
real basis for the duty to pay a reasonable sum was not consent but rather was the Benefit-Burden 
Principle. The benefit to the recipient, namely the claimant’s labour, was tied to a burden, namely 
the cost of that labour, and by requesting or accepting the benefit the recipient came under an 
obligation to bear that burden. If there was no such obligation there would be a breach of the 
Benefit-Burden Principle and so a situation of unjust enrichment. By enforcing the obligation, the 
law avoided unjust enrichment. 
 But where there is an agreement between the parties, this has to take precedence over the 
Benefit-Burden Principle. There are, however, two exceptions to that. The first is the substantial 
performance exception. It arises because in such cases there would be a very strong breach of the 
Benefit-Burden Principle and giving recovery does not subvert the contractual agreement between 
the parties. The second exception concerns repudiated contracts. Here the defendant, having 
repudiated the contract, cannot rely on the agreement between them as a means of blocking or 
overriding the Benefit-Burden Principle. So, the contract gives way and recovery is awarded. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter 2 Section I we distinguished between two meanings of unjust enrichment. There was 
what Birks called the ‘generic conception’. By ‘generic conception’ Birks meant, at a high level of 
generality, ‘the common quality of a number of apparently different events [giving rise to 
restitution].’1 For example, ‘the generic conception of sale, hire, agency, partnership, loan is 
“contract”.’2 ‘Unjust enrichment at the claimant’s expense’ is the generic conception of all the 
events giving rise to restitution. For Birks there is nothing moral about ‘unjust’. It is used purely 
descriptively to mean ‘those circumstances in which the law provides for restitution.’3 So, this was 
a purely descriptive account of the commonalities between all the situations where the law awards 
restitution. There is nothing normative about it. 
                                                 
1 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 1985) 17. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid 19. 
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 However, the second meaning of unjust enrichment was moral: it is ‘the principle against 
unjust enrichment’.4 This is the principle which originated in Roman law. It is the moral principle 
which all the authors from Ames and Keener to Goff and Jones had seen as being the foundation 
of the law of quasi-contract. Birks observed that it ‘restates the conception of the event in a 
dynamic or normative form.’5 It is prescriptive rather than descriptive. 
 In Chapter 2 Section II.A we saw that Birks rejected the prescriptive principle because he 
considered it to be either too vague or was a truism. If ‘unjust’ was understood to embody 
important moral and political values then it would be too vague and could not be applied by the 
courts. But if ‘unjust’ was defined by reference to the law then the prescriptive statement would 
amount to no more than saying that the law should be respected.6 This argument fails for the 
reasons given in Chapter 2 Section II.B. It is possible to give content to the principle against unjust 
enrichment whilst avoiding either pure vagueness or positivism. 
 Indeed, it was argued that Birks’ argument for the descriptive principle was a Motte and 
Bailey fallacy.7 The Bailey is the moral principle against unjust enrichment. This is what makes his 
classification of events interesting and attractive, because, intuitively in all the circumstances where 
the law gives restitution it makes sense to say – in layman’s terms – that the enrichment was unjust. 
The Motte is his descriptive reversible enrichment doctrine, according to which ‘unjust’ just means 
‘what the cases say is reversible’. When Birks is actually using unjust enrichment he appeals to the 
Bailey, but when pressed with objections that this is just palm tree justice, he retreats to the Motte 
and claims that there is nothing moral with ‘unjust’. It would be unfair to accuse Birks of having 
intentionally relied on a fallacy. Rather, his fault is that he was unwilling to defend the Bailey (i.e. 
the moral principle against unjust enrichment). This is the task which this Thesis has sought to do. 
 As explained in Chapter 2 Section III.C, a defence of the moral principle against unjust 
enrichment requires identifying the reasons why a particular situation amounts to an unjust 
enrichment. This requires identifying the principles which tell us what are unjust enrichments. The 
methodology adopted in this Thesis has been not to seek to reinvent the wheel but instead, as Lord 
Reed said in a recent Supreme Court decision, to learn from ‘the wisdom of our predecessors.’8 
 The previous Chapters of this thesis have identified two such principles: the property 
principle and the benefit and burden principle. Bearing in mind that the methodology of this Thesis 
is to identify the principles that have been used to justify restitution, a full-blown defence of those 
                                                 
4 ibid 22. 
5 ibid 23. 
6 ibid. 
7 See Chapter 2 Section II.A. 
8 The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies (in liquidation) [2017] UKSC 29, 
[2017] 2 WLR 1200 [40]. 
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principles is beyond the scope of this Thesis. However, it is not enough to simply report that they 
were historically relied upon. One must also defend the internal coherence of those principles and 
consider whether they can be applied to new situations which did not exist at the time they were 
first developed. It is this task that this Chapter will undertake. 
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I. THE PROPERTY PRINCIPLE 
 
The Property Principle, as applied to money claims, was stated by Charlie Webb as follows: 
 
(1) the claimant, as legal title holder of the relevant asset prior to its transfer, was authorized to determine 
who may receive and use that asset; (2) though the asset is now in the defendant’s possession, it came into 
his hands only by virtue of a decision of the claimant’s which was qualified or, in some way, impaired; (3) 
there is then good reason to treat the claimant as still the person authorized to determine the asset’s use and 
disposition; but (4a) if we were to allow the claimant to assert a continuing title to that asset, this may create 
problems for third parties who have dealt with the defendant on the reasonable assumption that the asset 
now in his hands is his to dispose of; and (4b) if we were to allow the claimant to reclaim that asset ahead 
of the defendant’s other creditors in the event of the defendant’s insolvency, this would unreasonably 
prejudice those other creditors; so (5) it is reasonable, all things considered, to limit the claimant to recovery 
of a sum of money of equal value, leaving the asset in the defendant’s hands and his to dispose of.9 
 
Webb has provided a substantive defence of this principle in his book, so there is no need to repeat 
it here. However, there are two points that will be expanded on. The first is why it is that the law 
considers title to have passed even when the intention to pass title is impaired. The second is 
whether the Property Principle can apply to bank transfers. 
 
A. Why is a normative interest retained even though legal title passes? 
 
1. Nothing incoherent with the law protecting non-legal property rights 
 
According to Webb the claimant retains a normative interest in the asset even though title has 
passed. This normative interest is what the old cases referred to when they said that the asset 
‘belonged ex aequo et bonuum’ to the claimant. There is nothing incoherent in saying that one can 
retain a normative interest in something in which legal title has passed. As Wilmot-Smith, a critic 
of Webb’s thesis, put it: 
 
                                                 
9 C Webb, Reasons and Restitution (Oxford University Press 2016) 75–76. 
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I can still have a normative interest in a thing belonging to another even if I have no legal interest: if your 
father killed my father and stole his art, I might be thought to have a moral entitlement to the art even if the 
legal system recognises it as yours. That seems obviously right.10 
 
Nor is there anything incoherent with saying that, in some circumstances, the law will protect that 
‘moral entitlement’. Indeed, this is precisely what the Theft Act 1968 does in cases where title 
passes due to a mistaken transfer. It provides: 
 
Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in 
whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that 
obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to 
restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to 
deprive that person of the property or proceeds. 11 
 
So, for the purposes of the Theft Act, property or money mistakenly transferred to the recipient is 
deemed to be ‘property belonging to another’ even though legal title has passed. This was not the 
case prior to the Theft Act,12 but it shows that there is no incoherence in talking of the asset as 
‘belonging’ to the transferor. Such a ‘belonging’ is not a legal one – I cannot bring an action in 
conversion to recover it – but a moral one which the law protects by the action for money had and 
received and by extending the provisions of the Theft Act to it.13 
 But the question still remains: why does the law consider that there is a moral entitlement 
which it will protect via a personal action? To see we need to look at derivative transfers of title. 
  
                                                 
10 F Wilmot-Smith, ‘Reasons? For Restitution ?’ (2016) 79 The Modern Law Review 1116, 1130. 
11 Theft Act 1968 s 5(4). 
12 R v Gilkes [1972] 1 WLR 1341 (EWCA) 1344–45 (Cairns LJ). Explaining how section 5(4) filled a gap which 
existed at common law and under Larceny Act 1916 s 1(2)(i). 
13 The fact that the asset is protected by the Theft Act does not mean that the ownership is now a ‘deemed legal’ 
one. If that were the case then the tort of conversion would be available. But the Theft Act clearly does not have that 
effect. 
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2. Derivative transfers of title to chattels and money 
 
There is a wide variety of approaches which any legal system can take to regulating the passing of 
title to property. At one extreme we could have a purely subjectivist system under which title passes 
simply based on the unexpressed intention of the owner. At the other extreme the law could require 
registration for a transfer of property and it could provide that the register shall be conclusive. The 
former system affords maximal freedom to owners to transfer property whilst the latter imposes 
substantial bureaucratic burdens. However, under the former system it is very hard to know who 
owns what, but the matter is very easy under the latter system. So, in choosing which sort of rule 
to adopt the legal system has to balance party autonomy against the interest of third parties (by 
having certainty of title). There is no right answer as to how to do it and it is for each legal system 
to decide. 
 English law adopts a variety of different rules depending on the type of property, whether 
it is legal or equitable title which is transferred and whether the original owner will still be alive 
after the disposition. With land, an asset of considerable value which people rarely exchange, 
English law has adopted an objective system of registration which is virtually conclusive. When it 
comes to equitable interests, English law has adopted a more subjectivist approach, which again 
makes sense because such interests do not bind bona fide purchasers and so there is less of a need 
to protect third parties. And when the transfer is set to take place after the death of the original 
owner, the law imposes certain formalities on the transfer; this is because it would no longer be 
possible to check with the transferor if there were doubts about his intention. 
 What about the passing of chattels at law?  The law does not take a purely subjectivist 
approach. I cannot pass title to my laptop by simply saying ‘I transfer this to Johnny’. Instead, I 
need to deliver the laptop (the position is different, due to statute, under a sale of goods contract). 
We need not be detained by the precise rules of what counts as ‘delivery’, but it is sufficient to say 
that delivery is needed. There is, however, another issue; the relative conclusiveness of delivery. If 
an act of delivery has been done, how conclusive is it that the title has passed? In other words, 
what facts, if any, would mean that what looked like a delivery actually failed to pass title? What if, 
for example, the transferor was acting under duress (of the sort which would not be obvious to a 
third party)? Or if the transaction under which the transfer was done was defective? Or if there 
was a condition attached to the transfer which was not met? Again, the law has a choice to make. 
At one extreme it could say that any defect or qualification of the intent of the transferor would 
make the delivery ineffective. At the other extreme it could say that the delivery will always be 
effective. The law has to make a trade off.  
 Ch 6: Conclusion  
 173 
 The approach taken by English law is that only a complete absence of intention to transfer 
title will make the transfer ineffective. The illegality of the transaction,14 fraud,15 
misrepresentation,16 duress17 and undue influence18 do not affect the validity of the transfer, though 
might make it voidable (i.e. the transferor will have the power to rescind the transaction). However, 
fundamental mistakes will prevent title from passing. A mistake will be fundamental if it is a mistake 
as to the identity of the recipient,19 as to the identity of the subject matter20 and, especially in the 
case of fungibles, as to the amount to be transferred.21 But this is best seen not as an exception but 
as a consequence of the rule that there must be intention to transfer title. One must intend to 
transfer the chattel to the recipient.22 If there is a mistake about the thing being transferred, or, in the 
case of fungibles, the quantity of the thing transferred then there was no intention to transfer the 
chattel that was delivered. Similarly, if there is a mistake as to the identity of the recipient, the 
transferor then did not intend to transfer title to the person who got delivery. In other words, there 
must be a coincidence between the thing actually delivered and the thing intended to be delivered 
and between the actual recipient and the intended recipient. If there is not then the title is not 
passed. But, otherwise, legal title will always pass regardless of any other defects.23 
 It would appear that conditional transfers are possible in English law. Certainly where 
conveyance by contract – rather than by delivery – is available the parties have full autonomy to 
decide when title will pass,24 and so there should be no difficulties with either of those 
arrangements. Indeed, clauses providing that title be retained until payment are commercially very 
common.25 But in cases where – as with gifts – title must pass on delivery (or by delivery of a deed), 
what is the position? 
There is no direct authority on this point, but it would appear that it is possible to make a 
conditional transfer of a chattel outside of a contractual context. The better view is that such 
transfers operate as follows: at delivery, title remains with the original owner and a bailment 
                                                 
14 Singh v Ali [1960] AC 167 (PC). 
15 Car & Universal Finance Co v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525 (EWCA). 
16 Re Glubb [1900] Ch 354 (EWCA). 
17 Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation (The Evia Luck) (No2) [1992] 2 AC 152 (UKHL). 
18 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (EWCA). 
19 Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459 (UKHL). 
20 R v Ashwell (1885) 16 QBD 190 (CCR). 
21 Ilich v R (1987) 162 CLR 110 (HC Aus). 
22 D Fox, Property Rights in Money (Oxford University Press 2008) para 3.100; D Sheehan, The Principles of Personal 
Property Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2017) 154. 
23 Fox (n 22) paras 3.53-3.57. 
24 Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 17. 
25 Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 676. 
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relationship is created; after the appointed condition is fulfilled title passes and the bailee becomes 
the owner.26  
Therefore, the law concerning the passing of title to chattels, outside of sale of goods 
contexts, is as follows: 
1. Title will pass on delivery if there is intention to transfer the thing actually 
transferred to the person who is actually the recipient (i.e. provided there is no 
fundamental mistake). 
2. No (non-fundamental) mistake, defect or qualification of the intention will 
prevent legal title from passing; neither will any defect in the transaction by which 
the transfer is done. 
3. Title will pass on delivery subject to only one exception: where the parties have 
agreed that title be retained after delivery and will only pass when a condition is 
met. In such a case, title passes when the condition is met. 
4. The parties cannot provide that legal title passes on delivery but reverts back if 
the condition is not met. 
These rules make sense. They promote certainty of ownership whilst not exposing the parties to 
an overly great bureaucratic burden. However, the conclusiveness of delivery means that title will 
pass in circumstances where the parties did not properly intend for it to pass. So, for example, if 
the owner transfers a chattel because he mistakenly thinks he is under a legal duty to do so then 
there will be an effective transfer of title.  
 The position with money is the same. The rules concerning acquisition of derivative title 
to money are the same as for chattels. In addition, there are two other rules by which the recipient 
of money can acquire a clean title. These are the ‘no earmark rule’ and the ‘currency rule’. The ‘no 
earmark rule’ provides that when money is mixed the owner of the money loses his title to it. The 
‘currency rule’ provides that where money is tendered as currency, the recipient will acquire a good 
title to the money provided he was in good faith. As such this provides an exception to the nemo 
dat rule for money. As David Fox has shown, the purpose of the no earmark rule was to ensure 
the free circulation of money as currency.27 It, was, however, superseded by the currency rule.28 But 
the purpose of both rules is the same; namely to ensure that there was no need to query whether a 
person tendering any form of money was the true owner thereof. As Viscount Haldane LC put it 
in Sinclair v Brougham: ‘[i]f a sovereign or banknote be offered in payment it is, under ordinary 
                                                 
26 R Chambers, ‘Conditional Gifts’ in N Palmer and E McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods (LLP 1998) 430–432.  
27 Fox (n 22) paras 8.10-8.19. 
28 ibid 8.20-8.26. 
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circumstances, no part of the duty of the person receiving it to inquire into title.’29 The reason for 
that is to ensure the free circulation of money. If that were not the case, then commercial exchanges 
would be much less efficient.30  
 The purpose of these rules concerning the passing of title to money and other chattels is 
to protect third parties by reducing transaction costs (so that the third party can, in general, 
reasonably assume that the person in possession has valid title). Although they have the effect of 
also making life easier for the recipient, they are not intended to act for the benefit of the recipient. 
Yet they are unfair to the original owner; his freedom to decide what will happen to his asset has 
not been respected. This unfairness to the original owner is acknowledged by the law when it 
recognises that, because the original owner did not properly intend to part with the asset, he retains 
a normative interest in the asset – which normative interest the old cases referred to as ‘belonging 
ex aequo et bonuum’. 
 
 
3. Why legally protect a non-legal interest in the asset? 
 
There are plenty of moral rights and duties that we do have but which the law does not enforce. 
For example, the law does not enforce our moral duty to keep gratuitous promises. Nor does it 
enforce our moral duty not to cheat on our partners. So, one needs to explain why the law should 
enforce this moral ownership especially when it has decided that it would not amount to legal 
ownership anymore. 
 The explanation for this is the ‘mess explanation’31 which, as we saw in Chapter 3 Section 
II.D, the courts started to outline in Sinclair v Brougham. According to that explanation, the law 
created a mess by adopting the no earmark rule, the currency rule, the abstraction principle and not 
looking at defects in the intention to transfer title, and giving a personal action is the law’s way of 
clearing up that mess. As Zimmerman puts it: 
 
                                                 
29 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 (UKHL) 418 (Viscount Haldane LC). 
30 Fox (n 22) paras 2.11-2.27. 
31 A term coined by McBride for explanations of the law according to which ‘C is allowed to sue D not because 
anyone has done anything wrong, but because something has gone wrong, and allowing C to sue D is the only (or 
best) way to clear up the mess that has been created’: N Mcbride, ‘Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: The Coming 
Counter-Revolution’, 8th Biennial Obligations Conference, University of Cambridge (2016) 19. 
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 in the words of the great pandectist Heinrich Dernburg, it is by means of an enrichment action that the law 
attempts to heal the wounds that it itself inflicts (by virtue of the abstract transfer of ownership).32 
 
But what exactly is this mess or wound? It is the fact that the transferor has lost legal title when he 
still has moral ownership. Importantly, therefore, the mess explanation requires the moral 
ownership theory in order to work. Without it the situation which the law creates is not a mess and 
so there is nothing to fix. 
 There is an additional explanation for recovery and this is what McBride has termed the 
‘confidence explanation’. According to this explanation, first put forward by Lord Kames in 1760, 
if there was no recovery for mistaken payments then people would spend a very long time making 
sure that the debts they paid were actually due. This would be greatly inefficient. So, in order to 
facilitate commerce, the law provides that a personal claim is available to recover mistaken 
payments.33 This is why the law decides to protect the moral ownership of the owner.  
 
 
B. Bank payments 
 
In a transfer of corporeal property, including money, it is straightforward to see how the Property 
Principle applies; the note that you now have in your possession was previously mine and so it is 
easy to say that I retain my normative interest in it. But this is not the case for bank transfers. When 
I transfer you £10, a chose in action I had against my bank is extinguished and you acquire a new 
chose in action against your bank. Indeed, it is not even an assignment of the chose in action that 
I previously had, but is instead a new one. So, it would seem that the Property Principle cannot 
apply in this context as there is no asset or right being transferred. Wilmot-Smith argues that this 
leaves defenders of the Property Principle with two options. They can either accept this 
consequence and argue that it only applies to tangible assets. Or they can seek an expanded 
definition of property which would cover bank transfers, but this runs the risk that this would 
implausibly stretch the notion of property, so that the Property Principle cannot do the normative 
work that it needs. And there might then not be coherent reasons for such an account not to apply 
to services.34 Webb has sought to take the second option and to argue that this does not then cover 
                                                 
32 Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of a Civilian Tradition (Oxford University Press 1996) 867. 
33 Mcbride (n 31) 21–22. 
34 Wilmot-Smith (n 10) 1131–1132. 
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services.35 Wilmot-Smith is not persuaded by Webb’s reasons.36 An examination of this debate is 
beyond the scope of this Chapter, but there is an alternative response. The trouble with Wilmot-
Smith’s objection is that it assumes that the law of unjust enrichment must internally have 
requirements for what counts as property. This, however, is not true. These could be external to it. 
So unjust enrichment could simply say that ‘the value of property transferred by mistake should be 
returned’, whilst leaving it to other areas of the law to decide what counts as ‘property’.  
 For better or for worse we treat a debt in a bank account as being equivalent to corporeal 
money. There are good reasons for that. A bank account can be reduced to corporeal money on 
demand and at par value. True, other assets or services can be exchanged for corporeal money but 
this does not happen on demand (the counterparty can refuse the exchange) and the value is set by 
the market rather than being visible on its face. As Fox puts it: 
 
The difference, for example, between a book which is sold for £100 cash and a bank balance of £100 is 
that the bank balance is expressed in monetary units of value, while the book has no fixed monetary value 
already inhering in it. Its value can only be assessed by looking to a market.37 
 
This is what justifies treating bank accounts as money. It is important to note that what amounts 
to money is not a pure question of law but is partly decided by social facts. As Fox puts it, ‘the 
question where the law should treat a certain kind of assets as money (and so, for example, apply 
a characteristic proprietary regime to it) can only be answered by observing whether the community 
where it circulates treats it as such.’38 A key feature of money is that, when used as a unit of value 
and medium of exchange, it does not matter what form the money takes; five £1 coins should be 
treated as exactly the same as one £5 note which should be treated the same as £5 in a bank 
account.39 Hence, the same proprietary scheme should apply to all. It is true that there are instances 
where we are interested in money as specific and not fungible property but these are quite rare and 
in such cases it is proper to apply a different analysis.40 Importantly, all such cases do not involve 
bank transfers of money from one person to another. Where there is a bank transfer of money, it 
is being treated as a medium of exchange or a unit of value and so is treated as a fungible which is 
                                                 
35 Webb (n 9) 97–98. 
36 Wilmot-Smith (n 10) 1132–1134. 
37 Fox (n 22) para 1.55. 
38 ibid 1.23. 
39 ibid 1.80-1.81. 
40 ibid 1.82-1.86. 
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no different from physical cash.41 In such cases, therefore, the bank transfer is appropriately treated 
as a notional cash transfer. The argument can therefore be expressed as follows: 
 
1. A bank transfer is treated as a notional cash transfer 
2. The Property Principle applies to cash transfers 
3. Where money is treated as fungible the same proprietary rules should apply to all forms 
of money 
4. Bank transfers always involve seeing money as fungible 
5. Hence, the same proprietary scheme should be seen as applying to bank transfer as with 
cash transfers 
6. Therefore, the Property Principle can apply to bank transfers. 
 
In any event, the objection that a bank transfer cannot be seen as involving derivative transfer of 
title because it creates a new chose in action is overstated. As Fox puts it: 
 
First, the creation of the recipient’s title depends on the expression of the payer’s will at the outset. It is the 
payer who initiates the payment instruction. Secondly, it will be seen that the recipient generally holds his or 
her debt claim against the bank subject to the same defects in title as affected the payer’s debt claim against 
his or her bank before the transfer. The fact that the recipient’s claim against his or her bank is newly 
created does not necessarily entail that he or she takes it free from competing titles.42 
 
 It must be noted that the notion of ‘derivative’ means of acquiring title for tangibles is to 
an extent a fiction. The distinction between original and derivative means of acquiring property 
was not found in the Roman Law texts but was instead created by commentators later on.43 As 
Schulz puts it, it was just a metaphor. The better view was that there was abandonment followed 
by a new title coming into being.44 The point is this: from a strict jural relations point of view there 
is no real distinction between derivative and original modes of acquiring ownership. Instead, these 
are analytical tools which we use to categorise what is going on. So it is perfectly legitimate, as we 
currently do, to treat bank transfers as involving derivative modes of acquiring title. The objection 
                                                 
41 This is also typically the case for physical transfers but not necessarily. So, for example, I might give a particular £5 
note to you because it has a serial number which we find funny. Here the specific character of the note matters and 
is therefore not fungible with another £5 note or with £5 in a bank account. But this is never the case for bank 
transfers as there is nothing to distinguish one unit of money in a bank from another.  
42 Fox (n 22) para 1.106. 
43 WW Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law : From Augustus to Justinian (P Stein ed, 3rd ed, Cambridge 
University Press 1963) 204. 
44 F Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford University Press 1951) para 595. 
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that, from a strict jural point of view, it is a new title that is created, and this can apply to a wide 
range of situations including some which we would consider to be focal cases of derivative modes 
of acquiring title. 
 What about the concern that treating bank transfers like cash transfers would open up 
Pandora’s box and that, therefore, services could also be treated like cash transfers? If this were 
the case then it would mean that the Property Principle would also cover services and that, 
therefore, Birks was right in considering that the recovery for services could be analysed using the 
same framework as the one used for cash transfer. However, this objection fails. Treating bank 
transfers like cash transfers does not open up Pandora’s box. There  are a number of highly 
significant differences between bank transfers and services. With a service there is nothing that can 
be returned. Now the objection is that neither can a bank transfer.45 But with bank transfers those 
differences are insignificant because of the nature of money. Consider these four examples: 
 
1. Widget: A transfers widget to B by mistake. B transfers widget back to A. 
2. Cash: A transfers a £10 note to B by mistake. B transfers two £5 notes to A. 
3. Bank: A transfers £10 from his bank account to B’s account by mistake. B transfers £10 
back to A. 
4. Service: A provides a service the market value of which is £10 to B by mistake. B transfers 
£10 to A (it does not matter the form of the £10). 
 
 The first case is the par excellence instance of the Property Principle. From there we can infer 
that a condition for the Property Principle to apply is that it must be possible to return to the status 
quo ante by transferring back the thing in question. The argument goes that in the Service case it is 
not possible to do so (B cannot transfer the service back and if he gives £10 then he is £10 worse 
off than he was compared to the initial position), and so the Property Principle does not apply. But 
Wilmot-Smith’s objection is that it is also not possible to do so in the Bank case. Now one might 
respond that in Bank the status quo ante is possible because, although they might not have the 
same chose in action as before, the parties have the same value as they did before. But to that 
objection Wilmot-Smith would reply that this is also true in the Service case. However, there is a big 
difference. In both Cash and Bank the thing or chose in action transferred (or newly created) has 
inherent value and the society and the law treat it as being equivalent to another form of money of 
the same value. Hence, in Cash A cannot complain that he got two £5 notes instead of one £10 
note, the two are simply inherently equivalent. The same goes in Bank; whilst technically the new 
£10 chose in action that A gets back is different from the one that he lost, the two are treated as 
                                                 
45 Wilmot-Smith (n 10) 1133. 
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being fungible equivalents and so he cannot complain. From B’s point of view matters are even 
clearer. What he loses is precisely the chose in action that he gained due to A’s actions. But in Service 
all of this is different. What B loses (£10) is different from what he gained from A (the service) and 
what A gets back (£10) is not a fungible equivalent to the service he provided. 
 So, the constraint for the Property Principle to apply can be formulated as follows: it must 
be possible to return the parties to the literal status quo ante or to a situation where the entitlements 
they get are fungible equivalents to what they had in the status quo ante. This, therefore, provides 
a coherent and principled basis for excluding services from the ambit of the Property Principle, 
whilst including choses in action and bank transfers. It follows that the Pandora’s box objection 
fails. It is perfectly possible for the Property Principle to apply to both cash transfer and bank 
transfers whilst not applying to services. 
C. Conclusion 
 
The application of the Property Principle to instances where legal title has passed is not incoherent. 
It is perfectly possible to have non-legal normative interests which the law nonetheless chooses to 
protect. This is what was meant when the old cases talked of ex aequo et bono ownership. In cases 
where there is no full intention to pass title to money and chattels but where title passes nonetheless 
because of rules that are in place for the benefit of third parties dealing with the recipient, it is 
proper for the law to treat the original owner vis-à-vis the recipient as if he were still the owner. 
Hence, the Property Principle will allow the original owner to recover the thing so transferred. 
Furthermore, the Property Principle can perfectly coherently be extended to situations where it is 
not a tangible thing that is transferred but a chose in action or a bank balance. Nor does such an 
extension open up Pandora’s box to incorporating services as part of the Property Principle.  
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II. THE BENEFIT-BURDEN PRINCIPLE 
 
D. One Principle Not Two 
 
The Benefit-Burden Principle was covered in Chapter 4 Section III. As was seen in Chapters 4 and 
5 it operates in two different ways. In certain circumstances it is triggered by voluntary acceptance 
of the benefit, but in others it is sufficient that the benefit be incontrovertibly at least equal to the 
burden. This might lead one to think that there are two different Benefit-Burden Principles. This, 
however, would be incorrect. There is only one principle but, in order to operate, it must not 
threaten other principles, including the Autonomy Principle. But it is only in those two situations 
that the Benefit-Burden Principle will not infringe the Autonomy Principle. So the point is that 
merely receiving a benefit creates a moral duty to bear the associated burdens but the law will not 
enforce that moral duty in those situation because to do so would be contrary to the respect for 
autonomy which English Law has. The following anecdote illustrates the point. 
 For the first five James Bond novels, Mr Bond carried a .25 Beretta gun. In 1956, Ian 
Fleming, the author of the Bond novels, received an unsolicited letter from one Geoffrey 
Boothroyd advising him that Bond ought to carry a different gun. Fleming took the advice and 
when Dr No was published in 1958, Bond had switched to using a Walther PPK. Fleming wrote 
back to Boothroyd thanking him for the advice and said the following, ‘Since I am not in the habit 
of stealing another man's expertise, I shall ask you in due course to accept remuneration for your 
most valuable technical aid.’46 In addition, Fleming also named one of the characters – Major 
Boothroyd – after his correspondent. 
 Legally, it is quite clear that Fleming owed nothing to Boothroyd. Yet Fleming considered 
himself to be morally bound to remunerate Boothroyd. The Benefit-Burden Principle explains it. 
Fleming took the benefit of Boothroyd’s advice and so was under a moral obligation to pay for it. 
However, legally enforcing this obligation would have breached Fleming’s autonomy as he had no 
possibility to reject the advice (it was unsolicited).  
                                                 
46 The correspondence is reproduced at ‘May I Suggest That Mr. Bond Be Armed with a Revolver?’ (Letters of Note) 
<http://www.lettersofnote.com/2011/06/may-i-suggest-that-mr-bond-be-armed.html> accessed 26 April 2018. 
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 Similarly, in Nicholson v Chapman47 the owners of the timber were certainly under a moral 
obligation to pay those who had rescued it.48 But, the enforcement of such an obligation would 
violate their autonomy, because the intervention was unrequested, and so the law does not do so. 
Therefore, it is only when the Benefit-Burden Principle does not clash with other principles, in 
particular the Autonomy Principle, that the law will grant recovery. There is no clash where the 
recipient has the opportunity to reject the benefit knowing that it is not provided gratuitously. Nor 
is there a clash if the imposition of liability under the Benefit-Burden Principle would 
incontrovertibly not make the recipient worse off. This is because, in such a case, there is no 
detrimental change to the position of the recipient and hence that change does not need to be 
subject to the approval of the recipient.  
 
E. In Defence of Benefit-Burden 
 
In a recently published article Bevan is critical of the ‘doctrine of Benefit and Burden.’49 His 
criticisms should not be cause for concern. First, it is important to distinguish the ‘doctrine of Benefit 
and Burden’ from the ‘Benefit-Burden principle.’ The doctrine is a rule of land law which provides 
an exception to the rule that positive burdens in freehold covenants do not bind successors in title. 
According to the doctrine, recently re-affirmed in three Court of Appeal judgments,50 the successor 
in title to the freehold will be bound by the positive burden if the following three conditions are 
met: 
 
1. The benefit and burden must be conferred in or by the same transaction and this 
transaction must have been in writing; 
 
                                                 
47 Nicholson v Chapman (1793) 2 H Bl 254, 126 ER 536. In that case Nicholson owned timber which which was 
docked on the Thames. Unfortunately, the ropes broke and the timber was released. It was collected by Chapman. 
who sought to argue that he was entitled to remuneration for having rescued the timber. This was rejected by the 
Court of Common Pleas. 
48 ‘perhaps it is better for the public that these voluntary acts of benevolence from one man to another, which are 
charities and moral duties, but not legal duties, should depend altogether for their reward upon the moral duty of 
gratitude’: ibid [259] (Eyre CJ). 
49 C Bevan, ‘The Doctrine of Benefit and Burden: Reforming the Law of Covenants and the Numerus Clausus 
“Problem"’ (2018) 77 Cambridge Law Journal 72. 
50 Davies v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 1164, [2009] All ER (D) 104; Wilkinson v Kerdene [2013] EWCA Civ 44, [2013] 
EGLR 163; Elwood v Goodman [2013] EWCA Civ 1103, [2013] 4 All ER 1077. 
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2. The receipt or enjoyment of the benefit must be relevant to the imposition of the burden, 
in the sense that the former must be conditional on or reciprocal to the latter: this is a 
matter of construction of any deed or document in the case; 
 
3. The person on whom the burden is alleged to have been imposed must have or have had 
the opportunity of rejecting or disclaiming the benefit, not merely the right to receive the 
benefit.51 
 
The doctrine undoubtedly reflects the Benefit-Burden Principle but, unlike the other cases 
considered in Chapters 4 and 5 where the Principle underpins recovery, in the case of freehold 
covenants it is applied directly in the other cases the Principle is mediated via other legal rules. 
 Bevan criticises the doctrine for resting on ‘unsteady doctrinal foundations.’52 He notes 
much of the same sources for the doctrine as were noted in Chapter 4 Section III.A. After citing 
Megarry V-C’s statement that the doctrine hails from, ‘The simple principle of ordinary fairness 
and consistency that from the earliest days most of us heard in the form “You can't have it both 
ways,” or “You can't eat your cake and have it too,” or “You can't blow hot and cold”.’53 Bevan 
adds: 
 
It is striking perhaps that a doctrine sitting in such clear conflict with the long-standing and celebrated 
Austerberry rule is justified on such slender and colloquial materials and according not to legal doctrine but 
by reference to non-scholastic cliché. Striking also that the potency and enforceability of property rights 
should fall to be determined by reference to a broad construct of “ordinary” fairness and consistency; 
notions which, whilst doubtless central to any functioning legal system and to the interests of natural 
justice, are not the primary drivers of property law.54 
 
Bevan then adds that maxims provide an ‘unstable and unreliable foundation for the construction 
of secure legal doctrine’55 and makes more specific criticisms about the way the doctrine has been 
applied. For example, he criticises the way the test for opportunity to reject has been applied.56 
 Bevan’s point about maxims is certainly true and his criticisms of the manner of the 
operation of the doctrine are well taken. But they do not trouble the argument made in this thesis: 
that the cases considered in Chapters 5 and 6 are underpinned by the principle of Benefit and Burden. 
                                                 
51 Bevan (n 49) 80; Davies v Jones (n 50) [27]. 
52 Bevan (n 49) 83. 
53 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 (EWCA) 289 (Megarry V-C). 
54 Bevan (n 49) 84. 
55 ibid 86. 
56 ibid 88. 
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This is for two reasons. First, the point about the use of maxims does not apply here. This is 
because, in the cases with which we are concerned there is no suggestion of applying the principle 
or the latin maxim – qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus – directly. Rather, each case is to be 
decided in accordance with a well-established set of rules which are different for each situation. 
What they have in common is that they all find the rationale for them in the above maxim and the 
Benefit-Burden Principle but there is no suggestion, as with the freehold covenant cases, of the 
Principle being applied directly by the courts. For the same reason, Bevan’s criticism that the 
doctrine is uncertain also does not apply here. 
 Secondly, Bevan criticises the legitimacy of using ‘slender and colloquial materials’ to avoid 
a well-established legal rule (that positive freehold covenants do not bind successors in title). But 
here the Principle is not used to overturn or avoid any such well-established rules. The core 
instances of recovery – recoupment, contribution, general average, quantum meruit – have been 
well established for over 200 years. True, there has been incremental development but the 
legitimacy of those instances of recovery is certainly not in doubt. A possible illegitimate use of the 
Principle (when applied directly) in the freehold covenant cases does not put in any doubt the 
legitimacy of other well-established rules which happen also to be underpinned by the Principle. 
 
 
 
 
F. Conclusion 
 
Whilst it might be inappropriate for judges to seek explicitly to apply the Benefit-Burden Principle 
to a case before them, this does not threaten the role of the Benefit-Burden Principle in 
recoupment, contribution, general average, quantum meruit, and other such cases. This is because in 
those cases the Benefit-Burden Principle operates in harmony with the Autonomy Principle and 
because there are well established rules which the courts apply, hence there is no need for judges 
to directly apply the Benefit-Burden Principle. Instead, they apply rules which are underpinned by 
that Principle. 
III. THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
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Party autonomy is one of the foundational principles of the common law. Indeed, it can be 
described as being one of the law’s ideologies.57 It has long been recognised that this principle plays 
a key part in the law of unjust enrichment by acting as a limit to recovery. Since the role of this 
principle is well-established this section will just be a brief overview of the role the principle plays. 
The principle explains why, in general, there is no recovery for unrequested benefits. So as Bowen 
LJ recognised in Falke v Scottish Imperial Insurance:58 ‘Liabilities are not to be forced upon people 
behind their backs any more than you can confer a benefit on a man against his will.’ Hence, subject 
to exceptions discussed below, one can only be liable if the benefit was requested or chosen, but 
the mere fact that one made use of a benefit which one received does not mean that one freely 
chose it because, ‘[if the claimant] cleans another’s shoes, what can the other do but put them on?’59 
This is what underpins what the law now, unhelpfully, refers to as ‘subjective devaluation’.60 
 So, this means, that where the benefit is not requested or freely accepted there can, subject 
to three exceptions, be no recovery. This is because imposing liability would force the defendant 
to pay for something which they did not want. This offends the autonomy principle. The Third US 
Restatement of the Law: Restituttion and Unjust Enrichment, helpfully calls this aspect of autonomy the 
‘no forced exchange principle’: 
 
Liability in restitution may not subject an innocent recipient to a forced exchange: in other words, an 
obligation to pay a benefit that the recipient should have been free to refuse.61 
 
This principle is, however, not engaged where the benefit received is money or is otherwise readily 
returnable. This is because in such a case the imposition of liability does not require a forced 
exchange as the recipient can simply return what he received. Similarly, where the benefit has, for 
one reason or another, already been converted into money, then the exchange has already happened 
and so requiring the recipient to return the sum in question does not amount to a forced exchange. 
Finally, if the benefit received spares the recipient a legally necessary expense then making him pay 
for it will not require a forced exchange because the recipient would always have been required to 
expend resources discharging that duty.62  
                                                 
57 S Worthington, ‘Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law’, The Common Law of 
Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart Publishing 2016). 
58 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co (1886) 34 Ch D 234, 248 (Bowen LJ). 
59 Taylor v Laird (1856) 25 LJ Ex 320, 332 (Pollock CB). 
60 Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50, [2014] AC 938 [26] (Lord Clarke, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson). 
61 Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (American Law Institute 2011) s 2(4) (Rule at p 16, Commentary 
at p 19, Notes at p 21). 
62 ibid 9(a) Rule at p 99, Commentary at pp 99-108, Notes at pp 109-110. 
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 The principle also underlies the primacy of contract. As was seen in Chapter 5, there will 
be no recovery in unjust enrichment (and especially in quantum meruit) so long as the contract 
between the parties has not been terminated. This is because restitution for benefits provided or 
the payment of a reasonable sum for the work done was not what the parties agreed. This might 
very well lead to instances of unjust enrichment as the recipient had the benefit of performance he 
did not pay for. But ordinarily, this will not be enough for the law to intervene in a manner contrary 
to what the parties agreed. Hence it is only where the contract ceases to operate that there will be 
such recovery.63 
 Finally, autonomy also plays a role in the defence of change of position. Elise Bant has 
argued that the defence has two aims, one of which is autonomy: 
 
The first (and very specific) aim is to protect the defendant from the harm he would suffer where an order 
to make restitution in part or in full would leave him in a worse (including entirely different) position than 
he was in prior to his receipt. This harm-orientated limb serves to protect the defendant’s autonomy, for 
example by preventing him from being placed in an entirely different position from that which he occupied 
prior to the receipt.64 
 
In other words, this protects the defendant from a situation where the transaction would be 
irreversible.65 In that sense, the defence is another embodiment of the ‘no forced exchange’ 
principle. To see the point, consider two situations: 
 
(1)  A by mistake provides B with a free meal in a restaurant. B consumes the meal in good faith thinking 
that he was entitled to it. The meal is worth £100. 
 
(2)  A by mistake transfers £100 to B. B in good faith thinks he is entitled to the money and decides to treat 
himself to a nice meal in a restaurant. He spends all £100 on the meal. Had he not received the money, he 
would not have gone to the restaurant. 
 
In both cases imposing liability to repay £100 on B would amount to a forced exchange as it would 
require B to pay, from his own money, for a meal that he did not think he would have to pay for 
from his own funds.  
 The second aspect of the defence, for Bant, is that it tames the irreversibility protection 
that it gives by reference to the defendant’s fault.66 So it is only if the defendant is in good faith 
                                                 
63 ibid 2(2) (Rule at p 15, Commentary at p 17, Notes at p 20). 
64 E Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing UK 2009) 217. 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
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that he will have the protection of the defence if the transaction turns out to have become 
irreversible. 
 To conclude, we can see that the Autonomy Principle plays a very important role in limiting 
liability in unjust enrichment. In particular, bar exceptional circumstances, liability cannot be 
imposed where doing so would violate the Autonomy Principle. Therefore, whilst the Property and 
Benefit-Burden Principles provide positive reasons for recovery the Autonomy Principle operates 
to place limits on recovery. 
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IV. EVENTS, REASONS AND RESPONSE 
 
An unjust enrichment is a situation, or – to use Birks’s terminology – an event, whereby someone 
has acquired an advantage which it is unjust for them to have. The principle against unjust 
enrichment assumes that the law should seek to avoid such situations from occurring and, if they 
do occur, to remedy them. It is the three principles above, and not the principle against unjust 
enrichment, which point out what the unjust enrichments are. There are, however, various different 
ways in which the law can then respond to such situations. In this section we will consider each of 
the main situations of unjust enrichments and consider what makes them unjust enrichments and 
how the law responds to this. 
 
 
G. Category A: Returning the benefit 
 
1. Category A1: Defective intention to transfer money/goods 
 
Here money or goods have been transferred to the defendant recipient in circumstances where the 
claimant did not fully intend to make the transfer. Nonetheless, the law considers that he had 
sufficient intention to pass legal title. In such a case, the property principle explains why the 
situation is one of unjust enrichment. This is because the recipient has something which, morally, 
does not belong to him. Hence, he is enriched and this enrichment is unjust. The property principle 
itself does not provide the explanation for recovery. It has to be combined with an account of why 
the asset still morally belongs to the claimant. Such an account was sketched in Section I.A above. 
According to this account, from a moral point of view the asset still belongs to the claimant 
because the claimant’s intention to pass title was defective. Furthermore, the legal rules which say 
that title passes notwithstanding the defect operate for the benefit of third parties and, between the 
claimant and defendant, are not intended to benefit the defendant (though, of course, the defendant 
does benefit as a side-effect from the fact he can pass title to third parties). Hence, the asset still 
morally belongs to the claimant. In addition, this is a moral entitlement which the law ought to care 
about and protect because the lack of protection (by way of retaining the legal title) was of the law’s 
own doing and because giving such protection would encourage people to transfer assets and hence 
reduce transaction costs. It is only at this stage that the property principle bites to say that the 
situation so created – that the defendant has legal title to an asset which does not morally belong 
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to him – is an unjust enrichment. The principle against unjust enrichment then kicks in to say that 
the law must remedy this situation. The final question is how should the law respond to this 
situation? There are three possible approaches.  
First, the law could give the claimant a personal wrong-based action for an unreasonable 
failure to return the asset, i.e. wrongful or unconscionable retention. This, in effect, amounts to 
what a fault-based conversion claim would be like if one existed. As we saw in Chapter 3 this was 
the initial approach which the law took to money claims but it is no longer the approach taken. 
However, as argued in Chapter 3, this remains the position for goods (i.e. returnable non-money 
assets/rights); the defendant is liable (in money) for wrongfully refusing to return the asset. 
Second, the law could give the claimant a personal claim against the defendant which would 
have the effect of putting the claimant and the defendant vis-à-vis each other in the same position 
they would have been in had the first type of claim been available. This is what the law now does 
with money. This is because, due to the nature of money, there is no difference between a duty to 
return a £10 note and a debt for £10. So, the claimant is not disadvantaged by the shift to a debt. 
As for the defendant, under the wrongful retention model considered in the previous paragraph, 
he would not have been liable if he had spent that money in good faith because his dealing with 
the money would then not have been wrongful and, once he had spent it, there would be nothing 
for him to wrongfully retain. Hence, in order not to disadvantage the defendant, the law gives him 
a defence under this second model in cases where he spent the money is good faith. This is the 
change of position defence. 
The above, solution, however, is only available for money claims; is not available for non-
money claims. This is because, for goods claims, if a debt for the value of the goods was imposed 
on the innocent recipient of the goods this would put the defendant in a position of having to pay 
for something which he did not want. This would be a forced exchange and would violate the 
autonomy principle. Hence, the defendant must have the option of simply returning the goods. 
This is why the law adopts the fault-based conversion model for non-money returnable 
assets/rights. 
The final model consists of the award of a proprietary rather than a personal remedy. It 
could, for example, be the imposition of a trust on the assets so transferred. Instances where the 
law adopts that solution are rarer and primarily fault-based. This makes sense as such a solution 
will affect third parties. It is, therefore, important to ensure that the imposition of a trust does not 
contradict the reasons why the law said title passed in the first place. Otherwise, the law would be 
contradicting itself. It is therefore right that proprietary remedies to unjust enrichment situations 
arising from defective transfer be the exception. 
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2. Category A2: Conditional transfer of money/goods 
 
C transfers an asset to D on the condition that event E occurs. E does not happen. To analyse this 
situation we must again ask the two questions: (i) why is it a situation of unjust enrichment and (ii) 
how should the law respond to it? 
 To the first question one might be tempted to give the same answer as above: the intention 
to transfer is defective because it was qualified and the qualification failed,67 so morally the asset 
still belongs to the claimant and so the situation is one of unjust enrichment. However, this 
reasoning does not account for the fact that the condition for the transfer must be shared by both 
parties in order to establish a total failure of basis.68 With mistake, there is no requirement that the 
factual understanding of the claimant be communicated to the recipient before one can say that 
the transfer is defective. Since, the Property Principle underpins recovery for mistaken transfers of 
things, this means that the Property Principle does not require that the basis of the transfer be joint. 
Furthermore, even if it were said that moral ownership was retained even when the condition was 
uncommunicated, the case for the law’s protection of that moral entitlement would be much 
weaker. This is because the claimant could have protected himself – by just communicating the 
condition – much more easily than in the mistake cases. In addition, the reduction of transaction 
costs does not require that claimants should be able make conditional transfer without 
communicating the condition. So, if ihe principle underpinning recovery for conditional transfers 
is not the property principle, then what is it? 
 In Chapter 5 Section IV.B, the ‘agreement to return’ explanation for the recovery of 
conditional transfers was considered. According to that explanation, by agreeing that the transfer 
of the asset was conditional, the parties actually, if implicitly, agreed to return it should the 
condition fail. It was argued that this was only a plausible explanation in cases where there was no 
duty on the defendant to the event which is the condition of the transfer (‘Event E’). But in cases 
where the defendant was himself under a duty to bring about event E, such reasoning was 
considered to be fictitious. Instead, it was argued that the better explanation was that a duty to 
return the asset only arises if the duty to bring about event E was no longer present. This is because, 
where there is no longer a duty to bring about event E, a duty to return the asset becomes necessary 
to protect the fact that the transfer was conditional.69 The need for a duty to return to arise can be 
explained in terms of the Benefit-Burden Principle. By virtue of the fact that the basis was joint the 
                                                 
67 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 1985) 219–21. 
68 Spaul v Spaul [2014] EWCA 679 [46]; Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429 (CA) 442 (Brown LJ); C Mitchell, P Mitchell 
and S Watterson, Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) paras 13–02. 
69 Chapter 5 Section IV.B. 
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defendant accepted that the benefit (i.e. the asset being transferred) was his but with an attached 
burden (his duty to procure event E). If he were allowed to keep the benefit without bearing the 
burden, this would breach the Benefit-Burden Principle. Hence, when the condition is not met we 
have a situation of unjust enrichment. It is a situation of unjust enrichment because the defendant 
obtained a benefit in breach of the benefit-burden principle. 
 How does the law respond to this situation? The primary response is the one which the 
parties agreed: putting the defendant under a duty to perform E. But if this is no longer possible 
(for example, because the contract under which the duty arose has been terminated) then another 
response is to require the defendant to give back the benefit in question. For money, this can simply 
be done by creating a debt for that sum, and, at least in commercial contexts, that remedy is not 
proprietary.70 For goods, it would be a duty to return the asset in question or perhaps a duty to pay 
the value thereof. The former would be more consistent with the principle underpinning recovery 
but, at least in commercial contexts or where the good is not unique, the court might prefer a duty 
to pay the value. The cases are not explicit on this point but in the cases concerning the return of 
presents in anticipation of marriage, there was a duty to return the actual presents rather than 
merely the value thereof. The cases, did not, however, address whether there was legal or equitable 
title in the presents.71 However, given the rejection of proprietary relief in money cases it would 
generally be inappropriate to give proprietary relief.  
 
3. Category A3: Improvements/unlocking assets 
 
In this scenario we are concerned with a claimant involuntarily improving or unlocking an asset 
belonging to the defendant in circumstances where the surplus caused by the 
improvement/unlocking becomes separable from the asset in question. For example, in a Greenwood 
v Bennett type of case, the defendant has the option to retain the surplus or give it up. If the 
defendant chooses to retain the surplus then the benefit-burden principle becomes engaged. This 
is because the defendant would then choose to keep the benefit of something without bearing the 
burden thereof. This makes it a situation of unjust enrichment. The law responds to such a situation 
by giving the defendant an option. The defendant can either return the surplus value or the 
defendant can opt to keep the surplus value but must then bear the burden thereof (i.e. reimbursing 
the cost of the improvements/unlocking). In that way the law responds to such a situation in a 
manner very similar to that concerning defective transfer of goods (where the defendant has the 
                                                 
70 Angove’s Pty Ltd v Bailey [2016] UKSC 47, [2016] 1 WLR 3179 [30] (Lord Sumption). 
71 See, on engagement rings, Jacobs v Davis [1917] 2 KB 532 (KBD); Cohen v Sellar [1926] 1 KB 536 (KBD). 
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option of returning the goods or paying up the value thereof). It, therefore, makes sense to put 
such cases in the same analytical category as goods, even though the reason why the situation is an 
unjust enrichment is slightly different. 
 
H. Category B: Shifting the burden 
 
In the category of cases that we will consider in this section, the situation of unjust enrichment 
arises because the party enjoying the benefit is not bearing the burden. But the nature of the benefit 
is such that it cannot be returned. So, the law responds by shifting the burden so that it is borne 
by the one who had the benefit. This way the Benefit -Burden Principle is respected and so there 
is no unjust enrichment. 
 Within this category there are two types of situations. In the first one the burden consists 
of cash that has already been spent. Here shifting the burden can be achieved by reimbursing the 
party who spent the money. In the second category, the burden consists not of cash being spent 
but of work being done. In such a case the law shifts the burden by remunerating the one who did 
the work. It is possible to have situations that are hybrids of those two.  
 
1. Category B1: Reimbursement of costs 
 
In those cases the law operates by shifting a loss from one party to another. It does so to correct 
an imbalance whereby a benefit is enjoyed by one but the associated burden is borne by another. 
The most typical situation is the discharge of the debt of another. So, if D owes £10k to X and C 
non-officiously discharges that debt, then D receives the benefit of the discharge but C bears the 
burden. This breaches the benefit-burden principle and so there is a situation of unjust enrichment. 
The law remedies that situation by creating a debt between C and D. This ensures that the burden 
is shifted from C to D. This way D has both the benefit and the associated burden and so, there is 
no breach of the benefit-burden principle and therefore no situation of unjust enrichment. The 
same reasoning applies in situations where the non-monetary obligations of another are discharged. 
As was argued in Chapter 4 Section II.B, with the exception of joint obligations, recovery is only 
granted when D’s duty to perform is converted into a secondary duty to pay damages. C, by 
avoiding this liability for D, ensures that D gets the benefit (of not being liable) whilst C bears the 
burden thereof.  
 The same thing is going on in cases where the bailee is able to recover for the expenses of 
the bailor. Here the bailee bore a burden which the bailor benefitted from. By implying a duty to 
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reimburse, the law shifts the burden to the bailee and, therefore, restores the equilibrium. The same 
occurs with General Average. The General Average act results in an uneven distribution of benefits 
and burdens. Some cargo owners have all the benefit (in the form of their cargo being saved) whilst 
others have all the burdens (in the form of having lost all their cargo). With General Average the 
law shifts the burdens to ensure an even distribution of benefits and burdens. 
 
 
2. Category B2: Remunerating the work 
 
If C does work for D under an entire obligation and, before completion, D commits a repudiatory 
breach then C is entitled to treat the contract as terminated and to sue for a quantum meruit. 
However, if C was unable to complete the work due to his own fault then C cannot recover 
anything. How is such a type of case explicable in terms of unjust enrichment? As we saw in 
Chapter 5 Section III.A, the reasoning of the courts in such cases is that, by requesting that the 
work be done, the Benefit-Burden Principle (the benefit being the work) is engaged. However, the 
contract between the parties – which provides that the work must be completed before 
remuneration is due – should be respected and so in the case where C abandons the work there is 
no recovery. But where D breaches the contract the law prevents him from relying on the contract 
in order to avoid liability under the benefit-burden principle. 
 So, in the end, we reach a position whereby D has received a benefit but not borne the 
burden thereof. This is a situation of unjust enrichment. The benefit being of a nature that cannot 
be returned, the only way of curing the situation is by making D bear the burden thereof. So, the 
law requires D to pay C for the reasonable value of the work done. 
 In Chapter 2 Section III.A it was argued that the Birksian unjust enrichment framework 
should not apply to services because accommodating services requires an implausibly wide 
definition of ‘enrichment’. Does that objection not also apply here? After all, if, as was argued in 
Chapter 2 Section III.A, it is implausible to say that there was an enrichment in Planché v Colbourn72 
then why is it not the case here as well? 
 There are two responses to this objection. First, under the Birksian unjust enrichment 
scheme, the response that the law takes is to award restitution of the value of the enrichment. 
Hence, it is important to have a well-defined account of what an enrichment is and how it should 
be valued. But, under the scheme proposed here, the enrichment does not establish what the law’s 
response should be. Instead, all it serves to say is that the situation is one which is defective and 
                                                 
72 Planché v Colbourn (1831) 8 Bing 14, 131 ER 305. 
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which the law should correct. Indeed, the response taken by the law in services cases (unlike money 
and goods) is not to award restitution of the enrichment. Rather, the response is to make the 
defendant bear the burden of the provision of the service. Hence, there is no need for a concrete 
definition of enrichment. To put it another way, the classification of something as ‘enrichment’ 
does not do any normative work. It serves to put various situations within a category of scenarios 
which are defective. But the normative work about why they are defective and how the law should 
cure the defect is not done by the classification in terms of ‘unjust enrichment’. By contrast, under 
Birks’s generic conception, whether something amounts to an enrichment or not will determine 
whether the courts will grant recovery. So, given that ‘enrichment’ has normative importance, it is 
vital to have a concrete definition of ‘enrichment’. But that is not the case here.  
 Nor is the need to show ‘receipt’ important in service cases. Showing ‘receipt’ is important 
in cases where the Property Principle does the work. This is because the Property Principle requires 
that something be received before the Principle can bite. But here it is the Benefit-Burden principle 
which does the work. For such a principle to be triggered all that is needed is that D requested or 
freely accepted something; not that he received it. Hence, the criticism of Birks’s theory – that it 
needs an implausibly wide definition of ‘receipt’ and ‘enrichment’ – do not apply here. 
 
I. Category C: Fixing the transaction 
 
In these cases a transaction does not go as planned so that someone ends up with a benefit without 
bearing the associated burdens when, in fact, the plan was for the burdens to also go with the 
benefit. Here the law intervenes by fixing the transaction so that the person who has the benefit 
ends up bearing the burden.  
 This is illustrated by Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus.73 The parents of Melissa Menelaou intended 
to purchase a house for their daughter. To do so they would sell their house on which the Bank of 
Cyprus had a charge. They would then use the money to purchase the house and the Bank of 
Cyprus would acquire a new charge on the new flat. Due to the negligence of the solicitors the new 
charge was not executed. Hence, Melissa got the flat without the encumbrance of the charge. A 
majority of the Supreme Court held that this was unjust enrichment (in the Birksian sense) and 
that, as a remedy, the Bank of Cyprus would acquire a charge over the property.74 
                                                 
73 Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus Plc [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176. 
74 The precise mechanism by which it did so was that the Bank would be subrogated to the unpaid vendor’s lien. 
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 As Cutts points out, this amount to ‘fixing a transaction, not undoing one.’75 But why was 
this situation one of unjust enrichment? In Menelaou, Melissa received a benefit – the house – 
without the burden – the charge – that was meant to come with it. This, therefore, is a situation of 
unjust enrichment. In this case the law cures the unjust enrichment not by reversing the transaction, 
nor by shifting the financial loss from the Bank to Melissa, but rather by fixing the transaction so 
that the intended burden is imposed on Melissa. There is, however, one difficulty. The benefit and 
the burden were not intrinsically tied to each other. They were tied because the parties wanted 
them to be tied. This is perfectly legitimate, but the difficulty is that there is no evidence that Melissa 
was a party to this transaction: it was between the bank and her parents. So, why should her burden 
be considered tied to the benefit? It should not have been. This is not to say that the case is wrongly 
decided. If, as Lord Carnwarth – in the minority – held, the bank had an equitable interest in the 
purchase money, then one can say that the benefit did have a burden tied to it. But, if that is the 
case, the doctrinal reasoning is then a simple exercising of tracing and there is no need to invoke 
unjust enrichment: it becomes superfluous. Be that as it may, one can see how the case is explicable 
in terms of benefit-burden.  
  
                                                 
75 T Cutts, ‘Modern Money Had and Received’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 23. 
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V. WHAT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK SHOULD THE 
LAW ADOPT? 
 
If the above argument is correct, Birks was mistaken when he considered that all instances of unjust 
enrichment could be analysed under a scheme based on generalising from the recovery of mistaken 
payments. There is, contrary to what Birks thought, not much in common between the recovery 
of mistaken payment and quantum meruit. The law must adopt an analytical scheme which reflects 
that. 
 
J. Cutting down the scope of the formula 
 
The Birksian structure is perfectly acceptable for cases falling with in category A above. That is 
cases where the law responds to the fact that the defendant received a benefit which they ought 
not to have received. In such a case the response of the law is either to reverse the transaction or 
to make the defendant pay for having failed to do so (as it does with the goods and improvements 
cases). Such cases can properly be analysed under the Birksian framework. Indeed, the scheme was 
primarily formulated with those cases in mind. 
 For the other cases, using the Birksian formula is unhelpful and leads to more confusion. 
This is because the focus of the law in category B is not actually to reverse a transaction. Nor is it 
about making the defendant give back a benefit. Rather it consists of shifting a burden from one 
party to another so as to reach an equilibrium between them. The focus is not on the defendant’s 
gain, but it is on the claimant’s loss.  
 For the final category of cases, the Birksian framework is also inappropriate because there 
the law does not seek to reverse a transaction but instead seeks to fix it. So, again there is no 
question of returning a benefit. Nor does the law seek to make the defendant pay. Rather it seeks 
to fix the transaction so that it operates as was intended. This is quite different from what the 
Birksian structure seeks to do. 
 So, if the Birksian formula cannot be used in categories B and C, what should we use 
instead? As argued in Chapter 4, category B1 does not pose much of a problem. This is because, 
the law already recognises that such cases are governed by a distinct analytical structure (as with, 
for example, recoupment and contribution) or are subsumed within other legal relationships (for 
example, the ability of the bailee to recover his expenses forms part of the law of bailment). It is 
true that many unjust enrichment scholars argue that such cases should be subsumed within the 
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Birksian formula,76 but, whilst the courts have acknowledged that such cases are based on unjust 
enrichment, they have not said that the Birksian formula should be applied to such cases.77 
Nonetheless, in ITC Lord Reed’s inclusion of discharge of the debts of another within the scope 
of the ‘at the expense of’ requirement, suggests that in future cases of recoupment and contribution 
might be analysed within the Birksian formula. This must be resisted. Whilst it is undoubtedly true 
that recovery in those cases seeks to cure a situation of unjust enrichment (to use the term in the 
wide, moral sense), it is not appropriate to apply the Birksian formula to such cases. Instead, they 
must retain their distinct analytical structure. 
 Category B2, that is services, is unfortunately more complicated. Here it has been accepted 
by the courts that such service cases must be analysed using the Birksian formula.78 It is, therefore, 
necessary to return to the pre-Birksian analytical structure relating to services. As argued in Chapter 
5 this requires showing that work has been done by the claimant at the request79 of the defendant. 
If there is no agreement governing the relationship already, the law will infer one from the 
claimant’s conduct and so there will be an obligation to pay the reasonable value of the service. If 
there is already an agreement, the law will not award the reasonable sum unless the agreement has 
been terminated or frustrated. This is a very simple scheme; one that is far simpler than applying 
the unjust enrichment formula to such situations. 
 The main remedy in Category C cases is proprietary subrogation. This forms a more general 
part of Equity’s role in fixing transactions that do not go as planned. There are already quite detailed 
equitable rules governing such cases. There is no need to attempt to analyse them in terms of the 
unjust enrichment formula. Indeed, Menelaou is a good illustration of why the unjust enrichment 
analysis is redundant and unhelpful. It is redundant because equitable subrogation was able to do 
the work. But it is also not helpful because unjust enrichment had to be stretched in order to 
accommodate this case. A wide reading of ‘at the expense of’ was required.80 Furthermore, the 
analysis at the unjust factors stage was also unpersuasive. The bank thought that it would be granted 
a charge over the new flat, but this related to a future fact and so could not be a mistake.81 Nor 
                                                 
76 E.g. in the case of recoupment but not contribution: G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2015) 252. 
77 With recoupment: Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Bros [1937] 1 KB 534 (EWCA) 545 (Lord Wright 
MR). With contribution: Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366, 76 (Lord Hobhouse). 
With agency of necessity/bailment: ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petroleo Brasileiro SA (No 2) [2012] UKSC 17, [2012] 2 AC 164. 
78 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752; Benedetti v Sawiris (n 60). 
79 The request has to be real, but it can be inferred rather than express. So, cases of free acceptance would count. 
80 With respect to Lord Reed, his attempt to explain Menelaou within the narrow rule laid down in Investment Trust 
Companies was not very persuasive: Investment Trust Companies (n 8) [63]-[66]. 
81 There is no recovery in mistake if the false belief relates to something in the future; in such a case it is a 
misprediction: Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108 [109] (Lord Walker). Notice also the similarities between 
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would failure of consideration have helped as there was no evidence that Melissa had accepted that 
a condition of her obtaining the new flat was that the bank would have a charge on it. So, in order 
to analyse this case under the rubric of unjust enrichment, the formula had to be artificially 
stretched. By contrast, Lord Carnwath’s analysis in terms of subrogation to the unpaid vendor’s 
lien did not require such stretching. So, as with Category B1, with Category C it is best to let Equity 
do its thing rather than seek to analyse this area in terms of the unjust enrichment formula.82 
 
K. Simplifying the unjust enrichment formula 
 
Given that the unjust enrichment formula will have to be stretched to incorporate many cases 
which do not belong in it, if the above argument is accepted it follows that there is scope for 
simplifying the formula. 
 The cases to which the formula would properly apply, Category A, are all instances where 
the defendant has received something which he should not have had and which he ought to return. 
It follows that the test of enrichment should therefore focus on identifying this. Hence, enrichment 
will be established in the following instances: (i) D has received money, (ii) D has received a benefit 
which has now been realised in money (or which can very easily be realised in money), (iii) D has 
received an asset/right/chose in action which is readily returnable coupled with an unreasonable 
refusal to make it available for return. ‘At the expense of’ is established using the ‘direct dealing’83 
test which Lord Reed adopted in Investment Trust Companies but without the exception he created 
for discharge of debts. Hence, this means that D must have obtained the benefit following a direct 
transaction with C or following C having dealt directly with D’s assets (for example by improving 
one of D’s assets). The ‘unjust factor’ stage will remain focused on identifying a defect in the 
transaction and there is no need to rely on ‘special’ policy based unjust factors which do not identify 
a defect (such as secondary liability). No change is required at the defences stage. 
                                                 
the ‘mistake’ in Menelaou and that in Dextra Bank, which was rightly classified as a misprediction: ‘The difficulty with 
this proposition is that this does not appear to have been a mistake as to a specific fact, like for example a mistake as 
to the identity of the defendant, but rather a misprediction as to the nature of the transaction which would come into 
existence when the Dextra cheque was delivered to the BOJ’: Dextra Bank & Trust Company Limited v Bank of Jamaica 
[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 (PC) [29] (Lords Bingham and Goff). 
82 G Virgo, ‘Restitution and Unjust Enrichment in the Supreme Court: Reflections on Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd v 
Menelaou’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 10/2016 (2016) 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2724024> accessed 31 May 2018. 
83 Investment Trust Companies (n 8) [46] (Lord Reed). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Given the belief that ‘unjust enrichment’ was just an excuse for ‘palm tree justice’ it is 
understandable that Birks opted for a descriptive ‘generic conception’ rather than a prescriptive 
‘principle against unjust enrichment.’ This, however, amounted to a change of direction from the 
way the law and its understanding had been developing. Whilst this change undoubtedly had some 
benefits it also had a number of drawbacks, chief of which was the failure to enquire into the 
reasons why certain situations were considered to be unjust enrichments. This lead Birks and his 
followers to think that the unjust formula could be used to analyse all cases of unjust enrichment 
(in the non-technical sense). But this was not true. Each situation amounted to an unjust 
enrichment for different reasons and the response of the law to each varied. Birks’s formula was 
designed for transfers of benefit that had gone wrong because they were not fully intended. But 
such cases are quite different from the ability of a contractor to recover the reasonable value of his 
work when the employer has prevented him from completing the work. Yet, Birks and his followers 
insisted that all such cases could just fit within the single formula. This has required stretching that 
formula to the point that some of its terms became meaningless. It did not provide the clarity of 
analysis that it was intended to provide.  
 A different approach is needed. But taking that approach requires doing that which Birks 
had not been willing to do: to identify the reasons why the law considered certain situations to be 
unjust enrichments. It is only then that a proper structure for the subject can be identified. This 
Thesis has identified two key principles – the Property and Benefit-Burden Principles – which. 
When combined with a limiting principle, the Autonomy Principle, provide reasons why certain 
situations are considered to be defective. Those defects have a common genus and can therefore 
all be characterised as situations of unjust enrichment. But this, crucially, does not mean that the 
reasons why they are unjust enrichments are the same. Nor does it mean that the responses the law 
takes to such situations are the same. There are variations and it is therefore not appropriate to 
apply the Birksian formula to all of them. Instead the type of structure, based on broad groupings 
in terms of situations and responses, that was developing prior to Birks’s intervention is the better 
one. That is not to say that Birks’s work was entirely wrong. For the cases concerning the return 
of a benefit (i.e. money or assets) which D obtained as a result of a defective transaction, the 
Birksian structure is very helpful and should be retained. But what must be avoided is the 
temptation to explain all the other areas in those terms. 
 Therefore, unjust enrichment is more complex and wider than Birks had suggested in 1985. 
This breadth and complexity means that not everything can be analysed within the formula which 
Birks developed. This does not mean that unjust enrichment is not a useful concept. Recovery is 
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awarded in a wide array of cases because of the principle against unjust enrichment. But this does 
not mean that every such case can be analysed using Birks’s conception. Conversely, this does not 
mean that the formula is not useful. On the contrary it is an important analytical tool. But it must 
not be stretched. Otherwise, it will lose its utility. 
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